Maslak v. Town of Vail

• Citation: 2015 COA 2,345 P.3d 972
• Decision Date: 15 January 2015
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 13CA1870 & 13CA2013
• Parties: Samuel H. MASLAK; Luleta Maslak; R. Glenn Hilliard; Deborah L. Webster; Richard J. Callahan; Mary Celeste Callahan; Olson Family 2012 Trust; Landon Hilliard; 1835 Sunburst Drive, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; and Starfire Company, LTD, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. TOWN OF VAIL, a municipal corporation; and Planning and Environmental Commission of the Town of Vail, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Colorado

345 P.3d 972

2015 COA 2

Samuel H. MASLAK; Luleta Maslak; R. Glenn Hilliard; Deborah L. Webster; Richard J. Callahan; Mary Celeste Callahan; Olson Family 2012 Trust; Landon Hilliard; 1835 Sunburst Drive, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; and Starfire Company, LTD, Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.TOWN OF VAIL, a municipal corporation; and Planning and Environmental Commission of the Town of Vail, Defendants–Appellees.

Court of Appeals No. 13CA1870 & 13CA2013

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. III.

Announced January 15, 2015

Holland & Hart LLP, Christopher H. Toll, Steven T. Collis, Greenwood Village, Colorado; Holland and Hart LLP, Stephen G. Masciocchi, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Hayes Phillips Hoffmann & Carberry, Kelly L. Donlon, Kendra L. Carberry, Denver, Colorado; Hayes Phillips Hoffmann & Carberry, J. Matthew Mire, Vail, Colorado, for Defendants–Appellees Town of Vail, a municipal corporation, and Planning and Environmental Commission of the Town of Vail.

Opinion

Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE

¶ 1 In this municipal land use dispute, plaintiffs—Samuel H. Maslak, Luleta Maslak, R. Glenn Hilliard, Deborah L. Webster, Richard J. Callahan, Mary Celeste Callahan, Olson Family 2012 Trust, Landon Hilliard, 1835 Sunburst Drive, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company, and Starfire Company, LTD (collectively the Homeowners)—appeal the Eagle County District Court's order granting the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by defendants, the Town of Vail (the Town), the Planning and Environmental Commission of the Town of Vail (the Planning Commission), and the Vail Recreation District (the VRD). The Homeowners also appeal the court's order awarding attorney fees to the Town. We vacate the orders and remand the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate the Homeowners' complaint in the Eagle County District Court.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 The Town and the VRD submitted an application to the Planning Commission to amend the Vail Golf Course's conditional use permit so that the golf course could be expanded to accommodate an events center. Over the Homeowners' objections, the Planning Commission approved the application. The Homeowners appealed the Planning Commission's decision to the Town Council, which upheld the decision.

¶ 3 The Homeowners then filed a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) complaint, seeking review of the Town Council's decision. The Homeowners E–Filed the complaint with ICCES, Colorado's E–Filing Provider, on June 28, 2013, which was four days before the 28–day deadline for filing a Rule 106(a)(4) complaint. See C.R.C.P. 106(b) (28–day deadline for filing Rule 106(a)(4) complaints). The administrative assistant who filed it, however, selected the wrong district court (the Denver District Court) from the ICCES drop-down menu, rather than the Eagle County District Court that was noted on the caption.

¶ 4 Three days later, ICCES e-mailed a notice to the administrative assistant indicating that the Denver District Court Clerk had rejected the complaint because of an “incorrect caption.” The rejection notice stated: “please correct and re-submit or submit to correct court.” The administrative assistant read the e-mail notice on July 5, 2013, and immediately submitted the complaint to the correct court, the Eagle County District Court.

¶ 5 Defendants then filed motions in the Eagle County District Court, seeking to dismiss the Homeowners' Rule 106(a)(4) action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As relevant here, the Town argued that the Homeowners “did not file their Complaint until July 5, 2013. Therefore, [they] have failed to meet their jurisdictional requirements of perfecting their appeal within 28 days and their Complaint should be dismissed.” The VRD similarly argued: “The Complaint in this action was not filed until July 5, 2013.... Because [the Homeowners'] Complaint was not filed, and this action not commenced and perfected within twenty-eight (28) days after the final decision complained of, the Court lacks subject matter [jurisdiction] to proceed. [The Homeowners'] Complaint must therefore be dismissed with prejudice.”

¶ 6 In response, the Homeowners argued that they “filed this action in a district court with jurisdiction over the matter and thus properly invoked the jurisdiction of the district courts in a timely manner.” The Homeowners alternatively argued that their misfiling was due to technical difficulties with the E–Filing system, and the Eagle County District Court could therefore permit the complaint to be filed nunc pro tunc to the date it was E–Filed with the Denver District Court.

¶ 7 The Eagle County District Court granted defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rejecting the Homeowners' “technical difficulties” argument. The court did not, however, address the Homeowners' argument that they had “filed [the] action in a district court with jurisdiction over the matter and thus properly invoked the jurisdiction of the district courts in a timely manner.”

¶ 8 The Town then filed a motion for attorney fees, arguing that the Homeowners' continued pursuit of the action against defendants was frivolous and groundless. The court granted the motion and ordered the Homeowners to pay the Town's reasonable attorney fees.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 9 The Homeowners contend that they had invoked district court jurisdiction—including that of the Eagle County District Court—by E–Filing their Rule 106(a)(4) complaint with the Denver District Court before the 28–day jurisdictional deadline for filing a Rule 106(a)(4) complaint. Thus, according to the Homeowners, the Eagle County District Court erred in dismissing their Rule 106(a)(4) complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶ 10 We review de novo whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action. Egelhoff v. Taylor, 2013 COA 137, ¶ 23, 312 P.3d 270 ; see also Prairie Dog Advocates v. City of Lakewood, 20 P.3d 1203, 1207 (Colo. App. 2000). To the extent that our review requires us to construe the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules), we construe them de novo. DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp ., 2013 CO 36, ¶ 24, 303 P.3d 1187. We must construe the Rules “liberally to effectuate their objective to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and their truth-seeking purpose.” Id . ; see also C.R.C.P. 1.

¶ 11 Defendants, however, argue that we should not review this contention because “the Homeowners' argument ... of whether the ... submission to the Denver ... District Court constituted a ‘filing’ was never presented in the trial court.” Specifically, defendants note that the Homeowners cite to C.R.C.P. 121 §§ 1–26(4)–(5) in arguing this issue on appeal, but did not do so when arguing before the Eagle County District Court. Thus, according to defendants, the Homeowners did not preserve for appeal the argument that they had invoked district court jurisdiction—including that of the Eagle County District Court—by timely E–Filing their Rule 106(a)(4) complaint with the Denver District Court. We are not persuaded.

¶ 12 Defendants are correct that the Homeowners cite to Rule 121 §§ 1–26(4)–(5) on appeal, but did not cite to that rule in arguing to the district court. Nevertheless, the Homeowners repeatedly argued to the district court that they had “filed this action in a district court with jurisdiction over the matter and thus properly invoked the jurisdiction of the district courts in a timely manner.” The Town and the VRD likewise argued below that the Eagle County District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Homeowners did not file their Rule 106(a)(4) complaint by the 28–day jurisdictional deadline. These conflicting arguments demonstrate that the issue of whether the Homeowners timely filed their Rule 106(a)(4) complaint in district court, and thus invoked the Eagle County District Court's jurisdiction, was squarely before the Eagle County District Court. The Homeowners' citation to Rule 121 §§ 1–26(4)–(5) simply provides additional support for their argument.

B. Legal Framework

¶ 13 Rule 106(a)(4) authorizes district court review of claims that a governmental body abused its discretion. See C.R.C.P. 106(a)-(a)(4) ( “[R]elief may be obtained in the district court” for claims that a “governmental body ... has ... abused its discretion....”).

¶ 14 Subsection (a)(4)(II) addresses how a Rule 106(a)(4) action is commenced. It provides:

Review pursuant to this subsection (4) shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint....

This is consistent with Rule 121 § 1–26(4), which applies to E–Filings. It states:

4. Commencement of Action—Service of Summons: Cases may be commenced under C.R.C.P. 3 by E–Filing the initial pleading....

¶ 15 Rule 121 § 1–26(5) addresses when an E–Filing is “filed”:

5. E–Filing—Date and Time of Filing: Documents filed in cases on the E–System may be filed under C.R.C.P. 5 through an E–Filing. A document transmitted to the E–System Provider by 11:59 p.m. Colorado time shall be deemed to have been filed with the clerk of the court on that date....

¶ 16 Read together, these rules provide that a litigant may commence Rule 106(a)(4) district court review by E–Filing the Rule 106(a)(4) complaint with the district court, and the complaint shall be deemed to have been filed on the date that it is transmitted to the E–System provider. See C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(II) and 121 §§ 126(4)-(5).

¶ 17 C.R.C.P. 3(b) adds that the court “shall have jurisdiction from (1) the filing of the complaint, or (2) the service of the summons and complaint.” Rule 106(b), however, states:

[A] complaint seeking review under subsection (a)(4) of this Rule shall be filed in the district court not later than 28 days after the final decision of the body or officer.

Our supreme court has held that Rule 106(b)'s 28–day filing requirement is jurisdictional. Citizens...