Massey v. W.R. Grace & Co., 22362
| Decision Date | 07 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 22362,22362 |
| Citation | 286 S.C. 434,334 S.E.2d 122 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | David MASSEY, Employee, Respondent, v. W.R. GRACE & COMPANY, Employer, and Transportation Insurance Company, Carrier, Appellants. . Heard |
Duke K. McCall, Jr., of Leatherwood, Waker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, for appellants.
Danny R. Smith, of Cummings & Smith, Spartanburg, for respondent.
This is a worker's compensation case. Respondent claimant, David Massey, was denied benefits by the Industrial Commission because his injury was not job related. The circuit court reversed holding claimant had proved a compensable injury. We affirm.
Claimant is a sixty year old man who had been employed in appellant's mineral ore plant for twelve years. His duties included throwing out large rocks before the ore mixture reached the grate. He worked seven days a week and had not missed a day in over a year at the time of the injury.
The day of the injury, claimant testified he felt a catch in his back which continued to get worse day after day. His physician testified claimant had ruptured a disc rendering him incapable of continuing work as a hard laborer.
The decision of the Industrial Commission will not be overturned by the circuit court or this Court unless clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence in the record. Mitchem v. Fiske-Carter Construction Company, 278 S.C. 180, 293 S.E.2d 701 (1982); Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981).
After reviewing the testimony, we agree with the circuit court the evidence supporting a compensable injury is overwhelming and there was no evidence in the record to support the decision of the Industrial Commission.
We affirm the Circuit Court's finding of a compensable injury and the award of benefits to respondent-claimant.
AFFIRMED.
Hearing Commissioner Reid and a majority of the Full Commission 1 found no compensable injury. The Circuit Court and this Court's majority, however, have chosen to substitute their findings of fact for those of the Commission.
A reviewing court may reverse the Industrial Commission only if it is unsupported by substantial evidence. Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). The majority correctly cites this standard, but proceeds to substitute its own factual findings of those of the Full gnmmission. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, "the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on the questions of fact." Lark, 276 S.C. at 132, 276 S.E.2d at 305, citing S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(g) (Cum.Supp.1984).
Substantial evidence supported the Industrial Commission's findings. There was evidence that respondent failed to report his injury as...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Howell v. Pacific Columbia Mills
...not be overturned by a reviewing court unless it is clearly unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Massey v. W.R. Grace & Company, 286 S.C. 434, 334 S.E.2d 122 (1985). Substantial evidence is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reac......
-
Brayboy v. Clark Heating Co., Inc.
...Act, a reviewing court may reverse Commission's findings only when unsupported by substantial evidence. Massey v. W.R. Grace & Co., 286 S.C. 434, 334 S.E.2d 122 (1985). When there is a conflict of evidence, the findings of fact of the Commission are conclusive. Lorick v. SCE & G, 245 S.C. 5......
-
Grayson v. Carter Rhoad Furniture
...in view of the substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(g)(5) (1986); Massey v. W.R. Grace & Company, 286 S.C. 434, 334 S.E.2d 122 (1985). In this case, the administrative findings are clearly erroneous because they are based on a mistaken view of the In a......
- Danny M., In Interest of, 22361