Martling v. Martling

• Decision Date: 12 June 1890
• Citation: 20 A. 41,47 N.J.E. 122
• Parties: MARTLING v. MARTLING et ux.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

20 A. 41

47 N.J.E. 122

MARTLING

v. MARTLING et ux.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

June 12, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

On final hearing on bill, answer, and proofs.

C. Christie and W. B. Williams, for complainant. William M. Johnson, for defendants.

PITNEY, V. C. Complainant seeks by this suit to be relieved from the effect of two certain deeds of conveyance, each bearing date September 30, 1884, and recorded in Bergen county clerk's office July 30, 1888, executed by her to the defendant, who is her son, and purporting to convey certain lands in Bergen county. The consideration expressed in one of them is love and affection and one dollar, and in the other one dollar, simply. The premises conveyed are situate in Ridgefield township, Bergen county. Those comprised in one of the deeds lies on the east side of the Bergen turnpike, and those in the other on the west side, and immediately opposite to the first. The bill alleges that these deeds were executed by complainant, who at the time was a widow 74 years old, at the earnest solicitation and entreaty, and by the influence and persuasion, of the defendant, and as a part of a scheme for the disposition of all her landed property which was intended by her to be testamentary in its nature; that at the same time she executed two other deeds of conveyance, to her other two children, of other lands, but retained possession of all of them, in pursuance of a distinct understanding with the defendant that she was to retain such possession during her life, with the right on her part to destroy either of them if she chose to do so; that she afterwards placed all of said deeds, with other valuable papers, in a box, of which she retained the key, and deposited the same, by the hands of the defendant, in the Hudson County National Bank, Jersey City, for safe-keeping; that on July 30, 1888, defendant procured the possession of the said box, took it from the bank, broke it open, abstracted the two deeds so executed to him, and placed the same on record in the Bergen county clerk's office, all without her knowledge or consent; that on August 1, 1888, defendant executed a deed to her conveying said premises to her for life, and induced her to believe that she was thereby restored to her full rights, but that she did not understand the nature of the transaction. The answer denies that the deeds in question were executed at the special solicitation, etc., of the defendant, but alleges that they were entirely complainant's own idea, and were planned and executed of her own free will, and were in strict accordance with a previously executed will, and her well-settled wishes. It denies that the deeds were not fully delivered, but alleges that the two made to the defendant were formally delivered to him at the moment of their execution, but that it was understood that the fact of their execution was to be concealed, and they not recorded, and that complainant was to have the use of the premises for life, but that defendant was to take immediate possession, which he did, and was to pay complainant the income for her life; that the deeds were left in complainant's possession temporarily, but that she subsequently delivered them to defendant, and that they were placed in the box, and deposited in the bank subject to defendant's order; that he took possession of the premises, and expended considerable sums of money, with complainant's knowledge and approval, upon them, and thereby increased their value. The answer further alleges that in July, 1888, after these improvements were made, complainant became dissatisfied, and asked the return of the deeds, which defendant refused, and, fearing that complainant would incumber or dispose of the property, he procured the deeds, and placed them on record, as he had a right to do, and informed complainant of the fact, and that he then and there agreed with her to convey to her a life-estate in the premises, which she accepted intelligently and cheerfully, and was entirely satisfied therewith, and at the same time executed to him a paper writing, under seal, which was a ratification of the two deeds in question, and of his registry thereof.

At the hearing upon these pleadings, the following questions were litigated: First. Were the deeds in question, at their execution, delivered in such a manner that the estate vested in the grantee, and the grantor had no further control over it? Second. If they were so delivered, were the circumstances such as to entitle the complainant to have them set aside, and the title revested in her? Third. If they were not so delivered, was the execution of the subsequent deed of ratification, and acceptance of a life-estate, by complainant, binding upon her?

The evidence showed that complainant was the owner of a farm comprising the lands in question, and other land, situate on both sides of the Bergen turnpike, in Ridgefield township, Bergen county. The part lying on the east side was an irregular parallelogram, with a frontage on the road of about 800 feet, and a depth of about 4,200 feet, and contained about 72 acres. In about the middle of its front was the dwelling, and in the rear of the dwelling the usual outbuildings. On the west side of the turnpike were about eight acres of land, and upon that tract was a dwelling suitable to be let out to tenants. Complainant had three children,—Stephen H. Martling, Annabella Acker, and the defendant. Her husband died in 1880. In his life-time she had conveyed to Stephen a small lot carved out of the north corner of the farm, on the east side of the road, and to her daughter Annabella a small lot carved out of the southerly corner, on the same side of the road; and they had each erected thereon comfortable dwellings, and were living in them, apparently, as people of leisure, and considerable wealth. She had also, at about the same time, conveyed to defendant a lot on the west side of the turnpike, which at the time was supposed to be equal in value with the lands give to the others, but which in reality was somewhat less in value. Defendant had built on this lot, and had sold it. In her husband's life-time, she had executed jointly with him a will by which she gave all the land on the west side to David, the defendant, for life, and at his death to his son Abraham, and had divided the land on the east side into three equal parts, lengthwise, making three very narrow strips, with the ends upon the road, and having the dwelling and other buildings on the middle strip; and she gave by her will to David, the defendant, the middle piece, and to Stephen the northerly, and to Annabella the southerly, one. This will was prepared, and its execution supervised, by Mr. Samuel E. De Groot a resident of the neighborhood, and a master of this court, who was sworn as a witness, and appeared to be an intelligent and competent person. I am satisfied from his evidence that it was properly worded to carry out the intention of the testator, and was well executed to pass real estate. This will was destroyed. The fact that it made an actual division of the land on the east side of the road in the manner above stated, and that by it defendant got the middle strip, with the buildings, is clearly proven by the evidence of the defendant himself, who read it twice shortly before it was destroyed. Complainant and her husband had lived for many years with their daughter, Mrs. Acker. The homestead dwelling, which had become dilapidated, had been rented out, as was also the dwelling on the west side of the road, and the farm. Complainant does not seem to have had any other property of any consequence, or other source of income except the rents of the real estate in question. The defendant was her favorite son, and she confided in him fully. After her husband's death, she intrusted him with the transaction of all her business. To this he himself testifies. To him only of her children she showed her will. She entertained for him the greatest affection, and up to and during the hearing she met and treated him with great cordiality and affection on all occasions, and as to all matters except as to the disposition of her property now in question, upon which subject, whenever introduced, she became at once excited and angry. She is evidently a person of a very emotional nature, easily carried away by her feelings, and subject to fits of passion, with varying phases, and passing easily from the one extreme, of anger and indignation, to the other, of love and confidence. These characteristics render it prudent and necessary to scan her evidence with care. Besides, she is clearly mistaken in several matters, and I have therefore placed but limited reliance upon her testimony.

The defendant was for many years freight agent of the Northern Railroad at the Erie docks, Jersey City. During the time covered by these transactions, he lived first in Brooklyn, afterwards in Jersey City, and then on the premises. Before moving to the premises, he visited his mother frequently. She and Mr. Acker both swear that he timed his visits to avoid meeting Mr. and Mrs. Acker. This the defendant denies, but I think the fact is with the complainant. Defendant induced Mr. and Mrs. Acker to take a house and spend the winter of 1881-82 in Jersey City, leaving complainant in their house, with the servants and horses and carriage; and it was during that winter that the transactions in question had their origin. Complainant swears that, from the time of her husband's death, defendant beset her about her property and her will,—told her that he was not satisfied with the will; that he would be cheated out of his share given him by it, and wished it destroyed; that he tortured her so much and so continuously about it that she finally consented that he should destroy it, and he did so in her presence. Defendant denies that he destroyed it, but says that she did it of her own free will. After that she says he wished her to make...