Mason v. Mason

• Decision Date: 08 February 2013
• Citation: 959 N.Y.S.2d 577,103 A.D.3d 1207,2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 00818
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: In the Matter of Paula L. MASON, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Aaron G. MASON, Respondent–Respondent.

103 A.D.3d 1207

959 N.Y.S.2d 577

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 00818

In the Matter of Paula L. MASON, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Aaron G. MASON, Respondent–Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Feb. 8, 2013.

Goodell & Rankin, Jamestown (R. Thomas Rankin of Counsel), for Petitioner–Appellant.

Richard L. Sotir, Jr., Jamestown, for Respondent–Respondent.

Sandra Fisher Swanson, Attorney for the Child, Jamestown, for Kali A.M.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, VALENTINO, WHALEN, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Petitioner mother appeals from an order that modified the parties' joint custody arrangement by granting sole custody of the parties' child to respondent father following a hearing. The mother contends that the Attorney for the Child (AFC) improperly advocated a position that was contrary to the child's express wishes because the AFC failed to state the basis for advocating that contrary position. The mother's contention is not preserved for our review because she made no motion to remove the AFC ( see Matter of Swinson v. Dobson, 101 A.D.3d 1686, 1687, 956 N.Y.S.2d 765;Matter of Juliet M., 16 A.D.3d 211, 212, 790 N.Y.S.2d 668). In any event, we conclude that the mother's contention lacks merit. “ There are only two circumstances in which an AFC is authorized to substitute his or her own judgment for that of the child: ‘[w]hen the [AFC] is convinced either that the child lacks the capacity for knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, or that following the child's wishes is likely to result in a substantial risk of imminent, serious harm to the child’ ” ( Swinson, 101 A.D.3d at 1687, 956 N.Y.S.2d 765, quoting 22 NYCRR 7.2[d][3] ). The obligation of the AFC, where the AFC is “convinced” that one of those two circumstances is implicated, is to inform the court of the child's wishes, if the child requests that the AFC do so ( see22 NYCRR 7.2[d][3] ), which the AFC did here ( see Matter of Kashif II. v. Lataya KK., 99 A.D.3d 1075, 1077, 953 N.Y.S.2d 306). Moreover, we note that the record supports a finding that the child lacked the capacity for “knowing, voluntary and considered judgment” (22 NYCRR 7.2[d][3]; see generally Matter of Rosso v. Gerouw–Rosso, 79 A.D.3d 1726, 1728, 914 N.Y.S.2d 829).

Contrary to the mother's further contention, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request for an adjournment to enable her new attorney to prepare for the hearing ( see Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 283–284, 481 N.Y.S.2d 675, 471 N.E.2d 447). We also reject the mother's contention that the...