Maryon v. City of Atlanta
| Decision Date | 18 April 1919 |
| Docket Number | 1059. |
| Citation | 99 S.E. 116,149 Ga. 35 |
| Parties | MARYON v. CITY OF ATLANTA. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
It is not a prerequisite to suite against a municipal corporation in this state, for injury to person or property, that the written notice required under Civ. Code 1910, § 910, should specify any amount of money claimed as damages.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
The words "extent of such injury," as used in Civ. Code 1910, § 910, requiring written notice of a claim for damages for injury to state the time, place, and extent of such injury, do not mean the amount of damages claimed in dollars and cents, but the nature, character, and particulars of the injury.
[Ed Note.--For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Extent.]
Certified Questions from Court of Appeals.
Action by H. S. Maryon against the City of Atlanta. Question of sufficiency of written notice of time, place, and extent of plaintiff's injury and of the negligence of defendant certified from Court of Appeals. Question answered in the negative.
Hines & Jordan, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Jas. L Mayson and S.D. Hewlett, both of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
The Court of Appeals desires instruction from the Supreme Court upon the following questions involved in this case:
"In order to comply with section 910 of the Civil Code of 1910, requiring that a claim in writing be presented to the governing authority of a municipality before suit to enforce a demand for 'money damages' on account of injuries to person or property, is it essential that any particular amount of money as damages shall be named or specified therein?"
As this question must, in our opinion, be answered in the negative such answer will necessarily cover the other questions propounded, thus making it unnecessary to specifically set them forth, as well as the answers thereto.
Section 910 of the Civil Code declares:
"No person, firm or corporation, having a claim for money damages against any municipal corporation of this state on account of injuries to person or property, shall bring any suit at law or equity against said municipal corporation for the same, without first presenting in writing such claim to the governing authority of said municipality for adjustment, stating the time, place, and extent of such injury, as near as practicable, and the negligence which caused the same, and no such suite shall be entertained by the courts against such municipality until the cause of action therein has been first presented to said governing authority for adjustment; provided, that upon the presentation of such claim said governing authority shall consider and act upon the same within thirty days from said presentation, and that the action of said governing authority, unless it results in the settlement thereof, shall in no sense be a bar to a suit therefor in the court; provided, that the running of the statute of limitations shall be suspended during the time that the demand for payment before such authorities is pending, without action on their part."
The statute codified in this section is in derogation of common right, and should be strictly construed as against the municipality, and it was so construed in Langley v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S.E. 486 (11), 98 Am.St.Rep. 133, where it was held that the statute "does not require absolute exactness of description, but simply that information as to the matters referred to may be given with sufficient definiteness to enable the city authorities to examine into the alleged injuries and determine whether the claim shall be adjusted without suit."
Mr. Justice Cobb, speaking for the court, said in the opinion, referring to the act in question:
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