Masch v. Barnhart

Decision Date20 December 2005
Docket NumberCase No. 05-C-625.
Citation406 F.Supp.2d 1038
PartiesKathryn M. MASCH, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

David F. Traver, Traver Law Offices, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff.

Matthew V. Richmond, United States Department of Justice Office of the U.S. Attorney, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ADELMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Kathryn Masch applied for social security disability benefits, claiming that she was unable to work due to liver disease, degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, diabetes, obesity, pain, fatigue, and depression. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied her claim initially and on reconsideration, as did an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") after a hearing. The Social Security Appeals Council then denied plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the SSA. See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir.2005). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Disability Standard

The SSA has adopted a sequential five-step test for determining whether the claimant is disabled. Under this test, the ALJ must determine:

(1) Whether the claimant is currently working;

(2) If not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment;1

(3) If so, whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in SSA regulations as being presumptively disabling;2

(4) If not, whether the claimant retains the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform her past relevant work; and

(5) If not, whether the claimant can make the adjustment to other work.

Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir.2004).

An affirmative answer at any step leads either to the next step, or, at steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step three, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled. The claimant carries the burden of producing evidence at steps one through four, but if she reaches step five, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir.2001). The SSA may carry this burden by relying on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE"), who evaluates the claimant's ability to work in light of her limitations, or through the use of the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines," (a.k.a. "the Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, a chart that classifies a person as disabled or not disabled based on her exertional ability, age, education and work experience. Elbert v. Barnhart, 335 F.Supp.2d 892, 895 (E.D.Wis.2004). However, the ALJ may not rely on the Grid to deny a claim if the claimant's attributes do not correspond precisely to a particular rule, or if non-exertional limitations (e.g., pain, or mental, sensory, postural or skin impairments) substantially reduce the claimant's range of work. In such a case, the ALJ must solicit the testimony of a VE, although she may use the Grid as a "framework" for making a decision. Samuel v. Barnhart, 295 F.Supp.2d 926, 929 (E.D.Wis.2003).

B. Standard of Review of ALJ's Decision

The district court's review of the ALJ's decision is limited to determining whether the decision is supported by "substantial evidence" and consistent with applicable law. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir.2004). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Cannon v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir.2000). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the district court must review the entire record, taking into account both evidence in support of a conclusion and anything that fairly detracts from its weight, Young v. Sec'y of Health & Human Services, 957 F.2d 386, 388-89 (7th Cir.1992), but it may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir.2000). Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is entitled to benefits, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ. Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997).

If the ALJ commits an error of law, however, reversal is required without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual findings. Id. The ALJ commits such an error if she fails to comply with the SSA's regulations and rulings. Lopez-Navarro v. Barnhart, 207 F.Supp.2d 870, 878 (E.D.Wis.2002) (citing Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir.1991)). The ALJ's decision must also demonstrate the path of her reasoning, and the evidence must lead logically to her conclusion. Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir.1996). While the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, she must address the important evidence and provide at least a glimpse into her reasoning. Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 889.

II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Evidence

At the time of the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff was 51 years old, 5'6" tall and weighed 285 pounds. (Tr. at 299.) She stated that she had last worked as a courier,3 and that she stopped because she was "slowing down [and] just couldn't do it anymore." (Tr. at 300.)

Plaintiff testified that she constantly experienced pain in her lower back and right side, between her bra strap and waist. She also stated that she had trouble grasping things with her right (dominant) hand and that her knees hurt due to arthritis. (Tr. at 301; 310-11.) She stated that her knees had given out, and she had fallen down the stairs a few times. She also stated that she had pain in her ankle, elbow and wrist joints all the time. She said that she relieved her pain with medication, hot showers and baths, and Lidocaine patches, and that she also took insulin for her diabetes. (Tr. 302-03.) Plaintiff testified that she was not receiving psychiatric treatment but did take medication for depression. She also stated that she had regular crying episodes and withdrew from people. (Tr. at 301, 310.)

Plaintiff testified that on a typical day she watched television and visited her daughter and grandchildren, who lived half a block away. She stated that she was able to bathe and dress herself (Tr. at 304) but needed help getting out of the tub (Tr. at 302). She testified that she could cook small meals, sometimes wash dishes, and dust once in awhile, but could not do laundry or yard work. She stated that she used a cane when she walked long distances or where there was nothing to hold onto. She testified that she could not lift her grandchild, who weighed 22 pounds. She stated that she drove but only short distances, and that she had a handicapped parking pass for her car. (Tr. at 305-08.) She said that she got lost while driving, became fatigued, and considered giving her license up because of "black floaters" in her field of vision. (Tr. at 310; 316-17.)

Plaintiff's daughter Rebecca, a registered nurse, completed an activities questionnaire for the SSA, in which she indicated that plaintiff had become very depressed, gained weight, cried frequently, and rarely went out. (Tr. at 96-97.) She stated that plaintiff could not walk far before her legs bothered her, and that plaintiff never did yard work, could not move anything heavy, and became very short of breath after exertion. (Tr. at 98-100.) In a separate questionnaire, plaintiff's other daughter, Randi, indicated that plaintiff isolated herself, rarely went anywhere, and had little interest in activities. (Tr. at 135-37.) She wrote that plaintiff easily got lost when driving, could not stand in one spot for long when cooking, could do little walking without discomfort, and could not finish cleaning due to pain and fatigue. (Tr. at 138.) She stated that plaintiff lost her balance easily and had fallen down the stairs. (Tr. at 139.)

Plaintiff received medical treatment for her conditions at Froedert Hospital and the Medical College of Wisconsin, primarily from nurse practitioner Leann Walker and Dr. Gary Kolesari. In October 2001, she was seen complaining of back pain with radiculation down her leg, and an x-ray revealed mild to moderate multi-level degenerative disc disease with degenerative facet disease extending from L4 through S1. (Tr. at 187.) On January 21, 2002, plaintiff was seen complaining of right flank pain and given Vicodin. (Tr. at 181.) Lab work showed high cholesterol, triglycerides, and creatinine. (Tr. at 182-83.) In February 2002, she underwent a sonogram, which revealed normal kidneys and a fatty liver. (Tr. at 180.)

Plaintiff had additional lab work done on August 26, 2002, which again revealed elevated creatinine levels. (Tr. at 173.) On August 28, plaintiff called her doctor and stated that she was having problems with her blood sugar. (Tr. at 176.) On September 4, she underwent a CT scan of the abdomen related to her complaint of right upper quadrant pain and elevated liver enzymes, which revealed mild hepatomegaly4 with diffuse fatty infiltration of the liver. (Tr. at 148.)

On January 16, 2003, plaintiff underwent another abdominal scan following continued complaints of right flank pain, but the scan was normal. (Tr. at 170.) Lab work from February 27 revealed elevated glucose, calcium, and uric acid. (Tr. at 213.) Plaintiff was also seen on that date by NP Walker, who noted that plaintiff was depressed, unable to get up and perform her daily activities, and felt very fatigued. (Tr. at 215.)

In March 2003, plaintiff was seen for post herpetic neuralgia5 and back pain. X-rays taken on March 29 revealed scattered osteophytic degenerative changes at the cervico-thoracic junction and minimal L3 through L5 osteophytic...

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