Massey v. Adams
| Decision Date | 16 March 1872 |
| Citation | 3 S.C. 254 |
| Parties | MASSEY v. ADAMS. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to reverse an order of the Circuit Judge, granting a new trial by the Jury upon a question of fact.
Where lapse of time is relied upon, as raising the presumption of a conveyance as against minors claiming the land as heirs of the owner who is alleged to have made the conveyance, the period of minority must be deducted, and if twenty years do not remain the presumption does not arise.
BEFORE THOMAS, J., AT LANCASTER, APRIL TERM, 1871.
Trespass to try title. The case is recited in the order appealed from, which is as follows:
" The plaintiffs in this action are the children and sole heirs at law of Amelia V. Hooper, deceased. Their mother, the said Amelia V. Hooper, upon the death of a former husband, Dr. Franklin Massey, became entitled under his will to the land (445 acres) now in dispute. The plaintiffs and the defendant both claim to derive title from her-the plaintiffs as heirs at law by descent, and the defendant by purchase.
On the 24th day of November, 1845, the said Amelia V. and Dr. Edward J. Hooper, in contemplation of their intermarriage, which occurred soon after, entered, it seems, into a contract under seal, in Lowns County, Alabama, by which the said Edward J. promised and agreed, on the occurrence of the marriage, to convey by deed all of the estate, both real and personal, of the said Amelia V., to Samuel B. Massey, of Lancaster, S. C., since deceased, " to have and to hold the said property, both real and personal, to be deeded as aforesaid, as trustee for the said Amelia V. Massey, for her sole and separate use and behoof, subject to her discretion (query, direction) and control, free from all debts liabilities or incumbrances of the said Edward J. Hooper whatsoever." But it does not appear that, in pursuance of this contract, any such deed was ever executed by said Edward J. Hooper.
On the 7th day of January, 1850, the said Samuel B. Massey, professing to act as attorney in fact of the said Edward J. Hooper and wife, executed (without reciting in what manner authorized) a deed of conveyance of the land in question, in their names, to one James Faulkner. But it does not appear that he was authorized by deed or power of attorney to make the conveyance; nor does it appear that Mrs. Amelia V., the wife, ever relinquished her right of inheritance in the land. The deed to Faulkner was not produced, but the record thereof in the Register's office is unaccompanied by any such power or relinquishment of inheritance.
After their marriage, it seems, Dr. Hooper and wife lived on the land for about two years, and then removed to North Carolina, where they were residing in 1850, when the deed to Faulkner was executed. Dr. Hooper died some time in that year, (1850,) and his widow having survived him until October, 1851, died in Alabama, leaving her children, the plaintiffs, all infants, the eldest not having attained the age of twenty-one years until December, 1861, and the remaining two being still infants at the time this action was commenced. It appears that the execution of the deed to James Faulkner was followed by possession of the land by him, which continued up to the time of his death, the date of which is not fixed by evidence. After his death it was sold by his executors and purchased by the defendant, John Adams, to whom a deed of conveyance was executed, dated February the 19th, 1863.
After Dr. Hooper and wife removed from this State, Mr. S. B. Massey appears to have acted as their general agent. The defendant, or rather the executor of James Faulkner, who had been vouched, relied on the presumptions arising from the marriage agreement, the lapse of time, the conduct of Mr. Massey, and upon Faulkner's possession of the land to support his claim.
I thought, and so instructed the jury, that these were insufficient to amount to evidence that Mrs. Hooper had ever been divested of her title to the land; and inasmuch as the infancy of the plaintiffs protected them against any right Faulkner might have acquired by his possession, they should find a verdict for the land in favor of the plaintiffs. They, nevertheless, found for the defendant, and the plaintiffs made this motion for a new trial. After hearing argument on the motion, I am still of opinion that the verdict is unsupported by evidence, and the motion must prevail.
I further instructed the jury that the presumption arising from twenty years' lapse of time, that anything which ought to have been done to perfect a title should be presumed to have been done, was answered by the production of the deed from S. B. Massey, under which defendant claimed, according to their own testimony; that the title could not pass in that way, and only could have passed by the intervention of a Court of Equity.
It is, therefore, ordered that a new trial be granted, and verdict heretofore rendered be set aside.
The defendants' attorneys excepted to the order, and now moved this Court to set aside the same:
1. Because the lapse of time since the date of the marriage settlement between the said Amelia V. and Dr. E. J. Hooper, executed in Lowns County, Alabama, on the 24th day of November, 1845, whereby the land in dispute was to become vested in the said S. B. Massey as trustee for the said Amelia V., accompanied by the subsequent possession of Massey, Faulkner and Adams, are sufficient in law to authorize the presumption that Hooper and wife did execute to S. B. Massey, under the terms of the marriage agreement, such a deed as authorized the said S. B. Massey to convey a good title to the said James Faulkner, in the manner in which he did convey.
2. Because, under the circumstances of this case, the law will authorize the presumption of the execution of any paper necessary to protect the title of the defendant.
3. Because, after such a lapse of time, and the circumstances of the case, a ratification of the deed of S. B. Massey to Faulkner may be presumed to have been made by Mrs. Hooper after the death of her husband.
4. Because, the terms of the said marriage agreement being that the said S. B. Massey should hold the land subject to " the direction and control" of the said Amelia V., the authority of the latter to convey, as may be implied from the circumstances, was sufficient to render valid the conveyance from Massey to Faulkner as made.
5. Because, the legal estate in the said land, being, by the terms of the said marriage agreement, vested in the said S. B. Massey, the subsequent conveyance of the land by Massey is valid in law, and the plaintiffs cannot, in this Court , seek to question or to set aside the same.
6. Because his Honor, the presiding Judge, erred in asserting " that the infancy of the plaintiffs protected them against any right Faulkner might have acquired by his possession" of the land in dispute.
7. Because twenty years' adverse possession (or a less time with circumstances) by Faulkner and Adams, is sufficient in law to raise a presumption of title, even as against infants; and the testimony of Mrs. Faulkner, that her husband purchased the land in 1848; and the testimony of John Short, that Faulkner had the land in 1849, was sufficient to warrant the jury in believing that Faulkner and Adams had actual or constructive possession for twenty years, or over, previous to the 8th of January, 1869, the date of the entry of this suit.
8. Because Faulkner's title was ratified by the plaintiff, B. F. Massey, at least to the extent of any interest he may have had in said land: 1st, by his implied assent to its sale as the estate of Faulkner, in November, 1862; 2d, by his becoming surety to the purchaser (Adams) for the payment to Faulkner's estate of the purchase money; 3d, by his acquiescence in the possession of Faulkner and Adams from December, 1861, (the date of his majority,) to the 8th of January, 1869, the date of the entry of this suit; and, in any event, the share in said land to which the plaintiff, B. F. Massey, may have been entitled, of right belongs to the defendant.
9. Because the testimony of A. J. Kibler, that he had delivered to Adams several papers, constituting what he believed to be a good chain of title, and the testimony of Adams that his papers were scattered, and some of them destroyed during the war; coupled with other facts in evidence going to show that the plaintiff, B. F. Massey, and the defendant, Adams, have the same interest in this action-both antagonistic to the estate of Faulkner- were sufficient, with lapse of time, to warrant the jury in presuming that Faulkner had a good title, the evidence of which had either been suppressed or destroyed.
10. Because the ruling of his Honor the presiding Judge, in granting a new trial, is, in other respects, contrary to law, and the verdict of the jury is supported both by the law and the evidence.
Kershaw , for appellant:
The exceptions make the points:
1. That the jury had a right to presume a power of attorney from Hooper and wife to S. B. Massey, to convey the land in dispute to James Faulkner, in the manner that he did, and that Mrs. Hooper relinquished her inheritance in proper form during coverture, or released the same after the death of her husband.
2. That the jury had the right to presume that the land was conveyed to Massey, according to the terms of the marriage contract, and that one of the provisions of the presumed deed was that the land could be conveyed by Massey, as the attorney of the parties, under the direction of Mrs. Hooper.
3. That the jury had the right to presume that a deed was executed to S. B. Massey, in pursuance of the marriage agreement whereby the legal estate passed to Massey, and...
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