Martz v. Ruiz

• Decision Date: 21 March 1958
• Citation: 158 Cal.App.2d 590,322 P.2d 981
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Henry D. MARTZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Marcos RUIZ, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 22601.

Page 981

322 P.2d 981

158 Cal.App.2d 590

Henry D. MARTZ et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Marcos RUIZ, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 22601.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

March 21, 1958.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 1958.

Hearing Denied May 14, 1958.

William Jerome Pollack, Beverly Hills, for appellants.

Spray, Gould & Bowers, Los Angeles, for respondent.

FOX, Presiding Justice.

The suit grows out of an automobile collision at the intersection of Balboa Boulevard and Sherman Way in San Fernando Valley. Those streets intersect at right angles. The two cars were traveling on Balboa Boulevard in opposite directions. The plaintiff's car was going south while the defendant was driving north. This was almost a head-on collision. The left front of defendant's car hit the front of plaintiffs'. There is a conflict in the evidence as to where the impact took place, that is to say, on which side of the double white line. There is evidence that approximately three-quarters of defendant's car was across this line. He maintains, however, that at the moment of impact his entire car was on his said of the white line. Plaintiffs, one of whom (James LaFever) was a passenger in the back seat, were injured. The jury returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiffs have appealed.

The court gave the jury an instruction on unavoidable accident, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

'In law we recognize what is termed an unavoidable or inevitable accident. These terms do not mean literally that it was not possible for such an accident to be avoided. They simply denote an accident that occurred without having been proximately caused by negligence.

'Even if such an accident could have been avoided by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill or caution, still, no one may be held liable for injuries resulting from it.

* * *

* * *

'Whether or not the accident in question in this case was unavoidable is, of course, a question of fact for you to determine; * * *'

Since the trial of this case the Supreme Court has passed on the propriety of giving such an instruction in the case of Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.2d 652, 320 P.2d 500. The court points out (49 Cal.2d 659, 320 P.2d 504) that 'the instruction on unavoidable accident serves no useful purpose' and that (49 Cal.2d 660, 320 P.2d 505) '[t]he instruction is not only unnecessary, but it is also confusing' and 'can lead only to misunderstanding.' The court states (49 Cal.2d 660, 320 P.2d 505) that '[t]he giving of a confusing of misleading instruction is * * * error' and, except in special situations not here present, 'the use of an unavoidable accident instruction should be disapproved.' The court then went on to say (49 Cal.2d 660, 320 P.2d 505): 'The determination whether, in a specific instance, the probable effect of the instruction has been to mislead the jury and whether the error has been prejudicial so as to require reversal depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the evidence and the other instructions given. No precise formula can be drawn.'

In the instant case there is no evidence that the accident resulted from any cause other than negligence. There is no suggestion that any other vehicle interfered with the movement of either of the two cars or that either of them developed any mechanical difficulty that caused or contributed to the collision. It is...