Maryland Cas. Co. v. Messina

• Decision Date: 16 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93SC172,93SC172
• Parties: MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Rose Wood MESSINA, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1058

874 P.2d 1058

MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Rose Wood MESSINA, Respondent.

No. 93SC172.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

May 16, 1994.

White and Steele, P.C., John M. Lebsack and Michael J. Daugherty, Denver, for petitioner.

Ozer, Sokolow & Ruppert, P.C., Rick Paul Lopez, Colorado Springs, for respondent.

Justice VOLLACK delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the decision by the court of appeals in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Messina, 860 P.2d 556 (Colo.App.1993), reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment. The district court decided that the claimant, Rose Wood Messina (Messina), was collaterally estopped from raising two issues in a civil action for personal injury protection benefits under the Auto Accident Reparations Act (the "no-fault" law) against Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland Casualty), the insurer of the vehicle that Messina was driving. The court of appeals held that the administrative law judge's findings of fact entered in a workers' compensation hearing did not estop Messina from litigating the two additional issues in her subsequent civil action for no fault. We affirm.

I.

Messina was employed by Traffic Control West as a traffic control supervisor ¹ near Ridgway, Colorado. On October 17, 1988, Messina attended a social gathering after work in Ouray, Colorado, where she consumed about five alcoholic drinks. ² After leaving the restaurant, Messina was involved in a one-car accident on Colorado Highway 550 at approximately 11:30 p.m. ³ Messina testified that the accident occurred when she swerved to avoid a deer and drove off the highway, causing the truck to roll over. At the time of the accident, Messina had been driving a truck owned by her employer and insured by Maryland Casualty. Her blood alcohol content was taken several hours after the accident and measured .115 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Messina was thereafter charged with, and convicted of, driving under the influence of alcohol.

Messina suffered serious injuries as a result of the car accident. She later filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. At the workers' compensation hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) in October 1989, Messina testified that Traffic Control West provided her with a motor vehicle to use on the job-site and during working hours only. ⁴ The ALJ made extensive findings of facts which included the following:

1) Messina had permission to use the car to travel to and from work to her home in Pueblo, to monitor daily on-the-job activities, and to perform work related jobs;

2) Messina was prohibited from using the car for personal use after working hours such as social gatherings involving alcohol;

3) Messina's supervisor had repeatedly warned her that drinking and driving was not allowed with company vehicles and that she was not to use the company vehicle for "partying" after work;

4) At the end of work, on the date of the accident, Messina returned to her temporary residence, then drove to Ouray to eat dinner with friends at which time she drank four or five alcoholic beverages;

5) Neither the drive to Ouray nor the dinner with friends was a requirement of Messina's employment nor did her employer receive any benefit from her attendance at this social gathering.

Based upon these findings of facts, the ALJ denied her claim for workers' compensation benefits, concluding that Messina had failed to sustain her burden of proving the accident occurred within the course and scope of employment. The ALJ further concluded that Messina was not authorized to use the company motor vehicle "for purposes of that social gathering." The Industrial Claim Appeals Panel affirmed the ALJ's order.

Subsequently, Messina brought a civil action in district court seeking personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from Maryland Casualty. Maryland Casualty filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of its rights and obligations to pay PIP benefits to Messina under Traffic Control West's automobile insurance policy. Maryland Casualty asserted that: (1) Messina was not a "permissive user" of the vehicle at the time of the accident; and (2) by using Traffic Control West's vehicle without a good faith belief that she was legally entitled to do so, Messina became a "converter," and therefore was not entitled to PIP benefits. ⁵

Maryland Casualty filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Messina from relitigating the issue of authorization which was considered by the ALJ in Messina's workers' compensation case. Maryland Casualty asserted that the issue of authorization was identical to the issues of Messina's status as a permissive user and her status as a converter in determining her entitlement to PIP benefits in her civil action.

The district court ruled that, because the ALJ had determined that Messina was using the motor vehicle outside the scope of her employment, Messina lacked permission to use the vehicle and did not have a good faith belief that she had such authorization. The district court therefore entered summary judgment in favor of Maryland Casualty.

The court of appeals reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment. The court of appeals determined that, because the factual issues in the workers' compensation proceeding were not identical to the issues presented in this action, ⁶ the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude the district court's consideration of Messina's claims.

Because the issues determined adversely to Messina in the earlier workers' compensation proceeding are not identical to the issues presented in this civil action, we hold that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude the district court from considering Messina's claims.

II.

We granted certiorari to review whether, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the factual issue determined in a workers' compensation proceeding--that the claimant was acting outside the course and scope of her employment at the time of the automobile accident--bars a determination of the claimant's entitlement to PIP benefits under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding if:

1) the issue precluded is identical to an issue actually determined in the prior proceeding; and

2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted has been a party to or in privity with a party in the prior proceeding; and

3) there is a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and

4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.

See Bennett College v. United Bank of Denver, 799 P.2d 364, 366 (1990); City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo.1988); Salida School Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo.1987); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (1973). The findings of fact and conclusions of law of an administrative agency, acting in a judicial capacity, may be binding on the parties in a subsequent proceeding if the agency resolved disputed issues of fact which the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate. Industrial Comm'n v. Moffat County Sch. Dist. RE No. 1, 732 P.2d 616 (Colo.1987).

The only elements at issue here are the first, that is, whether the issues have been litigated and necessarily adjudicated so that they are identical to the issue determined in the prior proceeding, and the fourth, that is, whether the estopped party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding. ⁷ We note that the requirements of the other two elements of collateral estoppel have wholly been met and are not in controversy. The second element is satisfied since Messina was a party in the workers' compensation proceeding and she is a party here. As to the third element, the ALJ's order was appealed to the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel, and there was a final determination by an administrative agency. Consequently, the third requirement of a final judgment on the merits is met.

Further, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. h (1982) also provides insight concerning issue preclusion If issues are determined but the judgment is not dependent upon the determinations, relitigation of those issues in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded. Such determinations have the characteristics of dicta, and may not ordinarily be the subject of an appeal by the party against whom they were made.

Section 28(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) states that relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action is not precluded when a "new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts."

Maryland Casualty maintains that the scope of employment question answered in the workers' compensation proceeding, the no-fault question of permissive use, and the no-fault question of conversion in the civil action for PIP benefits all share the common thread of a determination on authorization. Before the ALJ could have denied Messina workers' compensation benefits, Maryland Casualty contends, the ALJ needed to find that Messina's use of the vehicle was unauthorized, and outside the course and scope of her employment. Maryland Casualty further argues that the ALJ's finding that Messina's use of the vehicle was unauthorized is identical to a finding in her civil action for PIP benefits that she was not a permissive user of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Maryland Casualty concedes that the ALJ made no explicit finding about whether Messina possessed a good faith belief that she was entitled to use the motor vehicle in the capacity she did at the time of the accident. Rather, Maryland Casualty...