Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. v. Metal Trades Council of Amarillo, Tex. and Vicinity, AFL-CIO
Decision Date | 10 February 1984 |
Docket Number | D,No. 83-1568,AFL-CI,HANGER--SILAS,83-1568 |
Citation | 726 F.2d 166 |
Parties | 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3184, 100 Lab.Cas. P 10,845 MASON &MASON COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METAL TRADES COUNCIL OF AMARILLO, TEXAS AND VICINITY,efendant-Appellee. Summary Calendar. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Gibson, Ochsner & Adkins, S. Tom Morris, Amarillo, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
O.R. Buddy Wright, Amarillo, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before REAVLEY, RANDALL and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, Mason & Hanger, originally brought this suit in the state court, and it was removed to the United States District Court by appellee, Trades Council. The suit is to set aside a portion of a labor arbitrator's award. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441. The district court refused to set aside that portion of the award which was the subject of appellant's objection, and appellant appeals.
Appellant shut down its Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, from December 24, 1979, through January 1, 1980. The Trades Council filed a grievance in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement claiming that appellant had no right to shut down the plant and also making certain specific claims. After being denied relief through the grievance procedure, the Trades Council took the matter to arbitration in accordance with the contract. The arbitrator in his award held that the company did have the right under the contract to close down the plant at the time in question. He also held, however, that those employees who were on sick leave at the time the plant was shut down were nevertheless entitled to sick leave benefits under the contract. This is the portion of the award which appellant challenges and sues to set aside.
It is now almost trite to state, and both parties agree, that the courts have no authority to set aside an arbitration award which "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." United Steel Workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse Independent Truck Drivers Union, Local No. 1, 611 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir.1980).
We do not set out the terms of the contract, nor do we parse the reasoning of the arbitrator which is at issue. That is not within our authority. It is sufficient to say that it is clear in this case this arbitrator's award is based upon the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement. He applied the precise wording of certain provisions having to do with dental benefits to other provisions having to do with sick leave benefits to draw his conclusion that the contract required the payment of sick leave benefits during the period the plant was shut down.
We have no authority at all to second guess this interpretation. The important thing is that his decision was without question based upon the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. That is all that is required by the "draw its essence" test. If this were not so, the courts would be in the business of themselves interpreting and applying collective bargaining agreements when the parties have undertaken by contract to submit the dispute to an arbitrator. This would violate the well-established national policy of encouraging the settlement of labor-management disputes by arbitration. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Local Lodge 1609, 621 F.2d 756, 758 (5th...
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