Massachusetts Probation Ass'n v. Commissioner of Administration

• Decision Date: 12 July 1976
• Citation: 352 N.E.2d 684,370 Mass. 651
• Parties: , 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2214, 80 Lab.Cas. P 53,884 MASSACHUSETTS PROBATION ASSOCIATION v. COMMISSIONER OF ADMINISTRATION et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 684

352 N.E.2d 684

370 Mass. 651, 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2214,

80 Lab.Cas. P 53,884

MASSACHUSETTS PROBATION ASSOCIATION

v. COMMISSIONER OF ADMINISTRATION et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued May 7, 1976.

Decided July 12, 1976.

Brian T. Callahan, Boston (Mitchell B. Corbett, Stoneham, with him), for the Massachusetts Probation Assn.

Michael F. Farrington, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Committee of Probation & another.

Mark M. Grossman, Special Asst. Atty. Gen. (William R. Blane, Boston, with him), for the Commissioner of Administration.

Joellen D'esti Bogdasarian, Boston, for the Labor Relations Commission.

Warren H. Pyle, Boston, for Alliance, AFSCME-SEIU, AFL-CIO.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and BRAUCHER, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

On March 3, 1976, the plaintiff filed an amended petition ² for declaratory judgment (G.L. c. 213A) in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk asking the court to determine whether probation officers are 'public employees' ³ within the meaning of the recently enacted public employee collective bargaining statute (G.L. c. 150E, inserted by St.1973, c. 1078, § 2). Further, if it is found that probation officers are covered under c. 150E, thereby entitling them to collective bargaining rights, the plaintiff seeks a determination as to who is the 'public employer' ⁴ of these employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The case was reserved and reported to the full court on a statement of agreed facts by a single justice on March 29, 1976.

We conclude as a matter of statutory interpretation that probation officers do not come within the definition of 'public employees' as set forth in c. 150E, § 1, and, therefore, we do not reach the question of who is the 'public employer' of probation officers. Also, in light of our conclusion, we need not address the constitutional argument raised by the defendants, the Committee on Probation and the Commissioner of Probation, that the application of c. 150E to probation officers would constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine embodied in art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.

The relevant facts as appearing in the record may be summarized as follows. On October 25, 1968, United City Employees Local 285 of the Service Employees International Union filed a certification petition with the Labor Relations Commission (the Commission) pursuant to the municipal employee collective bargaining law, G.L. c. 149, §§ 178G--178N (since repealed by St.1973, c. 1078, § 1), seeking designation as the exclusive bargaining agent of '(a)ll Suffolk County Probation Officers.' On January 16, 1969, the plaintiff filed a similar petition seeking certification as the representative of 'all probation officers employed by the District Courts and Superior Courts in the Counties of the Commonwealth.' After formal hearings were held, the Commission dismissed both petitions on the basis that the then controlling municipal employee collective bargaining law, G.L. c. 149, §§ 178G--178N, did not apply to probation officers, because they were State and not county employees. Nevertheless, Local 285 and the plaintiff were offered the opportunity to amend their certification petitions and to proceed under the then existing State employee collective bargaining law (G.L. c. 149, § 178F, since repealed by St.1973, c. 1078, § 1, effective July 1, 1974).

At a supplemental hearing on the amended petitions in October, 1970, the parties, including the plaintiff, Local 285, the Commissioner of Probation, and the Committee on Probation, stipulated that, for the limited purposes of the pending case only, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was the employer of probation officers. The Commission, in a supplemental decision, directed that an election be held whereby 'Probation Officers in the employ of the Judicial Department of the Commonwealth' would be entitled to elect an employee representative for collective bargaining purposes under G.L. c. 149, § 178F. Judicial review of the Commission's decision was not pursued by either the Commissioner of Probation or the Committee on Probation.

The plaintiff, having been elected by secret ballot, was certified on January 15, 1971, as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for the probation officers. Following approximately two months of negotiations during the summer of 1973 between the plaintiff and the Commissioner of Probation, ⁵ a contract was submitted to the Committee on Probation ⁶ for its approval.

On February 6, 1974, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court, in his capacity as chairman of the Committee on Probation, informed the plaintiff that the Committee did not consider itself the employer of probation officers, notwithstanding the contrary decision of the Commission, and, therefore, it would not continue to bargain with the plaintiff. In response, the plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory judgment. See note 2 supra.

On July 1, 1974, the State employee collective bargaining act, G.L. c. 149, § 178F, ⁷ was repealed and superseded by G.L. c. 150E, which gave public employees of the Commonwealth, as defined in c. 150E, § 1, the right to bargain collectively over wages, hours, standards of productivity and performance, and other terms and conditions of employment. See G.L. c. 150E, §§ 2, 6. See also Sherry, 1974 Ann.Surv. of Mass.Law § 2.12. ⁸ The Commission, by virtue of the authority vested in it by G.L. c. 23, § 9R, as most recently amended by St.1973, c. 1078, § 2A, and pursuant to its mandate under c. 150E, § 3, to prescribe rules and regulations and to establish procedures for the determination of appropriate bargaining units, suggested standards for ten Statewide bargaining units for Commonwealth employees. Although the plaintiff was notified of the hearings relating to the Commission's proposed amendment to its rules and regulations, it did not attend. On March 3, 1975, the Commission issued its rule establishing a ten-unit bargaining structure for State employees.

On March 25, 1975, a petition was filed by the Alliance, AFSCME-SEIU, AFL-CIO (the Alliance) seeking certification as the exclusive representative of unit 8 employees (social and rehabilitative employees) for purposes of collective bargaining. Thereafter, unit determination proceedings were held, but the plaintiff, despite notification, did not participate. The Commission, on October 6, 1975, issued a decision directing that a representation election be conducted for unit 8 employees. Furthermore, the Commission, in view of the pending litigation concerning the status of probation officers, adopted the stipulation agreed to by the Alliance and the Director of the Division of Employee Relations, the designee of the Commissioner of Administration, which provided that, to the extent that probation officers were employees within the meaning of c. 150E they were to be included in unit 8. Probation officers were permitted to vote in the unit 8 election, subject to the challenge of any of the parties.

A representation election was conducted in the fall of 1975, and the verification and tabulation of ballots commenced on November 17, 1975. The probation officers' votes were not tabulated because of a challenge by the Commissioner of Administration, and, in addition, all probation officers were instructed by counsel to attach a statement to their ballots indicating that their vote was cast subject to the petition for declaratory relief that is now before us. The only union making a proper showing of interest and appearing on the unit 8 ballot was the Alliance. Thus, on February 4, 1976, the Commission certified the Alliance ⁹ as the exclusive representative of all unit 8 employees for the purposes of collective bargaining under c. 150E.

The question before us, whether c. 150E is applicable to probation officers, is one of first impression. We had no occasion to consider this issue under the prior State employee collective bargaining law, G.L. c. 149, § 178F, nor have we examined the definitional section (§ 1) of c. 150E in our previous decisions (see note 8 supra). There is little agreement among the parties as to the applicability of c. 150E to probation officers and the identity of the employer for purposes of collective bargaining if they are covered. The plaintiff contends that probation officers are entitled to collective bargaining rights under the statute and that the Committee on Probation is the only logical employer because of the degree of control exercised by the Committee over the hiring, firing, and standards of performance of probation officers. Of the five named defendants, see note 1 supra, the Commissioner of Administration, the Committee on Probation and the Commissioner of Probation argue that c. 150E was not intended to cover probation officers. ¹⁰ The Commission and the Alliance adhere to the view that probation officers are employees within the meaning of the statute and that the Commissioner of Administration is the sole employer under c. 150E, § 1, of State public employees, including probation officers. We believe that this divergence of opinion among the parties may reflect the somewhat ambiguous wording of the statute and the rather scant legislative history. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that, despite this lack of clear guidance, a sensible reading of the whole statute in light of the history of public employee collective bargaining in this Commonwealth compels the conclusion that probation officers are not entitled to collective bargaining rights under c. 150E.

In deciding the present case, we acknowledge, as all the parties apparently concede, that probation officers are employees of the judicial branch of government. The Committee on Probation, see note 6 supra, consists of members of the judiciary. This Committee appoints the Commissioner of Probation, who has responsibility, in...