Maryhew v. Yova
| Citation | 464 N.E.2d 538,11 OBR 471,11 Ohio St.3d 154 |
| Decision Date | 20 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-207,83-207 |
| Parties | , 11 O.B.R. 471 MARYHEW, et al., Appellants, v. YOVA, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Syllabus by the Court
A request by a defendant to the trial court for leave to move or otherwise plead is not a motion or a responsive pleading contemplated by Civ.R 7, and the obtaining of such order does not constitute waiver under Civ.R. 12(H) of any affirmative defenses, nor does it submit the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court.
From the record, it appears that there was an automobile accident on November 6, 1978 wherein an automobile driven by defendant-appellee, Carole L. Yova, collided with a vehicle driven by plaintiff, Ruth J. Maryhew. Plaintiff's daughter, Bessie, was also a passenger in the Maryhew automobile. Exactly two years later, on November 6, 1980, Ruth and Bessie Maryhew filed a complaint against the defendant seeking compensation for their injuries sustained in the accident. Mrs. Maryhew's husband, Boyd Maryhew, was also a party complainant alleging a cause of action for loss of consortium and other expenses.
The complaint was directed to the defendant by certified mail. However, on or about November 12, plaintiffs were notified by the clerk of courts that the certified mail sent to Carole Yova was returned by the postal authorities marked "unknown." The record does not show evidence of any further action taken by the plaintiffs to accomplish service of process upon the defendant.
The record does show that a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull County, by a journal entry dated May 5, 1981, granted leave to the defendant to move or otherwise plead in the action by June 15, 1981. The record also shows that the trial judge, by journal entry dated June 4, 1981, additionally granted the defendant leave to move or otherwise plead to the action by July 15, 1981.
Nothing further appears on record until December 1, 1981, when the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the basis that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, for lack of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and insufficiency of service of process upon the defendant. The trial court, on May 7, 1982 by way of a "Docket and Journal Entry," set forth that "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss granted: Case dismissed as barred by the Statute of Limitations." In addition, the trial court placed on a "Judgment Entry" dated May 24, 1982, which sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss based upon the running of the statute of limitations.
Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, upon the basis that no service had been made upon the defendant, that the leaves of court obtained by the defendant to move or otherwise plead did not constitute a general appearance, and that the statute of limitations period had expired.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
John W. Gall and David Hazelkorn, Warren, for appellants.
Richards, Ambrosy & Fredericka, Charles L. Richards and James A. Fredericka, Warren, for appellee.
It is rudimentary that in order to render a valid personal judgment, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This may be acquired either by service of process upon the defendant, the voluntary appearance and submission of the defendant or his legal representative, or by certain acts of the defendant or his legal representative which constitute an involuntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The latter may more accurately be referred to as a waiver of certain affirmative defenses, including jurisdiction over the person under the Rules of Civil Procedure. 1
In the present case, service was not perfected upon the defendant and there was not a specific written waiver of service pursuant to Civ.R. 4(D). 2 Also, there was not a voluntary entry of appearance on behalf of the defendant by way of an entry of the court, or a responsive pleading to the merits of the case. Therefore, the question presented is whether the two requests by defendant's counsel, as granted by the trial court, for leave to move or otherwise plead in the action, constitute a waiver of the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. We answer such inquiry in the negative for the reasons set forth below.
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, appearances were classified as either special or general. A special appearance was one made solely for the purpose of objecting to the mode, manner, or absence of the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In such an appearance, the defendant did not submit to the jurisdiction of the court. Conversely, a general appearance was a voluntary submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court by some act on his part other than presenting an objection to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. This type of an appearance was construed to be a recognition that the case was properly before the court.
To resolve the question presented, we no longer need to look to the facts in order to determine whether there has been a special or general appearance. Today we only have a general appearance under the Rules of Civil Procedure. To determine whether the trial court obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant, pursuant to those rules, we need only address whether there has been a waiver of the jurisdictional defenses, rather than the type of appearance.
In order for a judgment to be rendered against a defendant when he is not served with process, there must be a showing upon the record that the defendant has voluntarily submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction or committed other acts which constitute a waiver of the jurisdictional defense.
A number of the Civil Rules must be reviewed in answering the question before us. We first refer to Civ.R. 3(A) which provides that an action is commenced when service has been effected upon the defendant within one year from the filing of the action. The philosophy of such rule is that court dockets should be cleared if service has not been attained within the reasonable time of one year.
An action may be dismissed when service of process has not been obtained after the passage of more than one year. Lash v. Miller (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 63, 362 N.E.2d 642 . Such was the status of the case sub judice. No action having been commenced, there was no obligation upon this defendant under the Civil Rules to move or otherwise plead within the year and her failure to do so would not have waived her right to the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Inaction upon the part of a defendant who is not served with process, even though he might be aware of the filing of the action, does not dispense with the necessity of service. Haley v. Hanna (1915), 93 Ohio St. 49, 112 N.E. 149. The Civil Rules do not change this common law of Ohio.
However, the defendant did come into court, through counsel, on two occasions to request the trial judge for the right to move or otherwise plead. We must now turn to answer whether this constituted a waiver of the affirmative defenses.
Civ.R. 12(B) prescribes the manner of presenting affirmative defenses. The rule provides that "[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading * * * shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion * * *." The excepted defenses are lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, failure to join a party under Civ.R. 19 or 19.1. Therefore, the rule gives the pleader an option to assert the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person either by way of a motion prior to any pleading or in the responsive pleading to the complaint.
In the consideration of the question presented here, Civ.R. 12(B) must be read in conjunction with Civ.R. 12(G) and (H). Civ.R. 12(G) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] party who makes a motion under this rule must join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available to him. * * * " Civ.R. 12(H), in part provides: "(1) A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, * * * is waived (a) if omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in subdivision (G), or (b) if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereto permitted by Rule 15(A) to be made as a matter of course."
The appellants argue that by obtaining the two orders for leave to move or plead, defendant voluntarily waived service of process. However, as noted the record does not show a voluntary waiver of service in writing as required by Civ.R. 4(D). Additionally, the appellants in essence contend that the defendant had either entered a responsive pleading or, by way of the requests for leave to move or otherwise plead, had submitted motions to the court prior to a responsive pleading, which motions did not set forth the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Thus, appellants argue that the defendant waived such defense pursuant to Civ.R. 12(G) and (H).
We must reject appellants' argument for a number of reasons. First, requests for leave to move or otherwise plead do not constitute a responsive pleading. Civ.R. 7(A) sets forth the types of responsive pleadings which are contemplated by the Civil Rules. The record here shows no responsive pleading was made. Further, Civ.R. 7(B)(1) sets forth the definition of "motions" within the meaning of the Civil Rules. Such rule states that "[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or a...
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