Mason v. Adoue
| Decision Date | 31 October 1902 |
| Parties | MASON v. ADOUE et al.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from district court, Galveston county; Robt. M. Franklin, Judge.
Action by Frank Mason against the Galveston Brewing Company and others, pending which the charter of the independent corporation was revoked, and the action was continued against B. Adoue and others, the stockholders and directors. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
R. H. & Alice S. Tiernan, for appellant. James B. & Chas. J. Stubbs, for appellees.
This suit was brought by the appellant, Frank Mason, against the Galveston Brewing Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Texas for the manufacture and sale of beer and ice, and against the members of its board of directors. Appellant alleged the corporate existence of the defendant, and its active engagement in the manufacture and sale of beer and ice; that it had engaged with other persons in the formation of a pool, trust, or combination in restraint of trade in the articles manufactured by it; that, during the period of its membership in the trust and combination alleged, appellant had purchased large quantities of beer from the concern, for which he had paid the sum of $12,500, which sum he sought to recover against the concern under section 12 of the act of May 25, 1899. By an amendment, appellant alleged that since the institution of his suit the defendant, at the suit of the state, had been adjudged guilty of violations of the act, large penalties recovered against it, and its charter revoked; that upon the revocation of its charter its property remained in the hands of its board of directors in trust for its creditors and stockholders; and the directors were named as defendants, and judgment asked against them. The pleadings are voluminous, and for that reason are not set out at length; the statement of their substance being deemed sufficient for the purposes of this opinion. The defendants, by special exception, questioned the sufficiency of the petition on the ground that it appeared therefrom that the suit was for the recovery of a penalty, and that such an action could not survive the demise of the corporation, and, as that fact also appeared from plaintiff's allegations, his suit should be dismissed. This exception was sustained by the trial court, and, plaintiff refusing to amend, the court entered a judgment of dismissal. From that judgment comes this appeal.
Upon the question thus presented, appellant contends that his suit is not for a penalty, but for liquidated damages for a wrong to his property rights, suffered at the hands of the guilty corporation, and that in holding otherwise the trial court erred. The able briefs and arguments presented by counsel representing the parties to this action, both upon this and the constitutional question, which is also made, disclose much patient labor and research, and have been read by the court with much interest. In our view of the case, however, a disposition of the question first presented will determine this appeal, and it would serve no useful purpose to take up the other questions, or to enter into an extended discussion of the one which we propose to treat.
It is conceded that, if the action is to recover a penalty, the right to recover did not survive the demise of the corporation. Whether the suit is of this nature must be determined by the purpose of the legislature, as disclosed by the language of the act under which the right is asserted. The act in question was approved May 25, 1899, and has the following caption: "An act to prohibit pools, trusts, monopolies and conspiracies to control business and prices of articles: to prevent the formation or operation of pools, trusts, monopolies and combinations of charters of corporations that violates the terms of this act and to authorize the institution of prosecutions and suits therefor." Gen. Laws 1899, p. 246. Now, it is perfectly plain from the statement of the purposes and objects of the act that its object was not remedial, for the benefit of those who might be injured by the violation of its provisions, but punitive and deterrent. The expression "suits and prosecutions therefor" renders it manifest that the suits are designed to further the prohibitive purpose of the act, rather than to make whole the private individual who may have suffered...
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