Masjedi v. United States, CV 21-2719-FMO (KS)

• Decision Date: 06 April 2021
• Docket Number: NO. CV 21-2719-FMO (KS),CV 21-2719-FMO (KS)
• Parties: NAYRIKA DEBORA MASJEDI, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

NAYRIKA DEBORA MASJEDI, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.

NO. CV 21-2719-FMO (KS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

April 6, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 5, 2020, Nayrika Debora Masjedi ("Plaintiff'), a California resident proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint against the United States of America, President Donald J. Trump, Governor Gavin Newsom, the State of California, and 50 unnamed Doe Defendants (collectively, "Defendants") in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. (Dkt. No. 1-1 ("Complaint").) On March 30, 2021, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal of Civil Action in this Court and attached Plaintiff's state court complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff challenges aspects of the State and Federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic. (See generally Complaint.)

// Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) a trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte and without notice "where the claimant cannot possibly win relief." Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (adopting Ninth Circuit's position in Omar and noting that in such circumstances a sua sponte dismissal "is practical and fully consistent with plaintiffs' rights and the efficient use of judicial resources"). The court's authority in this regard includes sua sponte dismissal of claims against defendants who have not been served and defendants who have not yet answered or appeared. See Abagnin v. AMVAC Chemical Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Reunion, Inc. v. F.A.A., 719 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 n.1 (S.D. Miss. 2010) ("[T]he fact that [certain] defendants have not appeared and filed a motion to dismiss is no bar to the court's consideration of dismissal of the claims against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, given that a court may dismiss any complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).").

In determining whether a complaint should be dismissed at screening, the Court applies the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): "[a] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus, the plaintiff's factual allegations must be sufficient for the court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.").

When a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the court may not supply essential elements of a claim that were not initially pled, Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011), and the court need not accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences," Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

If the court finds that a pro se complaint fails to state a claim, the court must give the pro se litigant leave to amend the complaint unless "it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation marks omitted); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1176 (9th Cir. 2005). However, if amendment of the pleading would be futile, leave to amend may be denied. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) ("'Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend,' Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995), [a]nd the district court's discretion in denying amendment is 'particularly broad' when it has previously given leave to amend.").

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief under federal law and must be dismissed.¹ However, leave to amend is granted.

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II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

The Complaint asserts claims against the following defendants: now former President of the United States Donald Trump;² the United States of America; Governor of California Gavin Newsom; the State of California; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, who "were the alter egos, agents, servants, partners, transferees of any type, successors-in-interest, and/or employees of the named defendants and of one another." (Complaint ¶¶ 9-12, 14-15.) Plaintiff does not specify whether she sues any defendants in their individual or official capacities; rather, she states that each defendant "was/is a participant in the violation of Plaintiff's rights under the US Constitution and the Constitution of the State of California." (Id. ¶¶ 9-12.)

Plaintiff alleges as follows. The COVID-19 pandemic commenced in the United States in early 2020. (Id. ¶ 16.) In response to the pandemic, the United States of America and the State of California, through President Trump and Governor Newsom caused the closure of public and private business and industry, government agencies, and any business not declared an essential service; according to Plaintiff, the closures were effectuated without notice or opportunity for the citizens and Plaintiff to be heard. (Id. ¶ 17.) Consequently, many Americans lost their jobs, businesses, and abilities to earn a living; yet, Defendants continued to collect property taxes. (Id. ¶ 18.) Many of these closures persist, and Americans cannot pay their daily expenses or for basic needs. (Id. ¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff states that "[i]t is unfair and in violation of all human and American rights to close down their ability to earn money but not to mandate a suspension of the obligation to pay bills on time. And when this pandemic is either under control, or a vaccine is formulated Plaintiff and others will be required to work many more hours, 80 hours per week to make up for those losses." (Id. ¶ 21.)

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing to Challenge Laws of General Application.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the federal courts' exercise of judicial power to those matters that constitute "Cases" or "Controversies." "[A]n essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement" is that the plaintiff must have standing to pursue her claims. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To satisfy the Article III standing requirement, a plaintiff must show that (1) she has suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) there is a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of"; and (3) it is " 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" Id. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).

A plaintiff does not have standing "to challenge laws of general application where their own injury is not distinct from that suffered in general by other taxpayers or citizens." Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007). "The party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show . . . that [s]he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . and not merely that [s]he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally." Commonwealth of Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). Hence, "[a] litigant 'raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to [her] and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [her] than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.'" Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 ("Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive." (emphasis in original)).

// In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not clearly identify any "injury in fact" that she suffered as a result of the acts of wrongdoing alleged. Although Plaintiff identifies violations of constitutional and state law for which she asserts Defendants are responsible, she in no way distinguishes her personal injuries from the harm suffered by the general public as a result of Defendants' policies and conduct. More significantly, it appears that Plaintiff's primary grievance is that she, along with the people of California and the United States generally, are suffering restraints of their liberty due to restrictions imposed by the State and Federal governments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As stated above, Plaintiff's allegation that she is suffering these restraints along with all other Californians, and/or all other Americans is insufficient to establish that she has standing to seek relief from the laws and orders at issue. Rather, vindicating Plaintiff's perception of the public interest is the function of legislative and...