Mass. Coal. for Immigration Reform v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-3438 (TNM) |
| Decision Date | 11 August 2022 |
| Parties | MASSACHUSETTS COALITION FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Julie B. Axelrod, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, DC, John Michael Miano, Summit, NJ, for Plaintiffs Massachusetts Coalition for Immigration Reform, Kevin Lynn.
Julie B. Axelrod, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs Linda Huhn, Rob Meyer, Bruce Anderson, Steven Chance Smith, Gail Getzwiller.
Erika D. Norman, Sean Christian Duffy, U.S. Department of Justice Environment & Natrual Resources, Washington, DC, for Defendants Department of Homeland Security, US Department of State, US Department of Justice.
The Massachusetts Coalition for Immigration Reform (MCIR) and six individuals (collectively, the Coalition) challenge the Biden Administration's immigration actions—on environmental grounds. The Coalition contends that three federal agencies have not complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires agencies to perform environmental impact analysis before taking certain actions. According to the Coalition, the agencies' disregard of NEPA caused environmental harm. The agencies move to dismiss all claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
At this initial stage, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction. But the Court dismisses two claims: that the DHS's Instruction Manual violates NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (Count I) and that the Biden Administration should have prepared a "programmatic" environmental analysis of its immigration-related actions (Count XI). The Manual does not qualify as "final agency action" so this Court cannot hear an APA challenge to it. And the Coalition's programmatic challenge is not reviewable under the APA because it is not a "discrete" agency action. The Coalition's remaining claims survive the Government's Rule 12(b)(6) objections.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires agencies to conduct environmental impact analysis before undertaking "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). "Major federal actions" include "new and continuing activities . . . financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies" and new agency rules, regulations, and policies. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(q)(2). In a recommendation or report proposing a major Federal action that significantly affects the environment, agencies must include a detailed statement—called an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)—about the action's projected environmental effects, the feasibility of alternatives, and more. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i-v). Instead of an EIS, an agency may conduct a preliminary Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine whether a particular action might significantly impact the environment at all. If the answer is yes, an EIS becomes necessary. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.5.
These "action-forcing" provisions of NEPA and accompanying regulations require agencies to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of their actions. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989). Agencies must also share any EIS with the public, see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v), so that potentially affected individuals can comment. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Though NEPA "simply prescribes the necessary process" without "mandat[ing] particular results," its "procedures are almost certain to affect the agency's substantive decision." Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835.
Plaintiff MCIR is a non-partisan group whose members have both professional and recreational interests in the quality of the environment. See Am. Compl. ("Compl.") ¶¶ 26-30, ECF No. 17. And MCIR believes that mass immigration has had "distinctly negative effects on [the] environment." Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Indeed, MCIR contends that "[i]f NEPA should apply to any government policy, it should be to federal policies that induce population growth." Id. ¶ 13. MCIR alleges that changes to immigration policies "between the Trump and Biden administrations . . . ha[ve] already had a profound influence on the 'human environment.' " Id. ¶ 14 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332).
One of the many policies MCIR alleges should have received NEPA review is DHS's decision to end construction on the southern border wall. See id. ¶ 108. But according to MCIR, the Biden Administration has not conducted NEPA analysis before changing wide swaths of policy impacting population growth. See id. ¶¶ 13-14. Because NEPA requires agencies to "engage in environmentally informed decision-making" by publishing an EA or EIS and soliciting public comment, MCIR alleges that the Biden Administration's ongoing failure to do so "denie[s] [Americans] a seat at the table." Id. ¶ 13, 26.
Six individual plaintiffs join MCIR's suit. See id. ¶¶ 31-36. These individuals similarly espouse personal and professional interests in their local environment. See id. Two of the individual plaintiffs reside near the southern border and allege harm from the Government's repeated failure to perform NEPA analysis. See id. ¶¶ 197-218.
For example, Plaintiff Chance Smith—who manages a cattle ranch near the southern border—claims that increased border crossings disrupt his enjoyment of his ranch and the surrounding environment. See id. ¶¶ 35-36; 201-04. Smith alleges that border crossers have set fires, destroying land integral to Smith's cattle ranch, and that they have left trash, campsites, and other refuse on his land. See id. ¶¶ 203-04. Smith concludes that if the Government had properly conducted NEPA analysis before changing its immigration policies, the environmental consequences may have been different because the public would not be "in the dark about the scale of the environmental consequences." Id. ¶ 205.
The Coalition sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) (collectively, the Government) for their failure to conduct NEPA analysis before taking certain federal immigration actions that allegedly cause environmental impacts. See id. ¶¶ 38-41. Each agency has its own NEPA procedures. See id. ¶¶ 57, 61, 64. The crux of the Coalition's claim is that the Government failed to follow these procedures by neglecting to perform an EIS or EA before making or changing immigration policies. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 22, 71.
The Coalition claims that the following actions required NEPA analysis: ending construction of the southern border wall (Count II); terminating the "Remain in Mexico" Policies (Count III); allowing border patrol agents to grant permission to aliens to stay in the country, and helping them board buses to other states (Count IV); preventing immigration officials from detaining and removing aliens (Count V); ending the practice of fining aliens for failing to leave the country (Count VI); reinstating administrative closure in immigration courts (Count VII); and expanding various refugee programs (Counts VIII, IX, and X). See id. ¶¶ 226-52. The Coalition also alleges that DHS's Instruction Manual violates NEPA because it does not require NEPA compliance for immigration-related actions (Count I), and that the Government's failure to "prepare a programmatic EIS" for all the actions in Counts II-X violated NEPA (Count XI). See id. ¶¶ 220-25, 253-57. The Coalition seeks declaratory relief as to Counts I and XI, and injunctive relief for the rest. See Compl. at 112.
The Government argues that the Court should dismiss all counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), on standing grounds, and under Rule 12(b)(6) because they are unreviewable under the APA. See Gov't Mot. to Dismiss (Gov't MTD), ECF No. 19. That Motion is now ripe.
To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show injury, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. "At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice." Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The Court "presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).
To seek prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show an imminent threat of future injury. See In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2012). A plaintiff must also show a causal connection between his injury and the challenged conduct. Id. And it must be likely that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Only one plaintiff needs standing to press each claim. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
When a plaintiff sues under a statute, the Court must also determine whether he "falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue." Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014). To assess so-called "prudential standing" the Court interprets the statute to analyze whether it encompasses the injuries a plaintiff claims. See id. at 127, 134 S.Ct. 1377. If so, a plaintiff falls within the statute's "zone-of-interests." See id. And "[t]he zone of interests test is not meant to be especially demanding." Cement Kiln Recycling Corp. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). If a plaintiff brings an APA claim involving another statute, a...
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