Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dalton Coal & Material Co.
| Decision Date | 08 September 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 13981.,13981. |
| Citation | 184 F.2d 181 |
| Parties | MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. v. DALTON COAL & MATERIAL CO. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
John S. Marsalek, St. Louis, Mo. (Moser, Marsalek, Carpenter & Carter, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.
Howard B. Lang, Jr., Columbia, Mo. (Ralph L. Alexander and Alexander, Ausmus & Harris, all of Columbia, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.
Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and THOMAS and JOHNSEN, Circuit Judges.
An insurer sought a declaratory judgment against its insured, to the effect that its "Comprehensive Automobile Liability Policy," upon the insured's fleet of coal trucks, did not cover an accident which had occurred to a third party and the suit for personal injuries which resulted therefrom, when one of the insured's truck drivers allegedly failed to properly replace a manhole cover in a public sidewalk, on making delivery of some coal to a customer's premises. Also joined as a party defendant was another insurance company which had issued to the insured a "General Liability Insurance Policy."
The District Court entered a judgment, D.C., 81 F.Supp. 895, 897, declaring that the accident was within the coverage of the "Comprehensive Automobile Liability Policy"; that the insurer accordingly owed the duty of defending the resulting suit, under the standard provision of its policy to "defend * * * any suit * * * even if * * * groundless, false or fraudulent;" and that it equally was obligated to satisfy such liability (within its policy limits) as might be imposed upon the insured therein. The court further held that in instituting the declaratory action the insurer had been guilty of "wrongful and vexatious" conduct and that the insured therefore was entitled to a judgment against it for $350 as an attorney's fee, under Mo.R.S.A. § 6040. The insurer has appealed.
The "Comprehensive Automobile Liability Policy" provided insurance against "the liability imposed upon (the insured) by law for damages, * * * because of bodily injury, including death * * *, sustained by any person * * *, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any automobile." Another clause defined the "use" of an automobile as including "the loading and unloading thereof." No definition, however, was given of "unloading," so that the content of that term for insurance purposes was in the situation a question of Missouri law.
Two views have in general been taken by the courts of the scope of the term "unloading" in automobile liability insurance policies such as that here involved. One line of cases, of which Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226 Wis. 348, 276 N.W. 629, is illustrative, has adopted the "coming-to-rest" doctrine, under which the term "unloading" is regarded as covering only the process of removing goods until they can be said to have come to rest, in the sense that a particular operation may not be directly connected to a use of the automobile. The other line of cases, of which Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 108 Utah 500, 161 P.2d 423, 160 A.L.R. 1251, is illustrative, has adopted the broader "complete-operation" doctrine, under which "unloading" is regarded as covering all the operations which are required in any specific situation to effect a completed delivery of the goods. (For a list of decisions under each doctrine, see Annotation, 160 A.L.R. 1259.)
It was the trial court's view, 81 F.Supp. 895, that the "complete-operation" doctrine was the law of Missouri. This appraisal was made after taking into account the holding in Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181, 183, 154 A.L.R. 1088. In that case, a truck driver, in delivering coal to a hospital, used some wooden blocks, which he found along the hospital wall, to enable him to back his wheels up over the curb. After he had unloaded the coal through a sidewalk man-hole, he stacked the wooden blocks on the sidewalk, where, some six hours later, a pedestrian stumbled over them in the dark and was injured. Without discussion of the question as an operation of "unloading," the Missouri Supreme Court held broadly that the accident was within the general language of the coverage clause (identical with that here), "arising out of the * * * use" of the truck.
On the indication and implication of this holding, there is no basis for us to say that the trial court's appraisal of the Missouri law was erroneous. No Missouri...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
American Auto. Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity & CasualtyCo. of Richmond, Virginia
...Indemnity Co. v. Lee, 1 Cir., 168 F.2d 420, 425; Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Lee, D.C., 74 F.Supp. 353; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dalton Coal & Material Co., 8 Cir., 184 F.2d 181, 182; Coulter v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 333 Ill.App. 631, 78 N.E.2d 131, 135-136; London Guarantee & Acci......
-
Crowley's Milk Co. v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co.
...699, 703; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dalton Coal & Material Co., W.D.Mo.1949, 81 F.Supp. 895, 898-899, modified on other grounds, 8th Cir. 1950, 184 F.2d 181; Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, Tex.Civ.App.1952, 248 S.W.2d 779; cf. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Nashua Lumber Co., 1961, 103 N.H.......
-
American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.
...allegedly being unloaded at the time of the accident is typically a question of law, not fact. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dalton Coal & Material Co., 184 F.2d 181, 182 (8th Cir.1950), aff'g 81 F.Supp. 895 (D.C.Mo.1949) (applying Missouri law); 6 A.L.R.4th 686 (1981). The threshold inquiry......
-
Raffel v. Travelers Indem. Co.
...covered. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 374, 377; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dalton Coal & Material Co., 8 Cir., 184 F.2d 181, 182; Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Lee, 1 Cir., 168 F.2d 420, 425; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cassetty, 6 Cir., 11......