Martinez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., Case No. 8:10-CV-8-T-27EAJ
| Decision Date | 17 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:10-CV-8-T-27EAJ |
| Parties | ALBERTO HUGO MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, an inmate in a Florida penal institution proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("petition") challenging convictions for driving while license revoked, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed firearm, and resisting an officer without violence entered in 2005 by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, Polk County, Florida (Dkt. 1). Respondent filed a response to the petition (Dkt. 9). Petitioner filed a reply to the response (Dkt. 12).
Respondent asserts no challenge to the petition's timeliness. The matter is now before the Court for consideration of Petitioner's claims. An evidentiary hearing is not required for the disposition of this matter. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 8(a) (2012).
Following a jury trial on February 7, 2005, the jury found Petitioner guilty of driving while license revoked, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, carrying a concealed firearm, andresisting an officer without violence (Respondent's Appx. A, Ex. 1, Vol. I at 40-41). Petitioner was sentenced to 10 years in prison on the carrying a concealed firearm conviction, and 3 years in prison on both the driving while license revoked conviction and the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction, with each sentence to run concurrently (Id. at 68-75).1 The appellate court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences on March 10, 2006 (Id. at Ex. 2); Martinez v. State, 923 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) [table].
On October 30, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post Conviction Relief pursuant to Rule 3.850, Fla. R. Crim. P. ("Rule 3.850 motion") in which he raised 5 ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims (Respondent's Appx. B, Vol. I, Ex. 1). On January 4, 2007, the post conviction court denied grounds 1 and 3, and ordered the State to respond to the remaining three grounds (Id. at Ex. 6). The State filed a response (Id. at Ex. 7). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and to supplement ground 5 (Id. at Ex. 8). On January 30, 2007, the post conviction court again denied grounds 1 and 3, and ordered the State to respond to grounds 2, 4, and amended ground 5 (Id. at Ex. 9). The State filed a response (Id. at Ex. 10). On November 3, 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held on grounds 2, 4, and amended ground 5 (Respondent's Appx. B, Vol. II, Ex. 12). Following the evidentiary hearing, the post conviction court denied the remaining three claims on December 11, 2008 (Id. at Ex. 2). On December 9, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the Rule 3.850 motion (Id. at Ex. 4); Martinez v. State, 23 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) [table].
Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition in this Court on December 23, 2009 (Dkt. 1).2 Thepetition raises the following five ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), this Court's review of the state court's factual findings is highly deferential. Those findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, the state courts' resolutions of issues of law-including constitutional issues-must be accepted unless they are found to be "contrary to" clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States or involved an "unreasonable application" of such precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). It is not enough that the federal courts believe that the statecourt was wrong; it must be demonstrated that the state court decision was "objectively unreasonable." Id. Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2002).
To have a facially valid claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires Petitioner to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and "there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. However, if a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the court need not make a ruling on the performance component. Id. at 697.
"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). "Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). As the Richter Court explained:
The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both "highly deferential," and when the two apply in tandem, review is "doubly" so. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.
Id. (citations omitted).
A § 2254 application cannot be granted unless a petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; . . ." 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A); Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998). In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunityto act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also, Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003)("A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannot raise a federal constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the state courts.") (quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001)); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) () (citation omitted).
Under the procedural default doctrine, "if the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is applicable." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). "The doctrine of procedural default was developed as a means of ensuring that federal habeas petitioners first seek relief in accordance with established state procedures." Henderson, 353 F.3d at 891 (quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d at 1313).
Pre-AEDPA decisions from the Supreme Court establish the framework governing procedural default in federal habeas cases. A procedural default will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, Petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the default. "Cause" ordinarily requires Petitioner to demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in the state court. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892; Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995).
To show "prejudice," Petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his factual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). Petitioner must show that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
Second, Petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, without a showing of cause or prejudice, if review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. This exception is only available "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent." Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception concerns a petitioner's "actual" innocence rather than his "legal" innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)). To meet this standard, a petitioner must "show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" of the...
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