Mason v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 20 December 1887 |
| Parties | John W. Mason v. William Taylor |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Otter Tail county, Baxter, J., presiding, refusing a new trial. The action was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment directed for plaintiff for $ 1,338.
Order affirmed.
Clapp & Woodard, for appellant.
Chas D. Kerr, for respondent.
This is an action to recover compensation for legal services alleged to have been rendered by plaintiff, an attorney residing at Fergus Falls, for defendant, a resident of Scotland. He contends that said services, the value of which is not in dispute, were performed for Miller & McMaster, a real-estate firm at said Fergus, and not for him. That they were so performed in connection with certain investments made for defendant, and property owned by him, the care of which he had intrusted to said firm, is conceded.
While a determination of the purport and effect of the contract under which Miller & McMaster acted is not, in our judgment necessary to an affirmance of the conclusions of the court below, it was the foundation of all that subsequently transpired, and must therefore characterize the nature of the relations which actually existed between the three parties thereto, -- this defendant, of the first; Hay, of the second and Miller & McMaster, of the third part, -- in all that was done under it, and may well be discussed, and the status of each party settled. In brief, it bestowed upon Miller & McMaster plenary power to invest in town lots and farm lands in Minnesota and Dakota such sums of money as defendant and his undisclosed constituents might see fit to transmit through Mr. Hay; to erect buildings thereon, rent the same, and collect said rents; to insure said buildings; and to sell such property, without consulting their principal, whenever they could do so at a profit. Titles were to be taken in Taylor's name, the muniments thereof to be sent him when recorded. It was to continue for four years, and then, within one year after notice, the firm was to realize from their investments the defendant's capital and return it to him. This they covenanted to do, thus becoming guarantors of the principal intrusted to them. Taylor reserved no rights whatsoever, but all was left to the judgment of the men with whom he was dealing, who were to be compensated by retaining one-fourth of the excess of the earnings over 10 per cent. per annum upon the capital, and, in case of sale under notice, to realize and account for one-fourth of the profits derived, which should be in full to them for their own and their attorney's charges and expenses.
The pertinent inquiry is, did this in fact constitute...
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