Martinez v. Zavaras
| Decision Date | 22 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-cv-02421-BNB |
| Parties | RAYMOND MARTINEZ, Applicant, v. ARISTEDES ZAVARAS, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections, and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter is before me on Applicant Raymond Martinez's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Application") [#1]1 Respondents answered the Application (Docket No. 14) and Applicant filed a traverse (Docket No. 24). As Applicant is proceeding pro se, I must construe his pleadings liberally and hold him to a "less stringent standard." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). After reviewing the pertinent portions of the record in this case including the Application, the answer, the traverse, and the state court record, I conclude that the Application should be denied.
The state appellate court summarized the facts leading to Applicant's conviction as follows:
According to the People's evidence, defendant was wanted on a warrant for escape. Defendant emerged from a house police officers were watching, and the officers approached him. During the ensuing chase, defendant displayed a weapon, and he was shot by an officer. A cocaine pipe, 8.5 ounces of cocaine, and $3,698.28 in cash were found on his person.
People v. Martinez, 03CA1307 at 2 (Colo. App. Sept. 15, 2005) (unpublished opinion) .
On May 23, 2003, Applicant was found guilty by a jury of first degree assault on a peace officer, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of cocaine in Case No. 02CR4290 in the District Court of Denver County, Colorado. On May 24, 2003, after a bench trial, Applicant was convicted of four habitual criminal counts. The state trial court sentenced him to two concurrent 64-year terms for the assault and the intent to distribute convictions and to a 24-year term for the possession conviction.
Applicant filed a direct appeal of his conviction to the Colorado Court of Appeals. On September 15, 2005, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case with directions for the trial court to vacate the conviction and sentence for possession of a controlled substance. See People v. Martinez, 03CA1307 (Colo. App. Sept. 15, 2005) (unpublished opinion). Applicant petitioned for certiorari review, which the Colorado Supreme Court denied on January 17, 2006.
On February 22, 2006, the trial court vacated Applicant's conviction and 24-year sentence for possession, and issued an amended mittimus.
On June 1, 2006, Applicant filed a post-conviction motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the trial court denied on July 20, 2006. Applicant did not file an appeal.
On November 22, 2006, Applicant filed a second motion for post-conviction relief, which the trial court denied on November 14, 2007. Applicant appealed the decision, and his appeal was dismissed by the appellate court on March 20, 2009, for Applicant's failure to file an opening brief.
On October 13, 2009, Applicant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in this court, asserting five claims for relief: (1) that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court denied his requests to dismiss the public defender and appoint private counsel; (2) that he was entitled to a jury trial on the habitual criminal counts; (3) that he was unfairly prejudiced by admission of a photograph of a digital scale and by having to wear a taser unit at trial; (4) that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated because he was convicted and sentenced for both the greater offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and the lesser offense of possession of cocaine; and (5) that his constitutional rights were violated because he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
On October 15, 2009, United States magistrate judge Boyd N. Boland ordered the Respondents to file a pre-answer response limited to addressing the issues of timeliness and/or exhaustion of state court remedies. Respondents filed their pre-answer response on October 28, 2009. In the pre-answer response, Respondents argued that Applicant had failed to exhaust several of his claims in state court, and that these claims were procedurally defaulted. After receiving an extension of time, Applicant filed a reply on December 9, 2009.
On February 17, 2010, the Honorable Zita L. Weinshienk, a Senior United States District Judge, entered an order dismissing Applicant's fourth claim as moot and his fifth claim as procedurally defaulted. Nonetheless, finding that Applicant's remaining claims (Claims One, Two and Three) had been exhausted in the state courts, she ordered the claims drawn to a district judge and to a magistrate judge.
In the course of reviewing state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus proceedings, a federal court does not sit as a super-state appellate court. See Estelle v. Mcguire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The exhaustion of state remedies requirement in federal habeas cases dictates that a state prisoner must "give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Accordingly, based on denial of certiorari review by the Colorado Supreme Court in Applicant's case, habeas review in this Court is concerned with the proceeding in the Colorado Court of Appeals which was the final substantive proceeding in the state appellate review process.
Because Applicant filed his Petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA"), that statute governs the Court's review. Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1158 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 n. 1 (10th Cir.1999)). Under the AEDPA, a district court may only consider a habeas petition when the Applicant argues that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The grounds for granting a writ of habeas corpus are very limited: "a writ of habeas corpus... shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1309 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Federal law if it "'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in reme Court cases' or if it 'confronts a set offacts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court and nevertheless arrives at a different result from reme Court precedent.'" Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Federal law when "'the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the Applicant's case.'" Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2005) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10, 412). A "'federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.'" Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). Finally, when analyzing a petition, all determinations of factual issues by the state court are presumed to be correct and the Applicant has the "burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "[W]hether a state court's decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record [that court] had before it." Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 651-52 (2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
Claims One, Two and Three are the only claims remaining at issue in this action.
In his first claim, Applicant asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court denied his requests to dismiss the public defender and appoint private counsel. Applicant asserts that he had a conflict of interest with the public defender, andthey experienced a complete breakdown in communication, but the trial court failed to make the "requisite inquiries" into these allegations. Application at 15-18. In addressing this claim, the appellate court concluded:
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