Mascot Oil Co. v. United States, K-67.

Decision Date02 June 1930
Docket NumberNo. K-67.,K-67.
Citation42 F.2d 309
PartiesMASCOT OIL CO., Inc., v. UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. Claims Court

Theodore B. Benson, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

George H. Foster, of Washington, D. C., and Herman J. Galloway, Asst. Atty. Gen. (McClure Kelley, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States.

Before BOOTH, Chief Justice, and GREEN, LITTLETON, and WILLIAMS, Judges.

GREEN, Judge.

This action is begun to recover taxes which had been paid after the period of limitations had run against their collection. Counsel for plaintiff supports its case by the same line of argument that was presented to this court in Oak Worsted Mills v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 539, and Gotham Can Co. v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 749, in both instances adversely to the plaintiffs therein. In the Oak Worsted Mills Case, supra, we held that sections 607 and 611 of the act of 1928 (26 USCA §§ 2607, 2611) prevented a recovery. In the Gotham Can Co. Case, supra, we held that section 1106(a) of the act of 1926 (26 USCA § 1249 note) was of no benefit to the plaintiff where the taxes in question had been collected prior to the time when the revenue bill of 1926 went into effect unless it was shown that the taxes were overpaid. It was expressly stated, however, in that decision that the court did not pass on the effect of the provision in the revenue bill of 1928 which repealed section 1106(a) of the act of 1926 as of the date of its enactment. In the case at bar, it appears that the taxes in controversy were collected after the 1926 act went into force. The decision in the Gotham Can Co. Case is therefore not controlling herein because it does not determine the construction or effect of section 1106(a) when the taxes were collected after the period of limitations had expired and the 1926 act was in force. But we do not find it necessary to determine the question left open by the Gotham Can Co. Case for the reason that the defendant sets up an entirely new and different defense from anything pleaded in the two cases cited above and insists that the facts shown in support of this defense are sufficient by themselves and alone to warrant a judgment in its favor.

This defense is that the evidence shows that the plaintiff had made a deposit in a bank as a guaranty of the payment of the taxes in controversy when finally determined. In consideration of this deposit, the bank advised the collector of internal revenue that it would pay the amount of taxes finally determined by the commissioner to be due from the plaintiff, the case was held up until determination had been made, and thereafter when such taxes were finally determined the plaintiff paid the amount thereof and obtained a release of the deposit. The defendant contends that the principles laid down in the case of United States v. John Barth Co., 279 U. S. 370, 49 S. Ct. 366, 367, 73 L. Ed. 743, in any event prevent the plaintiff from recovering the refund in controversy. In that case the government brought suit to enforce a bond given by the defendant and its surety for the payment of taxes, and the defense was made that payment was exacted after the collection of the tax was barred by the statute of limitations. The court said that neither the statute of limitations nor section 1106(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (26 USCA § 1249 note) applied to an action upon a bond, and the signers of the bond were not relieved from the obligation arising out of that instrument. The court further said that —

"* * * The taxpayer was permitted by a bond temporarily to postpone the collection and to substitute for his tax liability his contract under the bond. The object of the bond was not only to prevent the immediate collection of the tax, but also to prevent the running of time against the government."

Judgment was accordingly rendered against the taxpayer.

It is true that in the case last cited the bond was filed prior to the time when the statute of limitations expired and in the instant case the deposit was made in the bank...

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  • Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • August 10, 2016
    ...and Indiana, the expiration of the statute of limitations period does not extinguish the underlying debt. See Mascot Oil Co. v. United States , 42 F.2d 309, 311 (Ct. Cl. 1930), aff'd , 282 U.S. 434, 51 S.Ct. 196, 75 L.Ed. 444 (1931) (“[T]he statute of limitations or other bar against a reme......
  • BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • December 11, 2006
    ...and the creditor may avail himself of every other lawful means of realizing on the debt or obligation. See Mascot Oil Co. v. United States, 70 Ct.Cl. 246, 42 F.2d 309 (1930), affirmed 282 U.S. 434, 51 S.Ct. 196, 75 L.Ed. 444; and 33 Comp. Gen. 66, 1953 WL 526 (1953). See also Ready-Mix Conc......
  • Glenn v. Cavalry Invs. LLC (In re Glenn)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • January 5, 2016
    ...definition. The law recognizes such. In most jurisdictions, time-barred debts remain. Broadrick, 532 B.R. at 74 ; Mascot Oil Co. v. U.S., 42 F.2d 309, 311 (Ct.Cl.1930), aff'd, 282 U.S. 434, 51 S.Ct. 196, 75 L.Ed. 444 (1931) ("[T]he statute of limitations or other bar against a remedy for th......
  • In re Matter of Collection of Debts, B-189154
    • United States
    • Comptroller General of the United States
    • May 8, 1979
    ... ... B-189154Comptroller General of the United StatesMay 8, 1979 ... Compensation ... - withholding - debt ... government of the United States or against it and to ... superintend the recovery of debts due the United ... realizing on the debt or obligation. See mascot oil Co. v ... United States, 42 F.2d 309 (ct.Cl. 1930), affirmed 282 ... ...
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