Mason v. State, C4-02-673.
| Decision Date | 22 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. C4-02-673.,C4-02-673. |
| Parties | Oscar James MASON, Petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Leslie Joan Rosenberg, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Amy J. Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, David Craig Brown, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by WILLIS, Presiding Judge, TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge, and MINGE, Judge.
On appeal from an order denying his postconviction challenge to a restitution order, appellant Oscar James Mason argues that the postconviction court (a) erred in reserving the restitution issue at sentencing, (b) erred in issuing its restitution order after sentencing, and (c) misinformed him about the proper procedure for challenging a restitution order. Because Mason did not request a hearing within 30 days after receiving notice of the restitution amount requested, as required by Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2000), we affirm.
In April 2000, Oscar Mason pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary and to receiving stolen goods. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court sentenced Mason to concurrent prison terms of 36 and 26 months, and Mason agreed to pay restitution for the out-of-pocket expenses his two victims incurred as a result of his crimes. At the sentencing hearing, the district court reserved the restitution issue because it had not yet received a restitution request from one of the victims. Mason agreed to the court's reservation of the issue and waived a presentence investigation so that he could begin serving his sentence as soon as possible. The court told Mason that if he disagreed with the restitution order, he could "object and have a hearing." The court also told Mason that he would receive a letter informing him of the restitution amount requested and that he should let the court know "if [he] want[ed] to fight it."
On January 23, 2001, Mason received a memorandum from the Department of Corrections notifying him that the court had ordered $1,940.70 in restitution. On March 13, 2001, Mason received notice that judgment in that amount had been entered. The March 13 notice listed the dollar amounts and specific items for which restitution had been ordered.
Later in March, Mason unsuccessfully sought the assistance of Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners (LAMP) and the State Public Defender's Office in challenging the restitution amount. In October, more than six months after receiving notification of the restitution amount requested, Mason filed a postconviction petition contesting the portion of the order awarding one of the victims restitution for the purchase and installation of a new home security system. The postconviction court heard Mason's petition in January 2002, and later denied it, reasoning that the request for a hearing was untimely under Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(b) (2000). This appeal followed.
Did the court err by rejecting Mason's postconviction challenge to the restitution order as untimely?
We review a postconviction court's order to determine whether the record supports the court's findings. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn.2001). In so doing, we defer to the court's findings and will reverse only if the court abused its discretion. Id. But we do not defer to the court's determinations regarding questions of law. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984).
As part of the disposition of a criminal charge, a victim may receive restitution for any out-of-pocket losses resulting from the crime. Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a) (2000). To be considered at the sentencing hearing, all information regarding restitution must be received by the court administrator at least three days before the hearing. Id. The court may reserve the restitution issue "if the victim's affidavit or other competent evidence submitted by the victim is not received in time." Id. Similarly, the court may issue a restitution order after sentencing if, among other things, "the true extent of a victim's loss * * * [is] not known at the time of the sentencing * * * hearing." Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(b) (2000).
Once restitution has been requested, a defendant may challenge the amount of restitution or specific items of restitution by (a) submitting a detailed affidavit setting forth all challenges to the restitution requested and providing specific reasons why a different restitution amount is appropriate and (b) "requesting a hearing within 30 days of receiving written notification of the amount of restitution requested, or within 30 days of sentencing, whichever is later." Minn.Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3 (2000). Under the statute, "[a] defendant may not challenge restitution after the 30-day time period has passed." Id., subd. 3(b).
Mason first argues that the court improperly reserved restitution because the state knew the extent of the second victim's loss at sentencing and simply failed to disclose it. But the statute does not condition the power to reserve restitution on whether the state knew the extent of the victim's loss at sentencing. Instead, it provides that restitution may be reserved "if the victim's affidavit or other competent evidence submitted by the victim is not received in time." Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(a). Here, the district court did not receive the affidavit of one of the victims or competent evidence of her loss in time. Accordingly, the court properly reserved the restitution issue. Moreover, Mason not only failed to object to the court's reservation of the issue, but also agreed to it to avoid delay and begin serving his sentence as soon as possible.
Mason next argues that the court improperly issued its restitution order after sentencing in violation of Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1(b)(3), because the state knew the true extent of the victim's loss but failed to disclose it at sentencing. Mason misconstrues the statutory scheme. Subdivision 1(b)(3) allows the court to issue a restitution order after sentencing if "the true extent of the victim's loss * * * was not known at the time of the sentencing * * * hearing." Id. (emphasis added). Subdivision 1(b)(3) does not specify whose...
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