Mary F v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Docket Number | 6:22-cv-01526-MK |
| Decision Date | 26 October 2023 |
| Parties | MARY F.,[1]Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER, Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Plaintiff Mary F. seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). All parties have consented to allow a Magistrate Judge to enter final orders and judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See ECF No. 3. For the reasons below, the Commissioner's final decision is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for additional administrative proceedings.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB in April 2020, alleging an amended disability onset date of July 1, 2019. Tr 308.[2] Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 71-104. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and a hearing was held in August 2021. Tr. 40. On September 23 2021, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Act. Tr. 21-33. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. 1-6. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff was 46 years old on her alleged onset date. Tr. 71. Plaintiff has at least a high school education and has past relevant work experience as a customer service representative or adjustment clerk, temp agency referral clerk, and a medical clerk. Tr. 31. Plaintiff alleged disability based on several physical and mental impairments, including bipolar disorder chronic migraines, and chronic back pain. Tr. 71.
The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v.Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted). The court must weigh “both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.” Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). “Where the evidence as a whole can support either a grant or a denial, [the court] may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ's.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (). “[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must prove an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of no less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining whether a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity”; if so, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). A severe impairment is one “which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If not, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the impairments meet or equal “one of a number of listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.” Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, the claimant is presumed disabled; if not, the analysis proceeds. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.
At this point, the Commissioner must evaluate medical and other relevant evidence to determine the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”), an assessment of work-related activities that the claimant may still perform on a regular and continuing basis, despite any limitations his impairments impose. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(b)-(c), 416.920(e), 416.945(b)-(c). At the fourth step, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can perform “past relevant work.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant can work, he is not disabled; if he cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. At step five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 142; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f). If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured requirements of the Act and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. Tr. 23. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “obesity; lumbar/cervical spasm/strain; migraines/headaches; and depressive/bipolar disorder.” Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination thereof that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment. Tr. 24. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had an RFC to perform light work with the following limitations:
[Plaintiff could] occasionally climb ramps and stairs but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds . . . can occasionally stoop kneel, crouch and crawl. Additionally, [Plaintiff would] have to alternate between sitting and standing while remaining on task.
Tr. 25-26. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work. Tr. 31. At step five, the ALJ found, given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy such that Plaintiff could sustain employment despite her impairments. Tr. 31-32. The ALJ thus found Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. Tr. 32-33.
Plaintiff asserts remand is warranted for three reasons: (1) the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting Plaintiffs subjective symptom testimony; (2) the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Dr Nimal Bastola, M.D.; and (3) the ALJ failed to account for her migraines and moderate limitation in persistence in her RFC. Pl.'s Br. 1, ECF No. 14. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected her subjective symptom testimony regarding her migraines. Pl.'s Br. 7 -12. When a claimant has medically documented impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record contains no affirmative evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of . . . symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). A general assertion [that] the claimant is not credible is insufficient; instead, the ALJ must “state which . . . testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). The reasons proffered must be “sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony.” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). If the ALJ's finding on the claimant's subjective symptom testimony is “supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p provides that “subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual's character,” and requires that the ALJ consider all the evidence in an individual's record when evaluating the intensity and persistence of symptoms.[3]SSR 16-3p, available at 2016 WL 1119029, at *1-2. The ALJ must examine “the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence; an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms; statements and other information provided by medical sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the individual's case record.” Id. at *4.
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that her migraines caused heightened sensitivities to light and noise. Tr. 55. Plaintiff said she has on average two to three migraines per week, and they last anywhere from a day to four days or more. Tr. 58. During the hearing,...
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