Maryland-Nat. Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Mayor and Council of Rockville

• Decision Date: 08 October 1974
• Docket Number: MARYLAND-NATIONAL,No. 13,13
• Parties: CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION et al. v. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF ROCKVILLE et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 550

272 Md. 550

325 A.2d 748

MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION et al. v. MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF ROCKVILLE et al.

No. 13.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Oct. 8, 1974.

Stephen J. Orens, Asst. County Atty. (Richard S. McKernon, County Atty., Alfred H. Carter, Deputy County Atty., John B. Walsh, Jr. and Stephen P. Johnson, Asst. County Attys., Rockville, on the brief) for Montgomery County, Md.

Sanford E. Wool, Silver Spring (Robert H. Levan, Silver Spring, on the brief), for Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission.

Ralph R. Roach, Silver Spring, for Ronald C. Johnson and others.

Roger W. Titus, City Atty., for Mayor and Council of Rockville.

David E. Betts, Rickville, for HMC Enterprises, Inc.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

LEVINE, Judge.

This is the sequel to Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. v. Rockville, 269 Md. 240, 305 A.2d 122 (1973), in which we reversed a circuit court decision sustaining demurrers to appellants' bill of complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Since a detailed account of the circumstances giving rise of this dispute may be found there, we shall mention only those which are essential to our decision.

We are confronted here with questions regarding the construction and constitutionality of Chapter 116 of the Laws of 1971. That enactment, which added a proviso to Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.) Art. 23A, § 9(c), states that no municipality annexing land may, for five years following annexation, rezone the land so as to permit 'a land use substantially different from the use for the land specified in the current and duly adopted master plan or plans of the county or agency having planning and zoning jurisdiction over the land prior to its annexation.' (emphasis added). Chapter 116, enacted as an emergency measure, became effective on April 23, 1971.

On January 25, 1972, the Mayor and Council of Rockville, Maryland (Rockville), a municipal corporation organized pursuant to Article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution and Article 23A of the Annotated Code of Maryland, annexed 174.8176 acres of land owned by appellee, HMC Enterprises, Inc. (HMC). Prior to such annexation, the subject property was located within the Maryland-Washington Regional District, and was therefore under the zoning and planning jurisdiction, respectively, of appellees, Montgomery County, Maryland (the County) and the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the Commission).

Immediately following the annexation, Rockville adopted Ordinance No. 2-72, which placed the newly annexed land in the city's R-90 zoning classification. In that zoning category, the property qualified for a procedure under Rockville's zoning ordinance known as Planned Residential Unit Development (PRU), which is in the nature of a special exception. Pursuant to a contract dated January 21, 1972, Rockville agreed to permit development of the subject property by HMC in accordance with the Planned Residential Unit Development provision.

On January 25, 1972, Rockville adopted Resolutions No. 4-72 and No. 6-72. Resolution No. 4-72 authorized the Mayor to execute the previously mentioned contract. Resolution No. 6-72 approved the Planned Residential Unit Development for the annexed property in accordance with 'Plan A.' That plan proposed the construction of 583 dwelling units in a subdivision consisting of 140 sale townhouse units, 64 rental townhouse units, 130 rental garden apartment units, and 249 single family units.

There was in effect on January 25, 1972, a 'Master Plan for The Vicinity of Rockville, Part 1,' duly adopted by the Commission on April 26, 1961, and a 'Master Plan for Potomac-Travilah and Vicinity,' duly approved by the County and duly adopted by the Commission on January 25 1967. Under those pland, the annexed property was variously recommended for the R-R zone (rural residential), the R-150 zone (detached restricted residential), and the R-E zone (residential estate). Neither townhouses nor garden apartments were allowed, as permitted uses or special-exception uses, under any of those three county classifications. They were, however, permitted uses under Rockville's Planned Residential Unit Development.

In our prior decision, we held that appellants could maintain this action, and need not be relegated to the statutory appeal prescribed for 'zoning cases'; we also held that the suit was not barred by laches. Upon remand, which was followed by cross-motions for summary judgment, the chancellor granted appellees' motion, ruling that Rockville, '. . . by its annexation and rezoning, has not permitted a land use substantially different from the use specified in the Master Plan(s) adopted by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission . . ..' (emphasis added). He thus found it unnecessary to reach additional issues which appellees had raised under the Federal and Maryland Constitutions. To avoid the possibility of further appeals, we shall decide them here.

We are thus presented with these questions:

I Whether Rockville placed HMC's land '. . . in a zoning classification which permits a land use substantially different from the use for the land specified . . .' in the two Master Plans?

II Whether Chapter 116 violates Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution?

III Whether Chapter 116 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights?

I

The chancellor rested his decision '. . . that (Rockville), by its annexation and rezoning, has not permitted a land use substantially different from the use specified in the Master Plan(s),' on three grounds: (1) That the three county zoning categories, R-R, R-E and R-150, and the R-90 in Rockville included an array of 'permitted uses,' a comparison of which demonstrates that the four classifications are similar to each other; ¹ (2) that substantial change is to be measured in the broadest possible terms, e. g., whether Rockville rezoned the subhect property '. . . to commercial or industrial use, or to any multi-family residential zone. . . .'; (3) that on March 13, 1973, the County established a new 'P-D' (Planned Development) zone in the nature of a special exception, which the chancellor characterized as 'strikingly similar' to Rockville's PRU procedure. In strenuously urging affirmance, appellees quite understandably argue that these grounds for the chancellor's ruling were correct.

The thrust of appellees' argument on this issue focuses on the intent of the Legislature. What seems to have troubled them is that Chapter 116 requires a comparison between a land use recommended by a Master Plan and a land use permitted by a given zoning classification. The solution to this dilemma-in the view taken below and advocated here by appellees-is the inclusion not only of permitted uses, but all special exception uses contained in each of the four zones which are being compared. By applying this broader standard of comparison, appellees thus find it possible to argue that Rockville's R-90 zone is more restrictive than the three county zones; hence, there has been no violation of Chapter 116.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent, Radio Com., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 Md. 82, 93, 314 A.2d 118 (1974); Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393, 306 A.2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1, 267 A.2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep't of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 249 A.2d 180 (1969); and in ascertaining that intent, the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification, City of Gaithersburg v. Mont. Co., 271 Md. 505, 511, 318 A.2d 509 (1974); Grosvenor v. Supervisor of Assess., 271 Md. 232, 315 A.2d 758 (1974); Radio Com., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra. If there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the legislature, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, supra; Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep't of Assess. & T., supra.

The language of the statute is clear in foreclosing a '. . . zoning classification which permits a land use substantially different from the use for the land specified in the current and duly adopted master plan . . ..' (emphasis added). Reference is made to neither the existing county zoning classifications nor any special exception thereto. The only uses 'specified' for the subject property in the current and duly adopted Master Plans are R-R (rural residential), R-E (residential estate), and R-150 (density control development, on family, detached, restricted residential, average lot size). Thus, any special exceptions permitted by the County zoning ordinance in any of those three zones cannot be the basis for a comparison. On the other hand, if, in rezoning the property simultaneously upon annexation, the municipality also grants a special exception, as Rockville has done here, then surely it has '. . . place(d) that land in a zoning classification which permits (the) land . . .' to be developed under that special exception. Therefore, the special-exception uses provided in the three county zones should have been ignored; but the PRU, although embodied in Rockville's R-90 zone as in the nature of a special exception, had actually been approved and, therefore, should have been considered. Hence, contrary to the clear legislative intent expressed in the statute, Rockville has 'place(d) that land in a zoning classification (R-90) which permits (as) a land use' the PRU.

We pass, then, to the question whether the use permitted by Rockville's zoning classification is 'substantially different' from the uses specified by any of the three county zones. We think it is. All three provide basically for single-family dwellings, differing...