Morris v. Peace

• Decision Date: 21 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 353,353
• Parties: John M. MORRIS et ux. v. Calvin Coolidge PEACE.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 681

14 Md.App. 681

288 A.2d 600

John M. MORRIS et ux. v. Calvin Coolidge PEACE.

No. 353.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 21, 1972.

Certiorari Denied June 9, 1972.

Gary R. Alexander, Marlow Heights, with whom were Vernon G. Haas, of Giordano, Alexander, Haas & Mahoney, Marlow Heights, on brief for appellants.

Edward B. Layne, Jr., of McInerney, Layne & McCormick, Rockville, on brief, for appellee.

Argued before ANDERSON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

THOMPSON, Judge.

The Court of Appeals has recently and repeatedly held that when an accident occurs in another state, the substantive rights of the parties, even though all are domiciled in Maryland, are determined by the law of the place of the injury. Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271, White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 352, 223 A.2d 763. We are primarily concerned in the instant case with whether or not the law of Virginia was properly invoked and properly interpreted. The particular contentions will be set forth hereinafter.

In Fairfax County, Virginia, March 18, 1967 was a

clear, sunny day and visibility was good. At approximately 4:00 P.M., the plaintiff/appellant, John M. Morris, was operating a Dodge panel-truck in a northerly direction on U.S. Route 1. The defendant/appellee, Calvin Coolidge Peace, was operating a 1963 red Ford automobile in an easterly direction on Frye Road. The appellee intended to turn left onto U.S. 1 and travel in a northerly direction. At the time of the accident, traffic on Frye Road was controlled by a stop sign. The major arterial highway, U.S. Route 1 had three lanes southbound and two lanes northbound. Frye Road terminated at Route 1 and consisted of one eastbound and one westbound lane.

The appellee Mr. Peace, testified that in obedience to the stop sign he came to a full stop; he looked to his left and right, observed a break in traffic, and concluded that he had sufficient time to enter Route 1 and make his left turn. He testified that he gave no turn signals, and prior to the impact did not again look to his right; he looked only straight ahead and concentrated on making a left turn into the nearest northbound lane of traffic. He testified that he had almost completed the turn and that he had 'about ten degrees to be straight' when his automobile was struck on the right front wheel and bumper area by the vehicle driven by the appellant, John M. Morris. The two vehicles veered from each other with appellants' vehicle proceeding in a northeasterly direction onto the east shoulder of Route 1 and appellee's vehicle proceeding in a counterclockwise fashion across the center line of U.S. Route 1, north of the intersection into the southbound lanes colliding approximately head on with a southbound vehicle operated by a Sgt. Ross.

Appellee, Mr. Peace, testified that prior to the impact his maximum speed was twenty (20) miles per hour. In a conversation at the scene of the accident, both the appellant-driver and the appellee acknowledged they had not seen each other until immediately prior to the collision, and the appellant-driver, according to appellee, stated his attention was distracted by a vehicle in a parking lot on his right that appeared to be attempting to enter the highway.

Lenia Miller, who was a passenger in the Ross automobile, testified that she saw the appellee's automobile pause and proceed into the intersection at a relatively fast pace. She testified that the vehicle was stopped for only a few seconds and did not thereafter stop or slow down prior to the collision. She said that after the appellee left the stop sign, she remarked to the driver of her vehicle, 'look at that fool, he is going to hit that truck.' She watched as the appellee's automobile crossed the southbound lanes of U.S. 1, entered the northbound fast lane and collided with the appellants' vehicle. The impact forced the appellee's vehicle back into the southbound lane where it collided with the automobile in which Mrs. Miller was a passenger.

The appellant John Morris testified that he entered U.S. Route 1 approximately one and one-half blocks or 170 feet south of the intersection with Frye Road. He stated he was traveling approximately 35 miles-per-hour, or 10 miles below the 45 mile-per-hour posted speed limit, and that due to the heavy traffic proceeding south on U.S. 1, he did not see the appellee's automobile until it had reached the center of U.S. 1. He had entered U.S. Route 1 from Green Leaf Street in an oblique fashion, proceeding northward and into the inside lane. He had done so because the automobile located on the parking lot was 'practically in the roadway' facing southwest. At the time of the accident Morris' truck was straddling the two northbound lanes, 'coming around' the vehicle on his right. He further testified that other than observing, 'out of the corner' of his eye the automobile in the parking lot, he was looking ahead at all times.

Mrs. Mary Louise Peace, wife of appellee, testified that she was a passenger in the right front seat of her husband's automobile. She and her husband had commented on the extraordinarily heavy traffic prior to the time he pulled out. She stated after waiting 'quite a while,' the opportunity appeared and her husband pulled out and began making his turn. She did not see the appellants' vehicle before or after the collision.

As a result of injuries sustained in the accident, appellant and his wife sued the appellee for personal injuries.

I Judicial Notice of Foreign Law

At common law, in cases controlled by foreign law, it was presumed that the foreign law was the same as the local law unless one of the parties specially plead and proved the foreign law. Mandru v. Ashby, 108 Md. 693, 71 A. 312. In 1939 Maryland adopted what is known as 'The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act' and which is now incorporated into Md.Code, Art. 35; § 47 to § 50, the latter section reading as follows:

' § 50. Evidence presented by parties on notice to adverse parties.

Any party may also present to the trial court any admissible evidence of such laws, but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise.'

Appellants contend the trial judge was not required to apply the foreign law because of the tardiness of the appellee in filing formal notice of his intention to rely on Virginia law. It appears that the notice was actually filed in the case only one day prior to trial, but it was stipulated that the appellants' counsel was given notice by telephone of the appellee's intention to file formal notice, one week prior to the trial. In denying the appellants' request that the case be tried under the laws of Maryland rather than the laws of Virginia, the trial judge noted that appellants' declaration referred to the violation of the traffic regulations of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The trial judge also informed the appellants if they were surprised by his decision to apply the Virginia law, he would give favorable consideration to a motion for continuance.

Under these circumstances we see no abuse of discretion. Although the language in the declaration would not be sufficient to require the court to invoke the Virginia law, Wilson v. Dailey, 191 Md. 472, 476, 62 A.2d 284, that is no reason why it should not be considered in determining whether or not the formal notice was a reasonable notice under the statute. The offer of the trial judge to continue the case would be sufficient to put the appellants in a...