Masloskie v. Century 21 Am. Real Estate, Inc.

Decision Date01 August 2012
Docket NumberNo. 26225.,26225.
Citation2012 S.D. 58,818 N.W.2d 798
PartiesWayne MASLOSKIE and Sandra Masloskie, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CENTURY 21 AMERICAN REAL ESTATE, INC., a South Dakota Corporation and G. Pat Baldwin, Defendants and Appellees.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Dylan A. Wilde of Wilde & Hunt Prof., LLC, Spearfish, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiffs and appellants.

Rodney Schlauger of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye and Simmons, LLP, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendants and appellees.

ZINTER, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Wayne and Sandra Masloskie sued real estate agent G. Pat Baldwin and Century 21 American Real Estate Inc. on a number of causes of action including actual fraud. Baldwin and Century 21 moved for summary judgment, arguing that all causes of action were barred by statutes of limitation on malpractice involving real estate agents and brokers. The circuit court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims. Masloskies appeal the dismissal of their cause of action for fraud. Because that cause of action is subject to a longer statute of limitations, we reverse and remand that portion of the judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶ 2.] We restate the facts in a light most favorable to Masloskies. In August 2006, Masloskies noticed a listing for a parcel of real property in Meade County. Masloskies contacted Baldwin, the listing agent who worked for Century 21. Baldwin showed Masloskies the property. Wayne Masloskie asked Baldwin how electricity would be supplied to the property. Baldwin represented that Masloskies could connect to a power pole 277 feet away on property owned by the United States Forest Service. Wayne asked Baldwin how he knew they would be able to connect to the power pole on Forest Service property. Baldwin responded that he had discussed the matter with Dave Zwitzeg of Butte Electric. Relying on Baldwin's representations, Masloskies purchased the property in October 2006.

[¶ 3.] When Masloskies began building a home on the property in the spring of 2007, they discovered that Baldwin's representations were not true. The Forest Service would not allow Masloskies to connect a private power line to the Forest Service's pole. Wayne then contacted Dave Zwitzeg of Butte Electric. Zwitzeg indicated that he never told Baldwin that a private party could connect a power line to the power pole on Forest Service property. Baldwin later admitted that he had not contacted the Forest Service to determine whether private purchasers of the property could cross Forest Service property and connect to its power pole. Because Masloskies could not connect to the Forest Service's power pole, they incurred substantial unanticipated expense connecting to an alternate power source more than a half mile away.

[¶ 4.] In June 2011, Masloskies brought suit against Baldwin and Century 21 (hereinafter collectively Baldwin). Masloskies asserted separate causes of action for fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and breach of good faith and fair dealing. Masloskies also sought punitive damages.

[¶ 5.] Baldwin moved for summary judgment on all claims. Baldwin argued that Masloskies' claims were barred by SDCL 15–2–14.6 and SDCL 15–2–14.7, three-year statutes of limitation for malpractice by realtors. Masloskies resisted the motion, arguing that SDCL 15–2–13(6), a six-year statute of limitations for fraud applied. The circuit court granted summary judgment ruling that all causes of action were time barred under the malpractice statutes.

Decision

[¶ 6.] Masloskies argue that the circuit court erred in applying the malpractice statutes of limitation to their claim for fraud. The construction and application of statutes of limitation presents a legal question that we review de novo. Jensen v. Kasik, 2008 S.D. 113, ¶ 4, 758 N.W.2d 87, 88.

[¶ 7.] SDCL 15–2–14.6 is the statute of limitations for realtor “malpractice, error, mistake, or omission.” The statute provides:

No action may be brought against a licensed real estate broker, broker associate, or salesperson, or any agent or employee thereof, for malpractice, error, mistake, or omission, whether based upon contract or tort, unless it is commenced within three years of the occurrence of the alleged malpractice, error, mistake, or omission....

Id.SDCL 15–2–14.7 is a matching statute of limitations that applies to real estate firms. It provides:

No action may be brought against a licensed partnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation of a real estate broker, or any agent or employee thereof, for malpractice, error, mistake, or omission, whether based upon contract or tort, unless it is commenced within three years of the occurrence of the alleged malpractice, error, mistake, or omission....

Id.SDCL 15–2–13(6) is the statute of limitations for fraud. It provides:

Except where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute, the following civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can be commenced only within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued:

...

(6) An action for relief on the ground of fraud....

Id.

[¶ 8.] Masloskies argue that their action for fraud is not one for “malpractice, error, mistake, or omission,” and therefore, SDCL 15–2–14.6 and SDCL 15–2–14.7 do not apply. Baldwin argues that “malpractice” includes a claim for fraud. Baldwin points out that SDCL 15–2–14.6 and SDCL 15–2–14.7 include actions sounding in “contract” or “tort,” and fraud may be the basis of tort and contract causes of action. See Schmidt v. Wildcat Cave, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 114, 117 (S.D.1977). Baldwin also relies on our decision in Bruske v. Hille, in which we noted the Nebraska rule that: [A]ny professional misconduct or any unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or fiduciary duties is ‘malpractice’ and comes within the professional or malpractice statute of limitations.” 1997 S.D. 108, ¶ 13, 567 N.W.2d 872, 876–77 (quoting Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913, 917 (1982)).1 Relying on the Nebraska rule cited in Bruske, Baldwin contends that his alleged misrepresentations, whether negligent or fraudulent, are professional misconduct constituting malpractice within the meaning of the realtor malpractice statute of limitations.

[¶ 9.] Bruske involved a claim against an oral and maxillofacial surgeon for fraud and deceit in failing to timely disclose the risk of a defective dental implant. The issue was whether Bruske's “fraud case [was] actually a medical malpractice claim.” Id. ¶ 1. We concluded that although Bruske's claim was denominated as one for fraud and deceit, it was actually a medical malpractice claim that was governed by the statute of limitations for medical malpractice. Id.

[¶ 10.] Significantly, we arrived at that conclusion before we made note of the Nebraska Supreme Court's language in Colton v. Dewey. We first observed that Bruske's claim was based on her expert's opinion that the defect was known in the oral surgery profession, and therefore, the defendant had a “duty to warn” Bruske of the defective implant. Bruske, 1997 S.D. 108, ¶ 6, 567 N.W.2d at 874–75. We next observed that Bruske failed to allege facts supporting actual fraud; i.e., that the defendant acted “with intent to induce [Bruske] to alter [her] position to [her] injury or risk.” Id. ¶ 9. We noted that [Bruske's] allegations supporting fraud and deceit lack[ed] the usual specificity necessary for such claims.” Id. ¶ 11. For both reasons, we concluded that “when closely examined, [Bruske's] claims sound in negligence [.] Id. ¶ 12. We specifically noted that Bruske's expert medical witness indicated the defendant “breached the standard of care” by not notifying her of the danger of the defective implant. Id. We held that the defendant's “failure to timely notify Bruske of the danger of the implant [ ] [was] the gravamen of her cause of action, and therefore it [was] cognizable under” a malpractice rather than fraud statute of limitations. Id. But, it was only after we had reached that holding that we then, in dictum, surveyed rules in a number of jurisdictions like Nebraska. We used that survey to support the general proposition that [m]edical malpractice characterized as fraud and deceit will not sanction a shift to a more beneficial statute of limitations.” Id. ¶ 13. Consequently, although we used the Nebraska rule to support this additional general proposition, we did not adopt the Nebraska rule to determine which statute of limitations applies in this kind of case.

[¶ 11.] Further, the Nebraska rule cannot be unalterably applied here because the foundation for that rule is not followed in South Dakota. In determining the applicable statute of limitations in professional relationships, Nebraska declines to give separate consideration to allegations of misrepresentation and negligence, or to the different aspects of professional relationships. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 244 Neb. 408, 421, 507 N.W.2d 275, 283 (1993). South Dakota does, however, separately consider allegations of negligence and fraud, as well as the different aspects of the professional relationship to determine the gravamen of the cause of action. See Bruske, 1997 S.D. 108, ¶ 1, 567 N.W.2d at 873 (separately examining whether allegations arising from the surgeon—patient relationship were actually grounded in fraud or malpractice); Rehm v. Lenz, 1996 S.D. 51, ¶ 16, 547 N.W.2d 560, 565 (separately considering allegations of malpractice and fraud in psychologist/counselor—client relationship); Richards v. Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80, 85 (S.D.1995) (same); Morgan v. Baldwin, 450 N.W.2d 783, 786 (S.D.1990) (separately considering the “allegations” to determine the “nature” of a complaint alleging both malpractice and breach of contract in attorney—client relationship). See also Zoss v....

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