Massachusetts Ass'n for the Blind v. Board of Assessors of Brookline
| Citation | 462 N.E.2d 86,391 Mass. 384 |
| Parties | MASSACHUSETTS ASSOCIATION FOR THE BLIND v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF BROOKLINE. |
| Decision Date | 13 March 1984 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
James Roosevelt, Jr., Boston (David C. Boch, Norwood, with him), for plaintiff.
Casimer deRham, Jr., Boston (Deborah J. Hall and Perry E. Israel, Boston, with him), for defendant.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.
The Massachusetts Association for the Blind (association) appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the association's appeal from the denial of an abatement of a $35,600 real estate tax assessed for the 1977 fiscal year on property acquired by the association in 1976. The application was filed with the assessors on October 31, 1980, pursuant to St.1980, c. 560, 1 which authorized abatement applications by charitable organizations that, because of a failure to file a list of property required under G.L. c. 59, § 29 2 (Form 3 ABC), were ineligible for a charitable exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, Third, 3 during any year encompassed in the period beginning January 1, 1969, and ending June 30, 1980. 4 Under St.1980, c. 560, such charitable organizations were permitted to submit abatement applications provided that the requisite Form 3 ABC was filed on or before November 1, 1980, and that "but for the failure to file said list with the respective assessors for taxable years [1969-1980], [the organization] would have received a property tax exemption in said years." 5
The association, which had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain an abatement of the fiscal year 1977 tax in a proceeding involving an application for abatement filed in 1976, submitted the requisite Form 3 ABC 6 with its 1980 abatement application. On January 23, 1981, the assessors denied the abatement. The association appealed under formal procedure to the board. After hearing oral argument on a petition to dismiss filed by the assessors, the board, on January 22, 1982, dismissed the association's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The board subsequently issued its findings of fact and report. The association appeals to this court pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 13. We remand the case to the board for further proceedings.
The following factual findings by the board are not disputed. The tax was assessed to St. Dominic's Institute, Inc. (St. Dominic's), a Massachusetts corporation organized under G.L. c. 180, which, on January 1, 1976, was the owner of record of the property. The association purchased the property from St. Dominic's on June 26, 1976. St. Dominic's, as the "person ... assessed," filed an application for abatement on October 15, 1976. 7 See G.L. c. 59, § 59, as amended through St.1974, c. 831, § 4. In compliance with G.L. c. 59, § 57, as amended through St.1976, c. 250, § 1, permitting payment without interest of the tax in two installments due November 1 (or thirty days after the bill was sent) and May 1, the association paid one half of the tax on November 1, 1976. On or about January 11, 1977, the assessors notified St. Dominic's that its application for abatement had been denied. On April 8, 1977, the association filed an appeal in its own name from the assessors' refusal to abate the tax and, eighteen days later, made timely payment of the second installment of the tax.
The assessors filed a plea in bar with the board on September 16, 1977, alleging that, because the tax had not been assessed to the association, payment of the entire tax was a prerequisite to the association's right to appeal the denial of the abatement under G.L. c. 59, § 59, and that, the association having paid only one half of the tax before appealing, the board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The assessors also claimed as jurisdictional defects the omission to submit a certification that an annual report (Form PC) had been filed with the Attorney General as required by G.L. c. 12, § 8F, 8 and the failure to file Form 3 ABC. On November 4, 1977, prior to a determination by the board of the jurisdictional issue, the association withdrew its appeal.
The board concluded that St.1980, c. 560, did not revive the association's right to apply for an abatement of the 1977 tax 9 because the association would have been precluded from obtaining an abatement for that year even if the Form 3 ABC had been filed. At the time the 1977 appeal was filed, G.L. c. 59, § 59, as amended through St.1974, c. 831, § 4, provided in pertinent part: (emphasis supplied). The board concluded that the statutory requirement that a nonassessed owner pay "the tax" prior to prosecuting an appeal necessitated payment of the entire tax, and held that the association's timely payment of the tax in compliance with the payment schedule permitted under G.L. c. 59, § 57, was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the board over the association's 1977 appeal. The board also concluded that St.1977, c. 198, 10 was not applicable to that appeal. 11
We agree with the board that, prior to the 1977 amendment, section 59 required a nonassessed owner to make full payment of the tax before appealing. The short answer to the association's claim to the contrary is that section 59 authorizes a mortgage holder "who has paid not less than one-half of the tax" to apply for an abatement in the interim between September 20 and October 1 of the fiscal year for which the tax is assessed. Where the statute explicitly creates a category of nonassessed persons entitled to commence abatement proceedings by paying "not less than one-half of the tax," we cannot construe the requirement that a different category of persons pay "the tax" as being satisfied by the payment of half the tax prior to initial involvement in the abatement process. 12
At the time the Legislature amended the sections on the jurisdictional requirements for appeals by "person[s] aggrieved," it did not change the jurisdictional requisites of section 59 for the prosecution of abatement requests by nonassessed parties. See Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Assessors of Boston, 313 Mass. 762, 768, 49 N.E.2d 230 (1943). We cannot interpret the meaning of "pays the tax" to entitle the association to appeal by following the installment payment schedule where the Legislature made no such provision. The Legislature did not elect to place abatement proceedings involving nonassessed owners on a jurisdictional par with those involving assessed owners until it amended section 59 by St.1977, c. 198. 13 The board did not, therefore, have jurisdiction over the association's 1977 appeal unless St.1977, c. 198, was applicable to that appeal. See note 10 supra.
We disagree, however, with the board's conclusion that St.1977, c. 198, was not applicable to the association's appeal. The applicability of a statute to cases pending on its effective date often turns on whether the statute affects procedural or substantive rights. See Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. Nousis, 373 Mass. 169, 173, 366 N.E.2d 38 (1977). The board concluded that the statute affected substantive rights by creating a "new class" of "person[s] aggrieved," namely persons acquiring title to assessed property after January 1 and electing to pay the tax in two installments. However, it can be argued with equal vigor that the statute merely altered the time at which tax payments were due from a preexisting class of "person[s] aggrieved," i.e., persons acquiring title after January 1 and paying the tax. In this case, as in others, the distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" is elusive. See City Council of Waltham v. Vinciullo, 364 Mass. 624, 626-627, 307 N.E.2d 316 (1974); Lindberg v. State Tax Comm'n, 335 Mass. 141, 143, 138 N.E.2d 753 (1956). Because the remedial nature of the statute is apparent, and because, in our view, application of the statute would not necessarily interfere with the substantive rights of the assessors or of the town of Brookline, we hold that the statute operated to validate the 1977 claim of appeal.
We note initially that the statutory language itself suggests a legislative intent to make the statutory provisions applicable to cases pending on the effective date. The statute requires that a person acquiring title after January 1 "in any year" be treated as an assessed owner for that year. Absent language explicitly resuscitating a concluded or expired cause of action, cf. St.1980, c. 560; Mulligan v. Hilton, 305 Mass. 5, 8-9, 24 N.E.2d 676 (1940), we would not read "in any year" as applicable "to a case which has been closed, i.e., has gone to judgment and either been affirmed on appeal or not been appealed within the time allowed for appeal," City Council of Waltham v. Vinciullo, supra, 364 Mass. at 627, 307 N.E.2d 316. However, the association's appeal had not been conclusively adjudicated at the time the statute became operative. 14
The year during which the association...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mayor of Salem v. Warner Amex Cable Communications Inc.
...We do not agree. Nothing in the amendment indicates retroactive intent. Contrast Massachusetts Ass'n for the Blind v. Board of Assessors of Brookline, 391 Mass. 384, 390-391, 462 N.E.2d 86 (1984). The amendment, if applied to the license agreement, would effectively alter a substantive prov......