Martinka v. Hoffmann

• Decision Date: 26 February 1943
• Docket Number: No. 33352.,33352.
• Citation: 9 N.W.2d 13,214 Minn. 346
• Parties: MARTINKA v. HOFFMANN, Com'r of Highways.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

9 N.W.2d 13

214 Minn. 346

MARTINKA v. HOFFMANN, Com'r of Highways.

No. 33352.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 26, 1943.

Appeal from District Court, Brown County; Albert H. Enersen and A. B. Gislason, Judges.

Proceeding by William L. Martinka against M. J. Hoffmann, Commissioner of Highways, for revocation of an order canceling and revoking petitioner's automobile driver's license and reinstatement of the license. From an order directing the commissioner to revoke his order and reissue the license, he appeals.

Reversed.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Arthur Christofferson, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Joseph J. Bright, Sp. Counsel, of St. Paul, for appellant.

Albert Pfaender, of New Ulm, for respondent.

YOUNGDAHL, Justice.

This is an appeal by M. J. Hoffmann from an order of the district court directing him as commissioner of highways to revoke his order cancelling and revoking the driver's license of William L. Martinka, the petitioner herein, and to reissue the license to him.

On September 25, 1941, petitioner was convicted in the municipal court of Springfield of the offense of driving and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of an ordinance of that city and was sentenced to pay a fine of $50. He appealed to the district court, where he was convicted on December 22, 1941, of the same offense. He was sentenced to pay, and paid, a fine of $50. This was his first conviction for such an offense, and he had not theretofore been convicted of violating any other traffic regulation or law.

Upon being notified of this conviction, the commissioner revoked petitioner's driver's license. On April 22, 1942, petitioner filed his petition, pursuant to Minn.St.1941 § 171.19, Mason St.1940 Supp. § 2720-145d, for an order directing the commissioner to revoke his order and reinstate the license. Upon a hearing on the petition, the court ordered the commissioner to revoke his order and reinstate the license. This appeal followed.

1. The sole question presented by this appeal is whether petitioner's driver's license was subject to revocation by the commissioner upon a first conviction of drunken driving, no recommendation being made therefor by the court before which the conviction was had. A determination of this issue necessitates a consideration of L.1939, c. 401, § 17, Minn.St.1941, § 171.17, Mason St.1940 Supp. § 2720-145b; L.1941, c. 552, § 1, Minn.St.1941, § 169.12, Mason St.1941 Supp. § 2720-176; and L.1941, c. 517, § 1, Minn.St.1941, § 171.04, Mason St. 1941 Supp. § 2720-144a, together with other provisions of the drivers' license act, the highway traffic regulation act, and the safety responsibility act as they relate to the question of revocation and suspension of drivers' licenses.

The drivers' license law had its inception in L.1933, c. 352. Section 10(a) (2) thereof, or Minn.St.1941, § 171.17(2), Mason St. 1940 Supp. § 2720-145b(a) (2), provided that the commissioner should forthwith revoke a driver's license upon a conviction of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At the same session of the legislature, the safety responsibility act was passed. L.1933, c. 351. Section 2(f) of this act, or Minn.St. 1941, § 170.02(6), Mason St.1940 Supp. § 2720-102(f), provided, in substance, that upon a conviction of driving while intoxicated a driver's license should be revoked and not renewed until the driver had given proof of his ability to respond in damages. From 1933 until 1939 the commissioner of highways was required to revoke a driver's license upon a first conviction of drunken driving. In 1939, by L.1939, c. 401, which repealed L.1933, c. 352 (the drivers' license law), the legislature reenacted certain provisions as to licensing, and again, in § 17 thereof, provided for the revocation of a driver's license on a conviction of drunken driving. At the same session there was also passed L.1939, c. 430 (the highway traffic regulation act). Section 4 of this act (Mason St.1940 Supp. § 2720-176) made it unlawful for a person to drive an automobile while intoxicated and provided that upon a first conviction the commissioner should revoke the driver's license upon a recommendation of the court before which the conviction was had. Upon a second conviction, the license was to be revoked without regard to a recommendation of the court.

The inconsistency and ambiguity of these two sections of the law are immediately apparent. Under the 1939 drivers' license law (L.1939, c. 401, § 17[2]), the commissioner was required to revoke without regard to a recommendation of the court on first conviction of drunken driving. Under the highway traffic regulation act (L.1939, c. 430, § 4[b]), revocation could be had only upon recommendation of the court upon a first conviction. This ambiguity precipitated the case of Ausman v. Hoffmann, 208 Minn. 13, 292 N.W. 421. There the commissioner contended that because L. 1939, c. 401, was passed later than c. 430, although on the same day, its provisions should control; but this court held that, although the laws were seemingly inconsistent, it was of the opinion that the legislature was unaware of the existence of such a conflict, and it applied the rule laid down in Halverson v. Elsberg, 202 Minn. 232, 233, 277 N.W. 535, that "two acts passed, approved, and effective the same day, are to stand together and be harmonized," and, further, that the license of a driver convicted on first offense of driving an automobile while intoxicated could be revoked only upon a recommendation therefor by the court before which the conviction was had.

In 1941, at the first session of the legislature after the Ausman case, the matter of revocation of drivers' licenses for drunken driving was again considered, for the very apparent purpose of clarifying the question as to the authority of the commissioner to revoke on first conviction without a recommendation of the court. At that session, L.1941, c. 552 and c. 517, came into being and were passed on the same day. Section 1 of c. 552, or Minn.St.1941, § 169.12, Mason St.1941 Supp. § 2720-176, amended the highway traffic regulation act and eliminated the provision requiring a recommendation of revocation by the court on a first conviction of driving while intoxicated. After the penalty clause there was added the provision that, upon a second offense, "his license to drive shall be revoked for not less than 90 days." L.1941, c. 517, § 1, Minn.St.1941, § 171.04, Mason St.1941 Supp. § 2720-144a, amended the drivers' license law. This amendment, which was obviously for the purpose of revising that portion of the drivers' license law to conform to L.1941, c. 552, § 1, provided that a license once revoked should not be reissued by the "department" (the commissioner) except upon furnishing proof of financial responsibility in the same manner as provided by the safety responsibility act, and if otherwise qualified. The phrase "if otherwise qualified," appearing in subd. (3) of § 1 of c. 517, clearly has reference to the second conviction of drunken driving, in which case the license to drive shall not be reissued in any event for at least 90 days, even though proof of financial responsibility is furnished. These provisions of the statutes indicate a clear intention on the part of the legislature to change the then existing law so as to eliminate the ambiguity discussed in the Ausman case and give the commissioner authority to revoke a license on a first conviction of drunken driving without the recommendation of the court.

2. L.1941, c. 552, § 1, after providing that Mason St.1940 Supp. § 2720-176, L.1939, c. 430, § 4, "is hereby amended to read as follows," then wholly omits certain provisions, including the requirement of recommendation by the court before a license could be revoked on a first conviction of drunken driving. This operated to repeal all the provisions not embraced in the amendment. 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supplements § 8928, and cases there cited. When an amendatory act is a substitute for the original statute, it repeals those portions of the prior statute which it omits. Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas C. & S. Co., 147 Minn. 350, 180 N.W. 229; St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. Broulette, 65 Minn. 367, 67 N.W. 1010; Shadewald v. Phillips, 72 Minn. 520, 75 N.W. 717; State ex rel. Maryland Cas. Co. v. District Court, 134 Minn. 131, 158 N.W. 798.

Here the provisions so repealed were those appearing as L.1939, c. 430, § 4(b), Mason St.1940 Supp. § 2720-176, to-wit:

"Upon a first conviction of any person hereunder the commissioner shall revoke his driver's license when and as such revocation is recommended by the court before which such conviction was had.

"Upon a second or subsequent conviction of any person under this section, the commissioner shall revoke his driver's license.

"Any person whose driver's license has been revoked, refused, suspended or cancelled may file a petition for a hearing in the matter in the District Court in the county wherein such person is residing, for the purpose of having said license reinstated in the discretion of said District Court."

As to the first change, which...