Mattison v. Mattison

• Decision Date: 02 March 1909
• Citation: 53 Or. 254,100 P. 4
• Parties: MATTISON v. MATTISON.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

100 P. 4

53 Or. 254

MATTISON v. MATTISON.

Supreme Court of Oregon

March 2, 1909

Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; Wm. Galloway, Judge.

Action by Alanson Mattison against Henry M. Mattison. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Modified.

This is a suit to quiet title. Isaac Mattison, father of the plaintiff and defendant, now deceased, by will made provision for plaintiff in the following language, namely:

"2nd. It is my will in order to provide for the comfort of my son Alanson Mattison and to secure to him a home during his life, I give, grant, and bequeath to said Alanson Mattison during his life, the occupancy, use, rents and profits of the west half of my farm situated and being in the county of Marion and State of Oregon, being a part of Section No 35, in Township 8 South of Range 4 West of the Willamette Meridian. In order to protect my said son in the full enjoyment for life of the said gift and bequest, I constitute and appoint my sons, Henry N. Mattison and Charles A. Mattison, trustees of said bequest with full authority to conduct and control said bequest in such manner as to my said trustees may be proper to secure to said Alanson Mattison the full and free enjoyment and benefits of said bequest."

"4th. It is my will that at the termination of the life estate hereinbefore given to my son Alanson Mattison by his death that said tract of land covered by said life estate be sold and that proceeds thereof be divided equally among my children," etc.

The said Charles A. Mattison, trustee named in said will, died in 1906, and this defendant, as such trustee, has been, and is now, claiming the right to take possession of said lands and the crop raised thereon; to rent the lands as he may see fit and pay the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff at such times and in such amounts as he may deem proper; and is withholding rents and profits of said lands from plaintiff and depriving him of the occupancy thereof. Plaintiff contends that, by terms of the will above quoted, he is the legal owner of a life estate in, and entitled to the occupancy, use, and control of, said lands without interference from defendant and he brings this suit to quiet his title thereto, and to enjoin defendant from interfering with his occupancy and control thereof. Defendant answered the complaint, admitting the terms of the will and asserting thereunder his right as trustee to lease portions of said land as he may see proper, collect the rents, repair, maintain, and improve said premises, pay the taxes thereon, and pay over to plaintiff the rents, issues, and profits in such sums and at such times as he may think best. To the new matter of the answer plaintiff filed a demurrer, which was overruled by the court, and a decree was rendered upon the pleadings in favor of defendant, from which plaintiff appeals.

Claire M. Inman, for appellant.

Oscar Hayter and Geo. G. Bingham, for respondent.

EAKIN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

Plaintiff seeks by this suit to have the court declare that the effect of the clause of the will above quoted is to pass to him the legal title to the life estate in the property mentioned, and defendant's contention is that the will transfers to him the legal title in trust, with full power and authority to possess and control the property, with absolute discretion to pay the rents and profits of it to plaintiff as he may deem best, or to expend the same in repairs or improvements upon said lands. If the effect of the will is to pass to plaintiff the legal title to the life estate, then the attempt to limit the enjoyment or power of alienation thereof by the same instrument is void. Mason v. R.I. Hospital Trust Co., 78 Conn. 81, 61 A. 57; 3 Am. & Eng.Ann.Cas. 588; Bennett v. Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 66 Md. 36, 5 A. 291. But a testator may create for the benefit and enjoyment of the devisee a trust estate, and such a provision may, if so intended by the testator, limit the right of alienation by the devisee and its liability for his debts. The English rule on this subject is that the grantor cannot put any restraint upon the right of alienation of an equitable life estate or place it beyond the reach of creditors, but, if the estate be granted to trustees for the benefit of the cestui que trust until alienation or insolvency, then the happening of that event will terminate the estate, or where the trustees are given full power and discretion to apply or not to apply the income for the benefit of the cestui que trust it is beyond his power to alienate it, and is not liable for his debts. This English doctrine has been followed in some states of the United States, in some the subject is governed by statute, while in many others a much broader policy has been adopted and is quite generally recognized, to the effect that an equitable life estate may be created by appropriate language, whereby the life tenant may have a legal right to the income therefrom, and which shall be inalienable by the life tenant and beyond the reach of creditors. This rule is stated in 26 A. & E.Ency. 139, where it is said that the English doctrine is largely extended by the majority of the states, and is called the "American doctrine," namely: "This doctrine is that it is lawful for a testator or grantor to create a trust estate for the life of the cestui que trust with the provision that the latter shall receive and enjoy the avails at times and in amounts, either fixed by the instrument or left to the discretion of the trustee, and that such avails shall not be subject to alienation by the beneficiary nor liable for his debts." In Mason v. Rhode Island H. & T. Co., 78 Conn. 81, 61 A. 57, this question was directly before the court, and Mr. Justice Prentice makes a similar statement of the rule, namely: "The great current of modern authority in this country is to the effect that an equitable life estate, under which the life tenant may have absolute rights, may, by appropriate language, be created by one for the benefit of another, which shall be inalienable by the cestui que trust, and beyond the reach of creditors." There is an exhaustive note to this case in 3 Am. & Eng.Ann.Cas. 588, in which the cases are collated and classified, sustaining the text above quoted, and in 54 Cent.Law J. 382, is a leading article to the same effect.

The following states sustain...