Massengill v. Scott
| Decision Date | 13 October 1987 |
| Citation | 738 S.W.2d 629 |
| Parties | Charles MASSENGILL, et ux. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mildred SCOTT, et al. Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Peter Alliman, Knoxville, for plaintiffs-appellants.
James R. Farrar, Robert H. Watson, Jr., Knoxville, for defendants-appellees.
This is an action for damages on various theories of tort. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that a previous judgment of the United States District Court rendered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants in an action for alleged violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constituted res judicata or collateral estoppel of the issues raised in this case, thereby supporting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals sustained the judgment of the trial court, Judge Goddard dissenting. We granted application for permission to appeal and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
On November 30, 1982 the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that the defendants herein had deprived them of certain constitutional rights thereby entitling them to damages as provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In that complaint the plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants' conduct also violated state law and amounted to tortious conduct of false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, assault and battery and outrageous conduct. The plaintiffs requested the Court to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over these state law claims. Although that request was timely raised by motion, it was denied by the District Judge and the case proceeded for trial on the Federal Section 1983 action.
At the close of the proof offered by the plaintiffs in Federal court the action of the plaintiff's wife, Beulah Massengill, was dismissed because there is no derivative cause of action allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal trial court also dismissed the actions against Dennis Trotter and other defendants not sued in this State action, and directed the remaining defendants to produce their proof. Eventually, the plaintiff Charles Massengill's case was submitted to the jury on the issue of whether or not the defendants, Scott and Johnson or either of them, had violated the plaintiff's civil rights as alleged. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendants.
The federal court declined to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over the alleged State law tort claims, resulting in a total dismissal of the federal court action.
On March 31, 1983 the plaintiffs timely filed in the State court a complaint against Mildred Scott, Richard Johnson, Dennis Trotter and Anderson County, Tennessee, alleging that the defendants Scott and Johnson were guilty of assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution and outrageous conduct and that defendants Trotter and Anderson County were liable to the plaintiffs because their negligence proximately caused and contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries. The action against the county was later voluntarily dismissed.
The defendants remaining filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that this present action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In support of their motion the defendants filed a copy of the federal court complaint, and a copy of the judgment entered on a general verdict for the defendants in the federal court. The trial court held that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were applicable and on that basis granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
As we have said so many times, a motion for summary judgment can be granted only when the pleadings, stipulations, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56.03, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; Phillips v. Pittsburg Consolidated Coal Company, Tenn., 541 S.W.2d 411 (1976).
The doctrine of res judicata bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action with respect to all issues which were or could have been litigated in the former suit. Collateral estoppel operates to bar a second suit between the same parties and their privies on a different cause of action only as to issues which were actually litigated and determined in the former suit. See, 22 Tennessee Jurisprudence, p. 112 and cases there cited.
Res judicata is not properly applicable in the case at bar because the cause of action in the state court is not the same as the cause of action in the United States District Court. The action in the federal court was based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any state ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proceeding for redress....
One purpose of that statute is to afford a right of action for damages to one who has been deprived of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by one acting under color of state law. A cause of action thus asserted is quite different from a cause of action based upon state law for damages resulting from such common law torts as false arrest and imprisonment,...
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