Maryland Casualty Co. v. Spitz

• Decision Date: 29 October 1917
• Docket Number: 2268.
• Citation: 246 F. 817
• Parties: MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. v. SPITZ.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

246 F. 817

MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. v. SPITZ.

No. 2268.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

October 29, 1917

On Motion for Reargument, December 31, 1917.

Maurice W. Sloan, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff in error.

Julius C. Levi and David Mandel, Jr., both of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant in error.

Before BUFFINGTON, McPHERSON, and WOOLLEY, Circuit Judges.

McPHERSON Circuit Judge.

Irma Spitz, the widow of Samuel Spitz and the plaintiff in this action, recovered on a policy in her favor, which insured her husband in the Maryland Casualty Company against injury and death, 'effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent, and accidental means. ' He died while the policy was in force, and one of the questions in the court below was whether his death was 'effected * * * through * * * accidental means. ' Before stating the facts it may be well to consider briefly the quoted words.

They do not mean simply that death shall be accidental; that is unintended, or unexpected, or unforeseen; but that the means or the cause of death shall be accidental. It is this to which the policy directs particular attention, and if the means be not accidental the death is not insured against. The words 'accident' and 'accidental' have been many times considered, and the numerous cases on this subject need not be reviewed. Their general meaning is not in doubt and the Standard Dictionary's definition of 'accidental' will serve as well as another:

'Accidental: (1) Happening or coming by chance or without design; causal; fortuitous.'

Accidental, therefore, is opposed to design, and a means is not accidental when it is employed intentionally, although it may produce a result not expected or intended. The intentional use of a means may produce more than one result; one may be likely, and another unlikely, to happen; but a result that is the natural, direct, and probable effect of such use must be regarded as intended, and cannot be regarded as accidental. The rule is thus stated in 14 R.C.L. Sec. 418, p. 1238:

'While it may be true that an accident is an event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation, and is undesigned, it is not true that every unforeseen, undesigned, and unexpected event is an accident. A result which, though not designed, foreseen, or expected, is yet the natural and direct effect of acts voluntarily done or of conditions voluntarily assumed, cannot be said to be accidental.'

See, also, the cases on this subject to be found in Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Carroll (1905) 143 F. 271, 74 C.C.A. 409, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 657, and note, 6 Ann.Cas. 955, and in Hutton v. States, etc., Co. (1915) 267 Ill. 267, 108 N.E. 296, 57 L.R.A. (N.S.) 127, and note, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 577. In the recent case of Insurance Co. v. Patterson (1914) 213 F. 597, 130 C.C.A. 177, this court had occasion to say:

'We agree that, when a man is injured while doing merely what he intends to do, he is not injured by an accident, unless the course of his action has been interrupted or deflected by some unforeseen and unintended happening. To illustrate from the facts before us: Since the deceased was attempting to start the engine of his car by turning the crank, whatever injury he might sustain from the ordinary strain of that operation would properly be regarded as the result of what he intended to do, and therefore would not be accounted accidental. But we can hardly suppose that he intended to slip and fall in the course of the operation, and therefore if he did slip and fall, and sustained injury as the direct result thereof, the happening would be unforeseen and unintended, and the injury would be accidental.'

Turning now to the evidence, and giving it the weight most favorable to the plaintiff, we discover the facts to be as follows:

The insured died of erysipelas on January 22, 1915. Late in December a boil or furuncle had appeared on the back of his neck, and for this he was treated at the office of a doctor. About January 1 his condition was improved. How long afterwards he wore a bandage does not clearly appear, but in any event a healthy scab had formed, the doctor had discharged him, and he was able to be about his business. He was a butcher, and on January 4 was engaged in cleaning chickens; a...