Mason v. State, 1D02-0523.
Decision Date | 29 August 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 1D02-0523.,1D02-0523. |
Citation | 853 So.2d 544 |
Parties | Joe T. MASON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; Nancy L. Showalter, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General; Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Joe T. Mason brings this direct appeal from conviction and sentence for violating section 790.23(1)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which outlaws possession of a firearm by a person who has been found "guilty of an offense that is a felony in another state...." We reverse.
The state introduced two documents to prove that appellant was a convicted felon when he possessed a firearm: Judgment and Sentence on Plea of Not Guilty (Judgment) dated February 21, 1985, and the antecedent Indictment, both filed in Carlisle County, Kentucky, and both styled "Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Joe Mason." Neither document contained fingerprints, a middle initial, or any other means of identifying appellant as the Kentucky convict.
After the state rested, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal on grounds that The trial court denied the motion, and we now review that ruling. At issue is the sufficiency of the evidence, not its legal weight. See generally State v. Brockman, 827 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
. "[A]n order on a motion for a judgment of acquittal is reviewed by the de novo standard." Jones v. State, 790 So.2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
The trial court's denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal was error. See Stovall v. State, 727 So.2d 1009, 1009-10 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
( ); Monson v. State, 627 So.2d 1301, 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (); Napoli v. State, 596 So.2d 782, 786 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (); Sinkfield v. State, 592 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) () ; Killingsworth v. State, 584 So.2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ( ).
The state argued here and below that "the Kentucky judgment contained appellant's name, date of birth, and social security number." This misstates the record. Neither the Judgment nor the Indictment contains appellant's middle initial, date of birth or social security number. What does contain appellant's middle initial, date of birth and social security number is the clerk's Certification of Records, certifying that the Kentucky Judgment and Indictment are true and correct copies of the originals. A Certification of Records dated December 10, 2001, was available at the time of trial.
The extraneous information in the Certification of Records was not, however, offered—and would not have been admissible—as substantive evidence. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 902.5, at 929 (2003 ed.) (); U.S. v. Stone, 604 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir.1979) (...
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...the prior convictions into evidence or from otherwise proving its case in light of this omission. See, e.g., Mason v. State, 853 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (requiring judgment of acquittal for possession of firearm by convicted felon when only evidence showing defendant was convicted fel......
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Gray v. State, 1D04-3826.
...inadmissible unless an exception applies." Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 902.5, at 945 (2004 ed.); see also Mason v. State, 853 So.2d 544, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ("The extraneous information in the Certification of Records was not ... admissible [] as substantive WOLF, J., Concur......
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Richard Holt Moncus Ii v. State , 4D09–3140.
...judgment, which shows identity between the name on the prior judgment and the name of the defendant, is insufficient. Mason v. State, 853 So.2d 544, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Instead, the State must present affirmative evidence that the defendant and the person named on the prior judgment ar......
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