Mason v. Arizona

• Decision Date: 28 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV-01-2439-PHX-ROS.,CIV-01-2439-PHX-ROS.
• Citation: 260 F.Supp.2d 807
• Parties: Scott A. MASON, Plaintiff, v. State of ARIZONA, a body politic, et al., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

260 F.Supp.2d 807

Scott A. MASON, Plaintiff, v. State of ARIZONA, a body politic, et al., Defendant.

No. CIV-01-2439-PHX-ROS.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

March 28, 2003.

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Scott A. Mason, Rhinelander, WI, pro se.

James Nelson Smith, Jr., Office of Atty. Gen., Liability Management Section, Phoenix, AZ, for State of Arizona, Arizona State Chiropratic Bd., N. Edwin Weathersby, Chery A. Weathersby, Craig Seitz, Sharon A. Seitz, James J. Badge, Deborah Carlson Badge, Norma H. Steinbrenner, Gerhard Steinbrenner, Sandra L. Verlotta, John Verlotta, Lee Miller, Camilla A. Miller, Patrice A. Pritzl, Matthew Neubert.

Lloyd James Andrews, Bryan Nathan Andrews, Bryan Nathan Sandler, Swenson Storer Andrews & Frazelle, PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Daniel E. Gurka.

William H. Sandweg, III, Corrin Koehler Koehler, Robbins & Green PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Edward W. Gurka, Elizabeth E. Gurka.

ORDER

SILVER, District Judge.

This action arose from two patient complaints filed with the Arizona State Board of Chiropractic Examiners ("Board") against Plaintiff. As a result of these complaints, the Board revoked Plaintiffs Arizona license to practice chiropractic medicine. Subsequently, pro se Plaintiff filed this action against the State of Arizona, the Board, the individual members of the Board and their spouses, and his two patients. Plaintiff alleges five claims: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) malicious prosecution; (3) defamation; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress. The various Defendants responded by filing Motions to Dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant dismissal for all Defendants on Plaintiffs federal claim and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the remaining state law claims.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on December 14, 2001 against the following Defendants: (1) the State of Arizona ("State"); (2) the Board; (3) each of the individual members of the Board, its Executive Director, and their spouses ("State Defendants"); (4) Daniel E. Gurka, a former patient of Plaintiff ("Daniel"); and (5) Edward W. Gurka, a former patient of Plaintiff, and his spouse ("Edward").

Plaintiff and each of the Defendants reside in Arizona. (Complaint ¶¶5-16) (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff, invoking federal question and supplemental jurisdiction, alleges the following causes of action: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) malicious prosecution; (3) defamation; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED"). Plaintiff requests relief in the form of injunctions, reinstatement, and damages. (Complaint pp. 26-28) (Doc. # 1). Defendants respond by filing various Motions to Dismiss.

A. Daniel's Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff alleges four state causes of action against Daniel. On March 21, 2002, Daniel filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. # 41). In this Motion, Daniel argues: (1) all claims against him must be dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction; (2) the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs defamation claims; (3) absolute and/or qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs defamation claims; (4) Plaintiff fails to allege a cause of action for IIED; and (5) Plaintiff fails to allege a cause of action for NIED.

On June 3, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Response. (Doc. # 55). Plaintiff "recognizes that an action for defamation accrues and statute of limitations begins to run upon publication," but nevertheless asks the Court to "toll" the statute of limitations in his case. (Response to Daniel pp. 2-3) (Doc. # 55). Plaintiff also argues that, at most, a qualified privilege protects Plaintiff, and requests "additional discovery [be] undertaken" to determine if Daniel violated this privilege. Id. at pp. 3-4. Finally, Plaintiff asks leave of the Court to amend his pleadings to properly state a cause of action for the IIED and NIED claims. Id. at pp. 4-5. Daniel filed a Reply on June 6, 2002 that simply restated his prior arguments. (Doc. # 58).

B. The State's Motion to Dismiss

The State filed its Motion to Dismiss on. March 26, 2002. (Doc. # 42). It argued that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars all claims; (2) Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), bars the § 1983 claim; (3) absolute and/or qualified immunity bars all claims; (4) failure to comply with Arizona notice of claims statute A.R.S. § 12-821.01 bars all state claims; (5) statute of limitation A.R.S. § 12-821 bars all state claims; and (6) Plaintiff fails to allege a cause of action under § 1983. Moreover, the State also joins Daniel's Motion to Dismiss in part.

Plaintiff responded on June 3, 2002. (Doc. # 57). In the Response, Plaintiff concedes that Will bars his § 1983 claim against the State. (Response to State p. 4) (Doc. #57). Furthermore, Plaintiff concedes that both (1) the notice of claims and (2) statute of limitations bars all of his state law claims against the State. Id at pp. 5-6.

The State filed a Reply on June 13, 2002. (Doc. #60). Recognizing that Plaintiff conceded that all of his claims against the State fail, the State requests dismissal, which will be granted.

C. State Defendants' and Board's Motion to Dismiss

The State Defendants and Board filed a joint Motion to Dismiss on March 29, 2002. (Doc. # 43). They requested dismissal because: (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars all claims against the Board and all official capacity claims against the State Defendants; (2) Will bars the § 1983 claim against the Board and all official capacity claims against the State Defendants; (3) absolute immunity bars all claims; (4) qualified immunity bars all claims; (5) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiffs attempts to re-litigate the decisions of the state's superior court, and res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Plaintiffs attempt to relitigate the revocation of his license; (6) failure to comply with Arizona's notice of claim statute bars all state law claims; (7) the statute of limitations bars all state law claims; (8) failure to exhaust administrative remedies bars all state law claims; (9) the Board is a non-jural state entity not subject to suit; and (10) Plaintiff fails to allege a cause of action under § 1983. Additionally, both the State Defendants and Board partially join Daniel's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 41).

Plaintiff filed a Response on June 3, 2002. (Doc. # 56). Plaintiff concedes that Will bars his § 1983 claim against the Board. (Response to State Def. and Board p. 5) (Doc. #56). Plaintiff also concedes that both (1) the notice of claims and (2) statute of limitations bars all of his state law claims only against State Defendant Pritzel. Id. at pp. 9-10. However, Plaintiff disputes the rest of Defendants arguments. On June 13, 2002, Defendants filed a Reply. (Doc. #59).

D. Edward's Motion to Dismiss

Edward filed his Motion to Dismiss on April 1, 2002. (Doc. #44). He argues that: (1) Plaintiff fails to allege a malicious prosecution cause of action; (2) the statute of limitations bars the defamation claims; (3) Plaintiff fails to allege an IIED cause of action; and (4) Plaintiff fails to allege a NIED cause of action. Moreover, Edward partially joins Daniel's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 41).

Plaintiff responds by conceding that his malicious prosecution claim fails. Additionally, Plaintiff "recognizes that an action for defamation accrues and [the] statute of limitations begins to run upon publication," but nevertheless asks the Court to "toll" the statute of limitations in his case. (Response to Edward pp. 2-3) (Doc. #54). Finally, Plaintiff asks leave of the Court to amend his pleadings to properly state a cause of action for the IIED and NIED claims. Id. at pp. 3-5. Edward filed a Reply on June 20, 2002 (Doc. #61) that simply joins Daniel's Reply (Doc. # 58).

DISCUSSION

This is a federal question case with state causes of action included under supplemental jurisdiction. The parties agree that Arizona law applies to the state causes of action. Each of the Motions to Dismiss request dismissal pursuant to both Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

A. Legal Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

A court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Barnett v. Centoni 31 F.3d 813, 813 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Buckey v. Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir.1992)); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995); W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.1981).¹ "The federal rules require only a `short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). "The Rule 8 standard contains a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim." Id. at 249 (quotation marks omitted). "All that is required are sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them." McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir.1991) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1202 (2d ed.1990)). Indeed, though "`it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely[,] ... that is not the test.'" Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). "`The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Id. Finally, it is well established that pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded[,] are held to less stringent standards than formal...