Mason v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1905
• Citation: 78 Conn. 81,61 A. 57
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MASON v. RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST CO. et al.

61 A. 57

78 Conn. 81

MASON

v. RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 9, 1905.

Case Reserved from Superior Court, New London County; Alberto T. Roraback, Judge.

Action by John J. Mason against the Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company and others for the determination of a trust, A demurrer was filed to the complaint, and questions of law were reserved for the advice of the Supreme Court, Judgment sustaining demurrer advised,

William H. Mason, a resident of Thompson, died in 1860, leaving a widow and three sons, his only heirs and next of kin. The eldest son, Amasa, was the child of a former wife. The two younger, William, and John, the plaintiff, were the children of his surviving widow. John was under age at the time of the making of the will. The will made provision for the testator's widow and each of the children. The present controversy arises out of the fifth clause as modified by a codicil. By this clause the sum of $60,000 in stocks is given to trustees, with directions to them to make certain appropriations of the net income thereof for the benefit of John during his minority. These provisions have no present importance. The original will further directs that the trustees pay over to John, after he attains his majority, the net interest or income of this fund during his life, in semiannual payments. John is given power to will said fund or any part thereof to his lawful wife, if he have one, or to any or all of his lawful heirs. Failing a testamentary disposition of said fund by John pursuant to this power, it was upon his death to be distributed as if it were his estate. The three sons were made the residuary legatees and devisees, share and share alike. By a codicil the testator revoked so much of the provisions of said fifth clause as required the trustees to pay over the interest or income of said fund to John semiannually, and in lieu thereof it was provided that they were authorized and empowered "at their own discretion and as they should see fit and proper from time to time" to pay over to John, after he should arrive at the age of 21 years, for and during his natural life, "the whole or any part, or none, of the interest or income from time to time" of said fund. The codicil further provided that any accumulation of income upon the death of John should be disposed of in the same manner as provided in said fifth clause for the disposition of principal. It also reaffirmed the power of appointment contained in said clause, with the addition of the provision that it was the testator's intention that such power should be considered and deemed a mere naked power, and not as vesting in John, or as furnishing any evidence of any intention to vest in him, any right or title to the property itself. The fourth clause of the will contained a gift in trust for the benefit of William, like in amount and identical in terms with that in the fifth, save the provisions relating to minority, and the codicil made the same modifications thereof as those outlined relating to the fifth clause.

The defendant trust company is the trustee of said fund, and has in its hands the principal thereof and certain accumulated income. The plaintiff is the assignee of all the interest of his brother Amasa under said will, whether as residuary legatee or otherwise, and especially in the two trust funds created by said fourth and fifth clauses. William, the third son of the testator, died in 1902, leaving no widow, child, or issue. He left a will, in which, among other things, he attempted to exercise his power of appointment under the fourth clause of his father's will and the codicil thereof in favor of a son who predeceased him. The defendant Learned is the administrator with the will annexed of said will of William.

Wallace S. Allis, for plaintiff. James Tillinghast and W. A. Briscoe, for defendant Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company.

PRENTICE, J. (after stating tie facts). The plaintiff prays that the trust created and defined by the fifth clause of his father's will, and the codicil modifying and confirming it, of which he is a life beneficiary, be declared terminated, and that the defendant trust company, as the trustee thereof, be ordered to distribute and transfer the fund and accumulations in its hands after an accounting before the court of probate, two-thirds to the plaintiff and one-third to the defendant Learned as the administrator c. t. a. of the estate of the plaintiff's brother William, deceased. The plaintiff presents this prayer as the assignee of his brother Amasa's interest, as the sole heir of his brother William, and by virtue of his own personal rights and interests, legal and equitable. The defendant trust company demurs to the complaint, which recites all the facts upon which the plaintiff relies, for reasons, in substance, that it appears therefrom that said trust has not been determined, that the purpose for which the same was created has not been accomplished, and that there has been no merger of estates in the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's contention, whatever...