Mason v. Stirling
| Decision Date | 09 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 5:20-cv-04309-RBH |
| Parties | Julie Melton Mason, Plaintiff, v. Bryan P. Stirling; Terry Marshall; John McRee; Norel Ezike, RN; Jorge Alva; Officer Laredo; Jane Doe Officers; and Jane Doe Nurses; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff Julie Melton Mason, currently incarcerated at Graham Correctional Institution in Columbia, South Carolina and proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. ECF No 91.
This matter is before the court with the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West filed on June 14, 2022.[1] The Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and the case dismissed. Plaintiff timely filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 109. Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff's Objections. ECF No. 111.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R to which specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The right to de novo review may be waived by the failure to file timely objections. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [Magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.” Id. Moreover, in the absence of objections to the R & R, the Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). However, in the absence of objections, the Court must “‘satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) ().
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (2010). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
When no genuine issue of any material fact exists, summary judgment is appropriate. See Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). The facts and inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. However, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
"Once the moving party has met [its] burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere allegations contained in the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial." Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The nonmoving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, unsupported speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Baber, 977 F.2d at 875. Rather, the nonmoving party is required to submit evidence of specific facts by way of affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, or admissions to demonstrate the existence of a genuine and material factual issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Bryan P. Stirling, Terry Marshall, John McRee, Norel Ezike, RN, Jorge Alva, and Officer Laredo were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in violation of the 8th Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 between the dates of April 17 and April 21, 2019. Plaintiff claims Defendants delayed the treatment of her pancreatitis, which resulted in an approximate 10 day hospital stay. She also alleges continuing health problems related to her pancreatitis attack and hospital stay. Plaintiff's amended complaint also appears assert state medical malpractice claims in addition to her constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Magistrate Judge recommended granting summary judgment as to Defendants Stirling, Marshall, John McRee, and Norel Ezike RN because Plaintiff failed to establish that those defendants had any personal involvement in her medical treatment. The Magistrate Judge also found that Plaintiff had failed to establish that Defendants Stirling, Marshall, McRee, and Ezike were liable as supervisors within the Department of Corrections.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a “person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 823 (2011); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997). The phrase “under color of state law” is an element that “is synonymous with the more familiar state-action requirement-and the analysis for each is identical.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982)).
Section 1983 also requires a showing of personal fault based upon a defendant's own conduct. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (). Thus, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (); see also Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). In this case, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants Stirling, Marshall, John McRee, and Norel Ezike, RN had any personal involvement in her medical care between April 17 and April 21, 2019 - the relevant dates in Plaintiff's amended complaint. See Plaintiff's Deposition, ECF No. 91-6 at 13. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that these defendants did not have any direct or personal involvement in her medical care during the relevant time period. See ECF No. 91-6 at 4-10. Plaintiff further stated in her deposition that she named Norel Ezike, RN simply because Ezike provided treatment to Plaintiff in the past, long before the events complained of in Plaintiff's amended complaint. See 91-6 at 15. Because Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants Stirling, Marshall, John McRee, and Norel Ezike, RN were personally involved in her medical care, these Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims of deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff has also failed to establish that Defendants Stirling, Marshall, John McRee, and Norel Ezike, RN were liable as supervisors of the facility. Liability of supervisory officials in § 1983 claims “is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.' ”Baynardv. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)). With respect to a supervisory liability claim in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege: (1) That the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to...the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813 (1994); see also Wilcox, 877 F.3d at 170.
Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she only named these Defendants because they were supervisors of the facility; however, she has failed to come forward with evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that these Defendants had actual or...
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