Mashni Revocable Living Tr. v. Mashni
| Decision Date | 26 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 358017 |
| Parties | MARY T. MASHNI REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, by MARY MASHNI, Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. ESTATE OF BOULOS N. MASHNI, by ROUBA HANNA AL-ARAJ, Personal Representative, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 20-015375-CB
Before: YATES, P.J., and JANSEN and SERVITTO, JJ.
Plaintiff Mary Mashni, as trustee of the Mary T. Mashni Revocable Living Trust, brought this action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against her son, defendant Boulos N Mashni, seeking recovery for a series of loans that she and her husband allegedly made to Boulos between 2003 and 2013 that were not repaid. In lieu of filing an answer, Boulos moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), alleging that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the statute of frauds. The trial court denied Boulos's motion. After Boulos filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal the trial court's order he died while the application was still pending. This Court thereafter granted the application and substituted Rouba Hanna Al-Araj, the personal representative of Boulos's estate, as defendant-appellant.[1]Mary T Mashni Revocable Living Trust v Estate of Boulos N Mashni, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 29, 2021 (Docket No 358017). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
This action involves a series of alleged loans that Mary Mashni and Naim Mashni made to their son, Boulos Mashni, all pursuant to oral agreements.[2] First, plaintiff alleged that in 2003, she and Naim transferred to Boulos the assets of two corporate entities-one that owned and operated a gas station and one that owned the gas station land. According to plaintiff, the business and real estate had a combined value of $2,700,000, and Boulos agreed to repay them $1,800,000 in monthly installments of $10,000 each, beginning when he had the financial wherewithal to repay the debt. We will refer to this alleged loan as the "gas station loan." Second, plaintiff alleged that in 2006, she and Naim obtained a 15-year, $200,000 home equity loan and, in turn, gave the loan proceeds to Boulos pursuant to an oral loan agreement whereby he agreed to repay the loan by making plaintiff and Naim's monthly mortgage payments until the debt was satisfied. We will refer to this second loan as the "home equity loan." Third, plaintiff alleged that in 2012, she loaned Boulos $33,000, which he promised to repay, but never did. We will refer to this third loan as the "$33,000 loan." Fourth, plaintiff alleged that Boulos, who held a power of attorney for plaintiff and Naim, borrowed $254,000 from plaintiff's and Naim's bank accounts between 2006 and 2007, which he promised to repay, but never did. We will refer to this fourth series of loans as the "bank account loans." Plaintiff alleged that Boulos made two monthly payments toward the home equity loan shortly after that loan agreement was made, but he did not make any additional payments, and he did not pay back any of the other loans. Plaintiff alleged that she demanded repayment of all of the loans in January 2017, but Boulos did not pay back any of the loans.
On November 24, 2020, plaintiff brought this action against Boulos for repayment of the four loans. She asserted claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. She also asserted a claim for equitable estoppel, alleging that Boulos's pleas of financial hardship over the years and reassurances that he would repay all the loans estopped him from asserting defenses based on the statute of limitations and the statute of frauds. In lieu of filing an answer, Boulos moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the statute of frauds. Boulos also requested sanctions under MCL 600.2591, alleging that plaintiff's claims were frivolous. Plaintiff denied that her claims were untimely or barred by the statute of frauds, but further argued that to the extent that the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds applied, Boulos should be equitably estopped from asserting those defenses. The trial court ruled that Boulos failed to establish that any of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds. It further held that, to the extent that the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds might later be found to apply, development of a factual record was necessary to resolve plaintiff's claim that Boulos should be equitably estopped from asserting those defenses. Accordingly, the trial court denied Boulos's motion for summary disposition. This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal the trial court's order.
In this case, Boulos did not submit any affidavit or other documentary evidence in support of his motion. Plaintiff, however, submitted her own affidavit, which the trial court was permitted to consider in determining whether any questions of fact existed that could provide a basis for recovery.
Defendant argues that all of plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff's claims are subject to the six-year limitations period that applies to actions for breach of contract. MCL 600.5807(9). Defendant argues, however, that all of plaintiff's claims accrued more than six years before plaintiff filed this action on November 24, 2020.
"Generally, the burden is on the defendant who relies on a statute of limitations defense to prove facts that bring the case within the statute." Kincaid v Cardwell, 300 Mich.App. 513, 522; 834 N.W.2d 122 (2013). "Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of limitations runs from the time the claim accrues." MCL 600.5827. Unless otherwise provided by statute, "the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damages results." Id. "[T]his Court has generally held that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues when the breach occurs, i.e., when the promisor fails to perform under the contract." Blazer Foods, Inc v Restaurant Props, Inc, 259 Mich.App. 241, 245-246; 673 N.W.2d 805 (2003).
As the trial court observed, resolution of the statute-of-limitations issue depends on when plaintiff's claims accrued. In the context of this case, accrual depended on when Boulos first became obligated to repay the loans and failed to do so. According to plaintiff's complaint, and plaintiff's affidavit, there was no specified repayment date for at least the gas station loan and the $33,000 loan. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Boulos was required to begin repaying the gas station loan "at a future date after [Boulos] had the financial wherewithal to pay the monthly payments of $10,000," and she averred in her affidavit that Boulos "promised that he would pay $10,000 per month for 15 years after he developed the business." Plaintiff did not allege a repayment date for the $33,000 loan in her complaint, but she averred in her affidavit that this loan was payable on demand, and that she demanded payment in January 2017. Plaintiff alleged in both her complaint and her affidavit that the $254,000 bank account loans were payable on demand, and that she demanded payment in January 2017. Regarding the home equity loan for $200,000, plaintiff alleged in her complaint both that Boulos agreed to "make[] the monthly refinancing payments until the loan was paid" and "promis[ed] to make the monthly payments over a period of fifteen years equal to the mortgage payment as increased by the loan." In her affidavit, however, she also averred that this loan was payable on demand, and that she demanded repayment in January 2017. In his motion for summary disposition, Boulos generally emphasized that each of the alleged loan agreements were made much more than six years before plaintiff filed her complaint and generally suggested that any breach would have occurred almost immediately. He acknowledged plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial