Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Wells, MASSEY-FERGUSO

• Decision Date: 26 January 1978
• Docket Number: MASSEY-FERGUSO,INC
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
• Parties: , a Maryland Corporation, and Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants below, Appellants, v. James C. WELLS, Jr., and Hilda I. Wells, his wife, and Kenneth L. Reed and June S. Reed, his wife, Plaintiffs below, Appellees.

Page 640

383 A.2d 640

MASSEY-FERGUSON, INC., a Maryland Corporation, and Thos.

Best & Sons, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants below, Appellants, v. James C. WELLS, Jr., and Hilda I. Wells, his wife, and Kenneth L. Reed and June S. Reed, his wife,

Plaintiffs below, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Sept. 16, 1977.

Decided Jan. 26, 1978.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.

Alfred M. Isaacs and James W. Semple, of Flanzer & Isaacs, Wilmington, Richard Allen Paul and Paul M. Lukoff, of Paul, Lukoff & Hurley, Wilmington, for defendant-appellant Massey-Ferguson, Inc.

Ben T. Castle and Richard A. Zappa, of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, for defendant-appellant Thos. Best & Sons, Inc.

James M. Tunnell, Jr., Walter L. Pepperman, II, and George Pazuniak, of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, and Julius Komissaroff, of Berg, Komissaroff & Sawyer, Wilmington, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before HERRMANN, C. J., DUFFY, J., and BROWN, Vice Chancellor.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal in a products liability and negligence case against Massey-Ferguson, Inc. (Massey) and Thos. Best & Sons, Inc. (Best) arising from personal injuries sustained by plaintiffs, James C. Wells, Jr. (Wells) and Kenneth L. Reed (Reed).

I

Stated as narrowly as possible, it appears that Wells and Reed were helping Best employees service or repair a large farming machine known generally as a "combine." They were kneeling on the ground under the combine and pushing forward on a grain pan with their hands when the "header," weighing some four thousand pounds, fell on them. Each sustained serious injuries. The combine had been manufactured by Massey and sold by Best. The header had been supported by a safety stand made by Massey as an integral part of the machine. Hydraulic hoses through which the header was raised and lowered and which, according to the evidence, kept it in a raised position and thus acted as a "back-up" safety device, had been disconnected by Best employees in the course of the work.

After a lengthy trial, the jury found, on special interrogations, that both defendants were negligent and awarded damages to Reed; however, it could not decide whether Wells assumed the risk of injury by having placed himself in a dangerous position. The Trial Court granted partial new trials on the issue of Wells' assumption of risk and as to damages for each plaintiff. Defendants then docketed this appeal.

The parties disagree as to what issues the notice of appeal presents to the Court whether there was reversible error in the jury's findings of negligence, whether the Trial Court properly denied motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and whether that Court abused its discretion in ordering partial new trials.

II

We must first consider what is before us, that is, what issues are properly subject to review by this Court.

The notice of appeal filed by defendants reads as follows:

"PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that both defendants below, Massey-Ferguson, Inc. and Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., appellants herein, hereby appeal jointly and severally to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware from the decision of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County dated October 7, 1976 granting plaintiffs a partial new trial on certain limited issues only."

Defendants contend that the appeal filed is from the entire decision by the Trial Court, including all findings on the merits, while plaintiffs contend that the appeal is from the grant of a partial new trial only.

Defendants have attempted to settle the controversy as to the scope of the appeal by moving to amend the notice. However, under settled law a notice of appeal cannot be amended or modified after expiration of the time for perfecting the appeal, Trowell v. Diamond Supply Co., Del.Supr., 8 Terry 422, 91 A.2d 797, 801-02 (1952). It follows, therefore, that the motion must be denied.

But the notice as filed is ambiguous and we conclude that, in justice, it should be given a broad reading under the circumstances of this case. So viewed, we determine that the notice of appeal raises all issues on the merits. We say this because the appeal was taken "from the decision of the Superior Court . . . dated October 7, 1976" and that decision included rulings not only as to partial new trials but also as to "various post-trial motions," many of which the Trial Judge discussed in some detail, including Wells' alleged assumption of risk, the damage claims of the Reeds and Massey's renewed request for judgment NOV. The Court's "Summary" of its rulings implicitly included a denial of any post-trial motion not granted.

III

Turning now to the merits, Massey contends that the finding of liability was reversible error. We disagree.

Massey argues, first, that the jury's finding of negligence was against the weight of the evidence because plaintiffs failed to present evidence of a standard of care or duty applicable under the facts of the case, and thus failed to prove that defendants owed a legal duty to plaintiffs. Although it is true that there was no evidence of industry-wide standards, that is not fatal to plaintiffs' cause.

Plaintiffs' burden was to establish that Massey failed to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent manufacturer under all the circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 395, 398. ¹ While this standard of conduct may be established by evidence of industry-wide standards, such evidence is neither controlling nor always necessary. See Delmarva Power & Light v. Stout, Del.Supr., 380 A.2d 1365 (1977). We hold that it is not essential under the facts of the instant case.

We do not mean to suggest that the duty required in a case involving complex technical matters can be determined solely as a matter of a jury's common knowledge. But we are satisfied, however, that the technical evidence offered in this case by the parties' witnesses was such that, under proper instructions from the Trial Court, the jury could correctly apply negligence concepts without resorting to mere speculation. ²

Nor do we agree with Massey's contention that the weight of the evidence shows negligence to lie entirely with Best. Thus, for example, the jury could have found that Massey failed to provide adequate warnings that use of the safety stand device alone was not sufficient support to maintain the header in an up-raised position; ³ or that Massey negligently invited a user to rely on the safety stand system alone when going under the head. ⁴

In light of the foregoing, we hold that there was sufficient evidence of liability and that the Trial Court properly denied the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.

IV

Finally, it is contended that the Trial Court erred in granting partial new trials on the issues of assumption of risk and damages.

The Trial Judge determined that "the jury's partial verdict here has established . . . (defendants') negligence for purposes of gauging plaintiff's conduct" and that the question of Wells' assumption of risk can and "must be retried as the only liability determination." The Court also determined that an inadequate verdict had been awarded Reed, which was not the result of a compromise and which therefore did not preclude a partial new trial on damages.

The Trial Judge's rulings must be measured against the standards announced in Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, Del.Supr., 1 Storey 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958), wherein this Court held that:

" . . . the modern rule is well-settled that a new trial may be had upon limited issues when such issues are severable from the other issues, and no injustice will result from retaining the verdict upon those other issues."

Id. at 136. And the issue on appeal from the grant of partial new trials is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion. Trowell v. Diamond Supply Co., supra.

Since it was not unreasonable to have determined that the issues of damages and assumption of risk were severable from the liability issue, or to have determined that it would not result in injustice to retain the verdict upon defendants' negligence, we conclude that the grant of a partial new trial did not result in an abuse of discretion. Best argues that our recent ruling in Delaware Olds, Inc. v. Dixon, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 178 (1976), calls for invocation here of the "may have been" part of the rule, that is, that the modest verdict for the Reeds should be read as an indication of the jury's difficulty with the assumption of risk defense. But the facts make the case and, implicitly, the Trial Judge determined that the jury had made perceptive distinctions in its findings as to liability and we find no abuse of discretion in such a conclusion. In so ruling, we do not determine what evidence Best or any other party may offer on the Wells' assumption of risk issue or any unsettled allocation of fault issue which has not been settled by the law of the case.

Affirmed.

1 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:

" § 395. . . .

A manufacturer who fails to exercise...