Massey & Steagall v. Wheeler et al

• Decision Date: 20 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-2663,99-2663
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2000) Michael Massey and Richard L. Steagall, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Suzanne Wheeler, Unit Manager at the Federal Correctional Center in Pekin, Illinois, in her individual and official capacities, David Helman, Warden at the Federal Correctional Center in Pekin, Illinois, in his individual and official capacities, Janice Bonneville, Paralegal Specialist at the Federal Correctional Center in Pekin, Illinois, in her individual and official capacities and Michael Schallmoser, Case Manager at the Federal Correctional Center in Pekin, Illinois, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1030

221 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2000)

Michael Massey and Richard L. Steagall, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Suzanne Wheeler, Unit Manager at the Federal Correctional Center in Pekin, Illinois, in her individual and official capacities, David Helman, Warden at the Federal Correctional Center in Pekin, Illinois, in his individual and official capacities, Janice Bonneville, Paralegal Specialist at the Federal Correctional Center in Pekin, Illinois, in her individual and official capacities and Michael Schallmoser, Case Manager at the Federal Correctional Center in Pekin, Illinois, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-2663

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Argued February 23, 2000

Decided July 20, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division. No. 98 C 1348--Jeanne E. Scott, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Flaum, Kanne and Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judges.

Kanne, Circuit Judge.

Inmate Michael Massey and his attorney, Richard L. Steagall, brought a two- count complaint against the staff of the Federal Correctional Center at Pekin, Illinois, where Massey is incarcerated, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs allege that the prison's restrictions on inmates' unmonitored telephone calls violate their First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed Count One without prejudice for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Count Two, which Steagall brought both as a third-party asserting Massey's rights and in his own name asserting his own constitutional rights, also was dismissed. The district court dismissed without prejudice the third-party claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and dismissed with prejudice Steagall's first-party action for failure to state a claim. We affirm the district court's order and further hold that Steagall lacked standing to bring the third-party action in this case.

I. History

While incarcerated, inmate Massey has carried on a continuous course of litigation, including actions against prison officials related to medical care he received some time ago, see Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Massey I"), and a civil forfeiture action in Indiana state court. To facilitate this litigation, Massey contends that he requires unmonitored telephone calls with his attorneys at least weekly because monitored telephone calls, personal visits and legal mail are insufficient. From March 1996 to September 1998, Massey made weekly unmonitored telephone calls to his attorneys in Illinois and Indiana. In October 1998, Massey had no pending court dates and was receiving sparse legal mail and no visits from attorneys. The prison staff decided that Massey did not need weekly or twice weekly unmonitored calls as he demanded, because other means of communication were adequate. Federal regulation 28 C.F.R. sec. 540.103 prohibits the prison from placing frequency limitations on unmonitored telephone calls to an inmate's attorney "when the inmate demonstrates that communication with attorneys by correspondence, visiting, or normal telephone use is not adequate." Between October 1998 and February 1999, Massey placed twenty- eight unmonitored calls, still more than one a week. The procedure for making unmonitored telephone calls placed an administrative burden on the prison staff because unmonitored telephone lines are available only in a certain area of the prison, and a staff member must be present at all times to ensure the inmate does not place calls to anyone other than his lawyer. Massey placed far more unmonitored telephone calls than any other prisoner, and according to prisoner records, almost half of the unmonitored calls placed from Massey's unit were from Massey. Massey further alleged that on three occasions, prison staff illegally opened his legal mail.

Massey saw a prison conspiracy behind the limitation on his weekly unmonitored calls, and he and Steagall complained that the other means of unmonitored communication were not adequate. When an inmate feels any of his rights have been infringed, Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) rules provide an administrative procedure to remedy the problem. Massey took a step toward initiating the administrative remedy by requesting BOP forms BP- 9, BP-10 and BP-11. The prison staff denied this request because inmates must file BP-9 before requesting BP-10. Rather than simply providing Massey with BP-9, defendant Suzanne Wheeler precipitated this litigation by engaging in a hyper-literal reading of Massey's request and refused to provide him any forms because he incorrectly requested three forms at once. Not to be outdone in the pursuit of absurdity, rather than respond with a request for form BP-9, Massey filed this lawsuit.

The prison officials moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321- 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 42 U.S.C.) ("PLRA") requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit in district court. The defendants moved to dismiss Steagall's action for failure to state a claim and his third-party action on the same administrative exhaustion ground as Massey's own claim. The district court granted the motions without prejudice as to Count One and with prejudice as to Count Two.

II. Analysis

Massey believes the district court erred in holding that administrative exhaustion could be decided at the pleading stage under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). Steagall appeals the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of his case for failure to state a constitutional injury. We review de novo the decisions regarding both dismissals. See Kaplan v. Shure Bros., Inc., 153 F.3d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1998). In so doing, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 489 (7th Cir. 1997).

A. Massey's claims

As we recently stated in Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999), the PLRA contains a "comprehensive administrative exhaustion requirement," which states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. sec. 1997e(a). Although not depriving the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction, the provision requires dismissal of any case in which an available administrative remedy has not been exhausted. See Perez, 182 F.3d at 535. As Massey knows too well from our decision in Massey I, 196 F.3d at 732-33, dismissal on the pleadings is proper for failure to plead the exhaustion of all administrative remedies. Massey does not, and clearly could not, plead that he exhausted all administrative remedies. Instead, he avers that there are "no available administrative remedies" and, conversely, that "any administrative remedies that are claimed to exist are in fact a sham." As we stated in Perez, 182 F.3d 536-37, and Massey I, 196 F.3d at 733, there is no "futility exception" to the PLRA exhaustion requirement. His failure to plead exhaustion of all administrative remedies mandates dismissal of his claim without prejudice.

Massey's only route around this inescapable conclusion relies on the argument that dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not proper at the pleading stage because exhaustion is an affirmative defense. See Massey I, 196 F.3d at 735 (recognizing administrative exhaustion as an affirmative defense); King v. Cooke, 26 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 1994). As required by Rule 8(c), the defendants raised the administrative-exhaustion defense in response to Massey's complaint, but moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim rather than for summary judgment under Rule 56, which allows for the consideration of matters outside the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 56. The district court chose to treat the defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than convert the motion to one under Rule 56 by considering matters outside of the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1999). While conversion would not change the outcome in this case, it seems clear from the district court's order that the complaint was found to be deficient on its face, without reference to other pleadings or exhibits, and therefore judgment under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper as to Count One.

B. Steagall's Third-Party Complaint

In Count Two, Steagall attempts an end-run around the administrative exhaustion requirement by bringing Massey's claims as a third-party plaintiff. In its motion to dismiss, the government addressed in a somewhat backward fashion the issue of whether Steagall had standing to bring a claim on Massey's behalf, but the district court declined to reach the third- party standing issue. Instead, it assumed Steagall was a proper party and decided that his third-party claim should fail on administrative exhaustion grounds. However, because the third- party standing issue disposes of part of this case, it would have been better for the district court to decide it, which we do here.

The prohibition on third-party claims is a prudential standing limitation which recognizes that claims are best prosecuted by those who actually have been injured, rather than by someone in their stead. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). The Supreme Court has established a narrow exception to this doctrine, allowing third-party claims when the third-party plaintiff can show a close relationship between the first and third party and some obstacle to the first party's ability to protect his own interest. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991); Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 199...