Bowers v. Cottrell

• Decision Date: 29 June 1908
• Citation: 15 Idaho 221,96 P. 936
• Parties: SARAH A. BOWERS et al., Respondents, v. MAY BELLE COTTRELL, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

96 P. 936

15 Idaho 221

SARAH A. BOWERS et al., Respondents, v. MAY BELLE COTTRELL, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 29, 1908

ACTION TO QUIET TITLE-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-DEED-DELIVERY-WHEN TITLE PASSES-FINDINGS.

1. A court of equity will not interfere or grant relief to a debtor who has transferred his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, in an action against the grantee to recover such property.

2. Where there is no conveyance, the general rule that a court of equity will not grant relief to the person who has made a deed to defraud creditors does not apply.

3. Whether property has been conveyed for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the grantor, depends upon whether or not the deed transferring such property was ever delivered and accepted by the grantee.

4. No particular form of delivery of a deed is required. Whether there was a delivery of a deed so as to pass title depends in a great measure upon the particular circumstances of each case, the test being, was a delivery made by grantor to grantee, or some other person for grantee, and accepted by the grantee, with the intention of passing title and making such instrument the deed of the grantor Delivery includes surrender and acceptance, and both are necessary to its completion. The grantor must be willing and agree to deliver and the grantee must be willing and consent to receive, and this accord of wills must be evidenced in some way to show the unequivocal intention of both parties that the instrument shall take effect according to its purport and tenor.

5. Where the grantee fraudulently secures possession of a deed without the knowledge or consent of the grantor, such deed conveys no title to the grantee, and the latter acquires no rights thereunder.

6. A deed executed to correct an error in a void deed, and not for the purpose of conveying title, does not amount to a ratification of such void deed, or pass title to the property therein described.

7. Where there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the court, they will not be set aside on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.

8. Held, in this case, the evidence supports the findings of the court.

9. When the findings of the court are inconsistent with the defendant's case, and in effect against the defendant on the issue made by the answer, and clearly show the plaintiffs' right to recover, notwithstanding the answer the findings are sufficient.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Ada County. Hon. Fremont Wood, Judge.

An action to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

Alfred A. Fraser, for Appellant.

It is against the policy of the law to enable either party, in controversies between themselves, to enforce an agreement in fraud of the law or which was made to injure another. (Randall v. Howard, 67 U.S. 590, 17 L.Ed. 269; Story Eq., vol. 1, sec. 298; Bolt v. Rogers, 3 Paige, 156; Wilson v. Watts, 9 Md. 356.)

Whenever two or more persons are engaged in a fraudulent transaction to injure another, neither law nor equity will interfere to relieve either of those persons, as against the other, from the consequences of their own misconduct. (Dent v Ferguson, 132 U.S. 68, 10 S.Ct. 13, 33 L.Ed. 242.)

A court of equity will afford no relief to a debtor who has transferred his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors and subsequently seeks as against the transferees to recover same back. (24 Cent. Dig., sec. 533, and cases cited; Briggs v. Coffin, 91 Iowa 329, 59 N.W. 259; Kitts v. Willson, 130 Ind. 492, 29 N.E. 401; Eyre v. Eyre, 19 N.J. Eq. 42.)

A transfer of property made to defraud creditors is valid between the parties. (24 Cent. Dig., 523, and cases cited; Montgomery v. Hunt, 5 Cal. 366; Goad v. Moulton, 67 Cal. 536, 8 P. 63; 20 Cyc. 621.)

The findings of the trial court must be within the issues, when compared with the pleadings, and must cover all the material issues raised, whether arising on allegations in the complaint and denied in the answer, or on affirmative defenses pleaded in the answer. (Wood v. Broderson, 12 Idaho 190, 85 P. 490; Dillon Imp. Co. v. Cleaveland, 32 Utah 1, 88 P. 670; Stanley v. Flint, 10 Idaho 629, 79 P. 815; Carson v. Thews, 2 Idaho 176, 9 P. 605; Bowman v. Ayers, 2 Idaho 305, 13 P. 346; Tage v. Alberts, 2 Idaho 271, 13 P. 19; Haight v. Tryon, 112 Cal. 4, 44 P. 318; 2 Spelling's App. Pr. 591; Haynes' New Trial and Appeal, sec. 240; Armacost v. Lindley, 116 Ind. 295, 19 N.E. 138; Bartholomew v. Fayette Irr. Co., 31 Utah 1, 120 Am. St. Rep. 912, 86 P. 481; Whiting v. Hoglund, 127 Wis. 135, 106 N.W. 391.)

N. M. Ruick, for Respondents.

When the determination of certain specific issues in a certain way renders other issues immaterial, no finding upon or determination of such immaterial issues need be made by the trial court or referee. (Brand v. James, 67 Wis. 541, 30 N.E. 934; Witcher v. Conklin, 84 Cal. 499, 24 P. 302; Spelling's New Trial & App. Prac., sec. 594; Brison v. Brison, 90 Cal. 323, 27 P. 186; Fox v. Haarstick, 156 U.S. 674, 15 S.Ct. 457, 39 L.Ed. 576; Snelgrove v. Earl, 17 Utah 321, 53 P. 1017; Tage v. Alberts, 2 Idaho 271, 13 P. 19.)

A deed is invalid if not delivered. Delivery depends on intention. (Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 28; Jones v. Loveless, 99 Ind. 317; Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 Wis. 55, 11 Am. Rep. 546; Black v. Shreve, 13 N.J. Eq. 455; Martling v. Martling, 47 N.J. Eq. 122, 20 A. 41; Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532, 32 P. 576, 33 P. 323; Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 636, 18 L.Ed. 262.)

Parol testimony is competent to show intention as to delivery. (Whitney v. Dewey, 10 Idaho 633. 80 P. 1117, 69 L. R. A. 572; Stevens v. Stevens, 150 Mass. 557, 23 N.E. 378; Black v. Schreve, 13 N.J. Eq. 455.)

A stolen deed has no validity. (Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 Wis. 55, 11 Am. Rep. 546; Hadlock v. Hadlock, 22 Ill. 384.)

A ratification must be made by the grantor with full knowledge of his rights. (Devlin on Deeds. sec. 268; Martling v. Martling, 47 N.J. Eq. 122, 20 A. 41.)

An undelivered deed is incapable of confirmation. (Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609.)

The recording of a deed, without knowledge of grantee, is no delivery. (13 Cyc. 569, and cases there cited; Devlin on Deeds, secs. 290, 291; Babbitt v. Bennett, 68 Minn. 260; 71 N.W. 22; Sampson v. Thornton, 3 Met. (Mass.) 275, 37 Am. Dec. 135; Sullivan v. Eddy, 154 Ill. 199, 40 N.E. 482.)

STEWART, J. Sullivan, J., concurs, AILSHIE, C. J., concurring in the conclusion.

OPINION

STEWART, J.

This is an action to quiet title. The cause of action, as disclosed by the complaint, is, in substance, that the plaintiffs, on June 16, 1905, executed their certain deeds purporting to convey the property described in the complaint to the defendant, then May Belle Coghlan, her daughter; that such deeds were never delivered to May Belle Coghlan and never intended to pass title to said defendant, and were retained in the possession of this plaintiff until on or about September 4, 1906, when they were surreptitiously, secretly and without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs, procured and placed upon record by the defendant, or some one at her instance or request; that no consideration was paid therefor, and said deeds were never intended to vest title in the defendant; that on the same day on which said instruments were executed, and at the same time and place, the defendant, May Belle Cottrell, executed to plaintiff her certain deeds purporting to convey to plaintiff said premises; that said deeds were taken into the possession of the plaintiff, Sarah A. Bowers, and were retained in her possession, with the deeds executed by Sarah A. Bowers, to May Belle Coghlan, but were never delivered and were retained by plaintiff, Sarah A. Bowers, until on or about September 4, 1906, when they were surreptitiously, secretly and without the knowledge or consent of plaintiffs, procured by the defendant May Belle Cottrell, or by some person at her instance and request, and retained by said defendant without being recorded.

To the complaint the defendant filed an answer specifically denying the allegations of the complaint, and alleged as an affirmative defense that on or about June 16, 1905, the plaintiff, Sarah A. Bowers, was indebted to various persons and corporations in a large sum of money, and had signed obligations as surety for which she and her estate had become, or was to become, liable, and for the purpose of defrauding her said creditors, and particularly the Bank of Commerce, a banking corporation engaged in general banking business at Boise, Idaho, and that on or about June 16, 1905, an action had been commenced, or was to be commenced, against this plaintiff, Sarah A. Bowers, and one George Baldwin, to recover on a promissory note made by said plaintiff and said Baldwin in the sum of $ 8,000, and for the purpose of defrauding said Bank of Commerce and placing her said property beyond the reach of any process of court to subject the same to the payment of any judgment of the said Bank of Commerce, she voluntarily, together with her husband, made, executed and delivered all of said deeds mentioned in said plaintiff's complaint to the defendant, May Belle Cottrell, and for no other reason or purpose.

Upon the issues thus presented, the court made its findings and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This appeal is from the judgment. The court found that the plaintiff, Sarah A. Bowers, was, on June 16, 1905, the owner in fee simple in her own right, and as her own separate property, of the real estate described in the complaint; that on said day she and her husband, Jacob R. Bowers, executed and...