Mason v. Torrellas

Decision Date06 October 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15–0726,15–0726
Citation792 S.E.2d 12,238 W.Va. 1
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
Parties Russell W. Mason, Executor of the Estate of Christine Ebert, Petitioner v. Christine Torrellas, Ancillary Administratrix of the Estate of Christine Ebert, Respondent

Daniel R. James, Esq., Nicholas T. James, Esq., Keyser, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner.

Charles F. Johns, Esq., Denielle M. Stritch, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Bridgeport, West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondent.

Opinion

Chief Justice Ketchum :

This case concerns a will contest in which the decedent, Christine Ebert, executed two wills: the first in West Virginia in 2012, and the second in New York in 2014, ten days before she died of, among other causes, dementia. Petitioner Russell Mason ("Plaintiff Mason"), the named executor of the West Virginia will, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Mineral County challenging the validity of the New York will. Respondent Christine Torrellas ("Defendant Torrellas"), the executrix of the New York will, filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Mason's complaint, arguing that the West Virginia circuit court lacked jurisdiction over this matter. The circuit court granted Defendant Torrellas' motion to dismiss. Following entry of this order, Plaintiff Mason filed the present appeal.

After review, we reverse the circuit court's order dismissing Plaintiff Mason's complaint and remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The decedent, Mrs. Ebert, was born in 1928, and, according to Plaintiff Mason, lived the majority of her life in West Virginia. Mrs. Ebert did not have any children and was predeceased by her husband. She had three siblings, including a sister, Irene Ketelsen, who lived in New York. The decedent owned real estate in West Virginia and Florida.

In November 2012, the decedent executed her last will and testament in Keyser, West Virginia ("West Virginia will"). Plaintiff Mason was named as the executor of this will. Pursuant to the West Virginia will, the decedent made the following bequests: 1) $3,000.00 to the United Methodist Church in Hartsmansville, West Virginia; 2) $2,000.00 for the care of her gravesite and her husband's gravesite to the Idleman Cemetery in Grant County, West Virginia; 3) a car lot located in Keyser, West Virginia, farm machinery, and West Virginia bonds to Plaintiff Mason; 4) a house located in Keyser, West Virginia to Sue Heavener; and 5) her household contents, Florida real estate, and residue of the estate to her sister, Irene Ketelsen.

According to Plaintiff Mason's complaint, the decedent "has continuously resided in Mineral County, West Virginia and ... was a domiciliary of the State of West Virginia." While the decedent was a West Virginia resident, Plaintiff Mason asserts that she visited her sister, Irene Ketelsen, in New York every year between Thanksgiving and Christmas. After these New York holiday visits, the decedent would go to Florida for the winter before returning to her West Virginia home.

Plaintiff Mason's complaint alleges that the decedent became ill while visiting her sister in New York in December 2013. Due to this illness, the decedent, who was eighty-six years old, was hospitalized at Winthrop University Hospital in New York. Plaintiff Mason alleges that while the decedent was suffering from multiple illnesses in the New York hospital, including dementia, she executed a second will ("New York will") on January 30, 2014.

The appendix-record contains the West Virginia will and the New York will. Mrs. Ebert's signature is markedly different in the two wills. In the West Virginia will, her signature is written in clearly legible cursive writing in which she spells out her full name, Christine Ebert. In the New York will, the alleged signature is illegible and does not bear any resemblance to her signature contained in the 2012 West Virginia will. The two signature pages, (1) West Virginia, (2) New York, are as follows:

The New York will states that the decedent is "a resident of and domiciled in the County of Nassau, State of New York." The New York will revoked her previous West Virginia will, and named Defendant Christine Torrellas as the executrix of the New York will. Defendant Torrellas is the decedent's niece, and is the daughter of the decedent's sister, Irene Ketelsen. Per the New York will, the decedent bequeathed her entire estate to her sister, Irene Ketelsen. The New York will names Defendant Torrellas as the residuary beneficiary of the estate if Irene Ketelsen predeceased the decedent.

The decedent died ten days after the New York will was executed. The decedent's New York State death certificate lists her residence as Keyser, West Virginia, her mailing address as "Route 1 ... Elk Garden [West Virginia]," and states that her place of burial will be in Scherr, West Virginia. The death certificate lists the following causes of death: "respiratory failure, pneumonia aspiration, dementia , and polycystic kidney [sic]." (Emphasis added). Following her death, the decedent was buried next to her husband in a cemetery in Scherr, West Virginia.

Defendant Torrellas offered the New York will for probate in a New York surrogate court on April 14, 2014. The New York surrogate court entered a final decree to probate the New York will in June 2014. Plaintiff Mason was not given "constructive or formal notice" of the New York will administration, and asserts that as a beneficiary of a prior will, he was entitled to such notice under the rules of the New York surrogate court.

After the New York surrogate court entered its final decree of probate, Defendant Torrellas began the process to admit the will for ex parte ancillary probate before the Mineral County Commission in West Virginia. According to Plaintiff Mason's complaint, the New York will was "admitted in an ancillary estate administration before the Mineral County Commission on July 24, 2014."1 Thereafter, Plaintiff Mason filed the present complaint in the circuit court of Mineral County on February 24, 2015.

Plaintiff Mason's complaint alleges that Defendant Torrellas 1) "procured the making and execution of the New York will knowing that [the decedent] lacked the requisite testamentary capacity"; 2) "misled [the decedent] into executing the New York will, thereby committing fraud"; and 3) exerted undue influence over the decedent, who "was not acting of her own free will," when the New York will was executed.2

In response to Plaintiff Mason's complaint, Defendant Torrellas filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Defendant Torrellas argued that the West Virginia circuit court did not have jurisdiction over this matter, asserting that because the New York surrogate court had entered a final decree of probate regarding the New York will, the West Virginia circuit court had to give that final decree "full faith and credit, and thereby prevent [Mr. Mason's] challenge to the validity of the NY will anywhere but in New York." Defendant Torrellas' motion to dismiss alternatively argued that even if the West Virginia circuit court had jurisdiction over this matter, Plaintiff Mason failed to plead sufficient facts to show the probate of the New York will was improper.

The circuit court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on June 16, 2015. At the conclusion of this hearing, the circuit judge granted Defendant Torrellas' motion to dismiss orally, stating "Court's going to grant the motion to dismiss, I think this has to be sorted out in New York Court." On June 24, 2015, the circuit court entered a three-sentence order granting Defendant Torrellas' motion to dismiss:

On the 16thday of June 2015 CAME the Defendant, by counsel, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, and moved the Court to dismiss this case. Upon review of the briefing and oral arguments of both parties, by counsel, this Court finds that, for the reasons set forth in Defendant's Motion, and for such other and further reasons as are apparent to the Court, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. It is, therefore, ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and STRICKEN from the Court's docket.

After entry of the circuit court's order granting Defendant Torrellas' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff Mason filed the instant appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has explained that "[t]he purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the complaint." Collia v. McJunkin , 178 W.Va. 158, 159, 358 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1987) (citations omitted). "The trial court, in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)." Syllabus Point 3, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co. Inc ., 160 W.Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977). "For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and its allegations are to be taken as true.... The policy of the rule is thus to decide cases upon their merits, and if the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted under any legal theory, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) must be denied." John W. Lodge Distrib. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 161 W.Va. 603, 605, 245 S.E.2d 157, 158–59 (1978). This Court has also held that "[a]ppellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo ." Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac–Buick, Inc ., 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Plaintiff Mason argues that the circuit court erred by granting Defendant Torrellas' Rule 12(...

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    ...2 L.Ed.2d 80(1957)." Syllabus Point 3, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co. Inc., 160 W.Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977).Syl. Pt. 1, Mason v. Torrellas, 238 W. Va. 1, 792 S.E.2d 12 (2016). However, as set forth above, summary judgment is appropriate where "the record could not lead a rational trier o......

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