Mason v. State

• Decision Date: 26 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1999-KA-01163-SCT.,1999-KA-01163-SCT.
• Citation: 781 So.2d 99
• Parties: Michael Dale MASON v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

781 So.2d 99

Michael Dale MASON v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 1999-KA-01163-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

October 26, 2000.

Joseph C. Langston, Christi R. McCoy, Booneville, for appellant.

Office of the Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, for appellee.

EN BANC.

SMITH, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Michael Dale Mason appeals to this Court from the Circuit Court of Itawamba County of a conviction by a jury of violating Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30, which makes it a felony for any person below the age of twenty-one with a blood alcohol level of .02% or greater to kill or mutilate a person while negligently driving or otherwise operate a motor vehicle. Mason was sentenced to serve a term of twenty-five (25) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with ten (10) of those years suspended and with five (5) years post-release supervision. From this conviction and sentence, Mason appeals.

¶ 2. After a review of the record on appeal and applicable law, we affirm Mason's conviction and sentence and the circuit court's ruling upholding the constitutionality of Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶ 3. In the early morning hours of August 29, 1998, James D. Rowell (Rowell) and Michael H. Kilgore (Kilgore) were changing a tire on Rowell's van on the shoulder of Highway 78 in Itawamba County. Rowell was killed and Kilgore severely injured when the pickup truck driven by then eighteen-year-old Michael Dale Mason (Mason) left the road and struck the van. Mason's blood-alcohol content was .102%.

¶ 4. Count I of the indictment charged Mason with causing the death of Rowell while operating a motor vehicle at a time when he had a blood alcohol content of.02% or more, and Count II charged Mason with the maiming of Kilgore while operating a motor vehicle at a time when he had a blood alcohol content of .02% or more. Prior to trial Mason filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute under which he was indicted, Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30, violates his equal protection rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The circuit court denied Mason's motion to dismiss the indictment.

¶ 5. At trial, Mason denied drinking intoxicants during an outdoor camping trip that he took with several other youths the night of August 28, 1998. According to Mason, while driving home on the morning of August 29, 1998, he noticed that his truck would wobble and swerve to the right every time he hit the brakes. He testified that as he approached the area where Rowell and Kilgore were changing the flat tire, the sun was in his eyes and, being unable to slow down due to cars being both behind and beside him, he chose instead to hit his brakes.

¶ 6. Several witnesses testified for the State during its case-in-chief and two in rebuttal to Mason's claim that he had not been drinking the night prior to the accident. Tamara Miller testified that there was Southpaw beer and a cooler filled with an alcoholic punch at the party. She observed Mason drinking a beer and stated, "I know I seen him drink." Nastasha Ray testified that she was in charge of planning the birthday party for Rolon Barlow and that alcohol was present on the island where the party took place. Ray mixed up the punch at home, which included both Everclear and Schnapps in a 48-ounce cooler. She claimed that Mason knew what was in the cooler because she had told him.

¶ 7. At the close of all the evidence, Mason's renewed motion for a directed verdict and his request for peremptory instruction were denied. The jury found Mason guilty as charged in Count I of the indictment. He was sentenced to a term of twenty-five (25) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with ten (10) years suspended upon conditions and with five (5) years of post-release supervision. Mason's motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied on July 1, 1999.

¶ 8. Mason timely filed a notice of appeal and brings the following issue before this Court:

THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MASON'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9. The standard of review in Mississippi for questions of law is de novo. Mississippi Transp. Com'n v. Fires, 693 So.2d 917, 920 (Miss.1997).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10. Prior to trial, Mason moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (Supp.1999) violates his constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court denied the motion, and it is from that denial that Mason appeals.

¶ 11. Section 63-11-30 makes it unlawful for any person below the age of twenty-one to drive or otherwise operate a motor vehicle within this state with a blood-alcohol level of .02% or greater. It also makes it unlawful for any person age twenty-one or older drive or otherwise operate a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of.10% or greater. Section § 63-11-30(1) provides in pertinent part:

(1) It is unlawful for any person to drive or otherwise operate a vehicle within this state who (a) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (b) is under the influence of any other substance which has impaired such person's ability to operate a motor vehicle; (c) has an alcohol concentration of ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) or more for persons who are above the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, or two one-hundredths percent (.02%) or more for persons who are below the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, in the person's blood based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath as shown by a chemical analysis of such person's breath, blood or urine administered as authorized by this chapter....

At the time pertinent to this case Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(5) read as follows:

(5) Every person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and who in a negligent manner causes the death of another or mutilates, disfigures, permanently disables or destroys the tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other limb, organ or member of another shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony and shall be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a period of time not to exceed twenty-five (25) years.

¶ 12. By virtue of Miss.Code Ann. § 67-1-81(Supp. 2000), the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages in this state is twenty-one years. Mason was indicted for having a blood alcohol content of "two one-hundredths (.02%) percent or more by weight volume of alcohol in his blood as shown by a chemical analysis, and ... being under the age of 21 years."

¶ 13. Mason argues that from the plain terms of § 63-11-30(1), a twenty-one-year-old could commit the acts constituting the crime for the purposes set forth in the statute with absolute immunity under that statute while a twenty-year-old who did the same thing would be subject to conviction of a felony and to imprisonment for a term of as much as twenty-five years. In short, Mason maintains that the statute burdens persons under the age of twenty-one with a higher standard than their twenty-one-year-old counterparts. He claims that the statute is clearly discriminatory and unconstitutionally denies equal protection of the law to persons under the age of twenty-one and that it should therefore be declared void.

¶ 14. It is easy enough to determine that the statute in question treats individuals differently according to age. The United States Supreme Court has explained that in the absence of a suspect classification or an impingement on fundamental rights, a state statute is to be upheld against an equal protection challenge if it is "rationally related" to the achievement of legitimate governmental ends. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993)(citing F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). Mason concedes that no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated by the statute in question. Rather, Mason urges this Court to apply the rational basis test and argues that, under this test, the discrimination between age groups is not rationally related to achieving a legitimate government interest.

¶ 15. Though this is a question of first impression for this Court, the equal protection challenge at hand has been squarely rejected by many of our sister states with like legislation. As those courts have found, we herein find that the distinction made by the challenged statute is rationally related to the legitimate governmental ends of protecting public safety and prohibiting under-age drinking and driving. Thus, we reject Mason's constitutional attack on § 63-11-30 and his claim of deprivation of equal protection rights.

¶ 16. In Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472, 510 S.E.2d 527 (1999), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to OCGA § 40-6-391(k), which set forth a blood alcohol concentration standard of .02 grams for persons under the age of twenty-one and a standard of.10 grams for persons over age twenty-one. The court held that the statute bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate state purposes of the protection of the public safety and safeguarding the physical well-being of children. Id. at 528. The court explained that the statute furthers the goal of protecting public safety by "prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles by young people who lack experience both in driving and in judging the effect of alcohol on their ability to drive, thus posing a greater threat to the public safety than older, more experienced drivers." Id. at 528. The court stated that the statute promotes the well-being of children by protecting them from the dangers of driving while...