Mason v. Lynch

• Decision Date: 06 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 849,849
• Parties: Cathy MASON v. Chauncey R. LYNCH.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

822 A.2d 1281

151 Md. App. 17

Cathy MASON v. Chauncey R. LYNCH.

No. 849, Sept. Term, 2002.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 6, 2003.

David M. Kopstein (Bryan Perilman and Dross, Levenstein, Perilman & Kopstein on the brief), Seabrook, for appellant.

Thomas R. Mooers (Brian C. Malone and Mooers & Associates on the brief), Washington, DC, for appellee.

Argued before SALMON, JAMES R. EYLER, and KRAUSER, JJ.

JAMES R. EYLER, Judge.

This case, arising out of an automobile accident, was tried before a jury, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff on liability and a finding of $0.00 damages. After judgment was entered and became final, the plaintiff noted this appeal and presents the following questions: (1) did the court err in permitting the defendant to introduce "photographs showing minimal property damage and argue that the photographs support an inference that the plaintiff was not injured, absent expert testimony establishing a correlation between property damage and personal injury," and (2) did the court err in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial "where the jury awards the plaintiff no damages despite the testimony of all expert witnesses that the plaintiff suffered at least some injury and required at least some medical treatment as a result of the subject occurrence." We shall answer both in the negative.

Factual Background

On June 23, 1998, Cathy Mason, appellant, was stopped for traffic when a vehicle operated by Chauncey R. Lynch, appellee, collided with the rear of a vehicle that was stopped behind appellant's vehicle, forcing that vehicle to collide with the rear of appellant's vehicle. Appellant filed suit against appellee in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, seeking compensation for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the collision.

Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude from evidence photographs of appellant's vehicle showing minimal damage, and to prevent appellee from arguing that there was any correlation between the extent of damage to the vehicle and the extent of injury sustained by appellant. The court denied the motion.¹

At trial, appellant testified, and also called Gregory Mason, appellant's brother and a passenger in appellant's vehicle; Warren Goldman, the driver of the vehicle struck by appellee and forced into appellant's vehicle; and Katrina Sutton, a friend of appellant, who testified to appellant's physical condition before and after the accident. Appellant also introduced into evidence a portion of appellee's deposition testimony. Pursuant to stipulation, appellant placed into evidence medical reports and medical bills relating to her treatment following the accident. The evidence introduced by appellant indicated that appellant sustained a closed head injury, cervical strain, and a temporomandibular disorder, producing pain and headaches. Appellant claimed medical expenses in the amount of $13,846.60 and lost wages in the amount of $373.97.

Appellee testified on behalf of himself and, pursuant to stipulation, placed into evidence a medical report prepared by a physician who examined appellant at appellee's request. The report from this physician indicated that appellant sustained a minor soft tissue strain of her neck and that the fair and reasonable treatment for that injury consisted of a hospital visit, two visits to her primary care physician, and physical therapy treatments through August 1998. Based on the list of medical expenses introduced by appellant, we have computed the total cost for that medical care at $1,928.60.

There was virtually no disagreement with respect to the facts relating to the happening of the accident. Liability was not admitted, but appellee had little to offer other than requiring appellant to prove her case. Appellee concentrated his efforts on the issue of damages. In closing argument, appellee's counsel commented on (1) the photographs showing minimal damage to appellant's vehicle, (2) appellant's testimony that she did not hit her body on the vehicle at impact and did not claim any injury at the scene, and (3) the timing of medical treatment and lawyer referral to health care providers.

The jury returned a verdict for appellant with respect to liability but assessed damages at $0.00.

Appellant filed a motion for new trial, arguing that a new trial was warranted because (1) the jury's verdict was contrary to the undisputed evidence, and (2) the jury was improperly allowed to speculate that a correlation exists between property damage and personal injury. The court denied the motion, and the present appeal ensued.

Discussion

Appellant contends that the court erred in two respects. First, the court erred in permitting appellee to introduce the photographs of appellant's vehicle and to argue a correlation between the extent of damage to the vehicle and appellant's injuries. Appellant argues that such evidence and argument was improper because, in the absence of expert testimony showing a correlation, it was irrelevant and permitted the jury to speculate. Second, the court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial on the issue of damages because the jury's verdict was contrary to the evidence, indicating that at least some injury had occurred.

Turning to the first issue, appellant urges us to follow a bright-line approach recently adopted by Delaware's highest court. In Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36 (Del.2001), the Supreme Court of Delaware held that: (1) "[a]s a general rule, a party in a personal injury case may not directly argue that the seriousness of personal injuries from a car accident correlates to the extent of the damage to the cars, unless the party can produce competent expert testimony on the issue," id. at 40, (2) "[c]ounsel may not argue by implication what counsel may not argue directly," i.e., may not characterize the accident as a fender-bender or otherwise downplay the seriousness of the accident, id. at 40-41, and (3) the court erred in admitting the photographs of plaintiff's car without a specific instruction limiting the jury's use of the photographs. Id. at 38. For the following reasons, we decline to adopt and apply Davis to the facts of this case.

First, despite many similarities, there exists one important distinction between Davis and this case. Unlike the present case, the defendant in Davis conceded liability, and only the damage issue was submitted to the jury. Id. The issues determine the scope of relevance for purposes of determining the admissibility of evidence.

In Davis, the court recognized that the trial court's admissibility determination required weighing the probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. at 41. The evidentiary rule in Davis contained the same language as Maryland's version of the rule. Id.; compare D.R.E. 403 with Maryland Rule 5-403. The court began by stating that, even when the sole issue at trial is damages, photographs of the plaintiff's car are not per se inadmissible because they "could conceivably serve some valid purpose other than supporting the minimal damage/minimal injury inference." Id. When applying the rule to the facts of the case, the court concluded that, in a trial where the parties agreed on the nature and the location of the damage to plaintiff's car and the sole issue for the jury was damages, "we can discern no relevancy to the photographs other than to suggest that [plaintiff] could not have sustained serious injuries from an apparently minor accident, and this inference is impermissible." Id. at 42. Accordingly, the Davis court explained that "the court should have immediately instructed the jury that there is no evidence of a correlation between the damage shown in the photographs and the severity of [plaintiff's] personal injuries," and held that its failure to do so constituted reversible error. Id.

This was not the situation in the present case in that appellee did not admit liability and, therefore, forced appellant to carry the burden of proof on liability as well as damages. Despite appellant's assertion that the photographs were not relevant, the crux of her argument is that the photographs, coupled with defense counsel's argument regarding the correlation between minimal property damage and minimal injury, invited the jury to engage in unsupported speculation. In reviewing the trial court's admission of the photographs, we rely on the established principle that admission of such evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. See Rose v. State Clifton T. Perkins Hosp., 26 Md. App. 358, 366, 338 A.2d 311 (1975)

; Morris v. Calvin Coolidge Peace, 14 Md.App. 681, 688, 288 A.2d 600 (1972). We can not say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the photographs were relevant and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Our review of other cases discussing the admissibility of photographs under similar factual scenarios suggests that while other courts employ an approach like the one in Davis, i.e., using the rule regarding relevancy that balances probative value and unfair prejudice, generally they are not as quick as the Davis court to disregard the trial court's determination. In Davis, although the court expressly stated that such photographs are not per se inadmissible, even when the sole issue at trial is damages, it went on to conclude that it could find no possible relevancy where the parties had agreed on the nature and location of damages to the car. Davis, 770 A.2d at 41-42. Other courts have been more willing to accept the trial court's discretionary determination that the photographs were relevant to the question of damages. See Gambrell v. Zengel, 110 N.J.Super. 377, 265 A.2d 823, 824-25 (1970)

("The possibility of some inflammatory effect on the jury as...