Marvin v. Connelly

• Decision Date: 22 February 1979
• Docket Number: No. 20891,20891
• Citation: 252 S.E.2d 562,26 UCC Rep. 370,272 S.C. 425
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: , 26 UCC Rep.Serv. 370 J. T. MARVIN, d/b/a Marvin Transport, Respondent, v. Doyle CONNELLY, Appellant.

Page 562

252 S.E.2d 562

272 S.C. 425, 26 UCC Rep.Serv. 370

J. T. MARVIN, d/b/a Marvin Transport, Respondent, v. Doyle CONNELLY, Appellant.

No. 20891.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 22, 1979.

Dallas D. Ball, Columbia, for appellant.

Harvey, Battey, Macloskie & Bethea, Beaufort, for respondent.

RHODES, Justice:

Respondent, J. T. Marvin, instituted this action, based on breach of warranty of title and misrepresentation of material facts, to recover the price of a refrigeration trailer which he had purchased from the appellant, Connelly. The lower court resolved the issue favorably to respondent. We affirm.

The primary question to be determined is whether appellant breached an implied warranty of title by selling respondent a trailer which, unknown to both parties, had been stolen from its rightful owner.

The undisputed facts reveal that appellant originally obtained possession of the trailer when an unknown individual employed him to make certain repairs on it. After the repairs were made, the vehicle remained unclaimed. In order to satisfy his mechanic's lien for repairs and storage, the appellant brought a foreclosure action in the magistrate's court. At the magistrate's sale on April 7, 1972, appellant was the successful bidder and consummated the purchase. On April 10, 1972, respondent purchased the trailer from appellant for $6,045.52.

It is established that the vehicle was stolen from its rightful owner at some point prior to appellant's original possession of it. This fact, however, was admittedly unknown to both parties until September 14, 1973, at which time the trailer was attached by Northland Insurance Company, which, upon payment of the theft claim to the rightful owner, had been assigned the true title.

Relying upon U.C.C. § 36-2-403(1), appellant initially asserts that he acquired at least a voidable title from the judicial sale which would have ripened into an indefeasible title after sale to respondent. We disagree.

Section 36-2-403(1) states the basic common law rule that a purchaser acquires all of the interest of his transferor. This U.C.C. section also recognizes that a person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. The concept of "voidable title", however, turns on whether the original owner assented to the transfer. See § 36-2-403, S.C. Reporter's Comments. As such, the section was intended to cover such factual situations as involve the severance of property from a rightful owner who intended to sell, as where there has been a fraudulent impersonation of the purchaser of the property (§ 36-2-403(1)(a)); or a fraudulent check is given for the purchase price of the property (§ 36-2-403(1)(b)); or when the sale is induced by fraudulent misrepresentation (§ 36-2-403(1)(d)). Since the record is devoid of any evidence showing assent by the rightful owner, the appellant failed to show that he purchased the trailer under any of the circumstances contemplated and can not take refuge under the theory of "voidable title". Therefore, the appellant purchased only the title rights belonging to his predecessor, the thief, thereby obtaining no title.

This conclusion is also supported by the common law principle that a person can pass to his successor no greater title than he acquired and, therefore, a thief or even one in the subsequent chain of title cannot grant good title to stolen property even to a bona fide purchaser. Sun Ins. Office v. Foil, 187 S.C. 183, 197 S.E. 683 (1938). See also 67 Am.Jur.2d, Sales § 257 (1973). Annot. 71 A.L.R.2d 221 (1960). The law in our state is well settled that where property is sold at a judicial sale, there is...