Massie v. Cessna

• Decision Date: 23 April 1909
• Citation: 239 Ill. 352,88 N.E. 152
• Parties: MASSIE v. CESSNA.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

239 Ill. 352

88 N.E. 152

MASSIE

v.CESSNA.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 23, 1909.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Charles M. Walker, Judge.

Bill for injunction by Perry J. Massie against Charles E. Cessna. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Clark & Clark, for appellant.

Elmer E. Ledbetter and M. B. Wellington (Edgar A. Bancroft and Victor A. Remy, of counsel), for appellee.

SCOTT, J.

This appeal comes directly from the circuit court of Cook county, and presents the question of the constitutionality of the statute of May 13, 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 79), entitled ‘An act in relation to the assignment of wages, income or salary’ (Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, p. 176), which reads as follows:

‘Section 1. No assignment of the wages or salary of any person shall be valid, so as to vest in the assignee any beneficial interest, either at law or in equity, unless such assignment shall be in writing, signed by the assignor and acknowledged in person by the assignor before a justice of the peace in and for the township in which the assignor resides, and entered by such justice upon his docket, and unless within three days from the date of the execution and acknowledgment of such assignment, a true and complete copy of said assignment and of the certificate of its acknowledgment shall be served upon the person, firm or corporation from whom such wages or salary is due or is to become due, in the same manner that the summons in chancery is now required by law to be served: Provided further, that no assignment of wages or salary by a married person shall be valid unless the same is also executed and acknowledged, as above, by the assignor's wife or husband, as the case may be.

‘Sec. 2. The term ‘assignment,’ as used in this act, shall include every assignment, transfer, sale, pledge, mortgage or hypothecation, however made or attempted, of the wages or salary of any person, or of any interest therein.

‘Sec. 3. Whenever any assignment of the wages or salary of any person or persons shall be given as security for a loan tainted with usury, or shall be given to secure the payment or fulfillment of a usurious contract, or the payment of the principal or the interest of a usurious debt, such assignment shall be absolutely void.

‘Sec. 4. Every assignment of wages to be earned in whole or in part more than six (6) months from and after the making of such assignment shall be absolutely void.

‘Sec. 5. Whenever any person, firm or corporation shall bring or threaten to bring any action or suit to enforce any assignment of wages or salary which has not been duly executed, acknowledged and served upon the employer in conformity with the provisions of this act or which is declared invalid by the provisions of this act, courts of equity shall have full power, upon the application either of the assignor of such wages or salary, or of the person, firm or corporation from whom such wages or salary is, or is to become due, to perpetually enjoin the threatened or attempted enforcement of any such assignment, and the fact that the complainant has a complete and adequate remedy at law, shall constitute no defense to the maintenance of a suit in equity for the purposes aforesaid.

‘Sec. 6. The invalidity of any portion of this act shall not affect the validity of any other portion thereof which can be given effect without such invalid part.’

The appellee filed his bill for an injunction against the appellant, alleging: That he had been for a number of years continuously in the employ of the Inter-Ocean Newspaper Company; that about 12 years ago he commenced a course of dealing with the appellant, who loaned money to wage-earners and salaried people at exhorbitant, illegal, and usurious rates of interest, which dealings had continued until the present time, and all of which had been usurious; that he had upon a number of occasions borrowed from appellant certain sums of money at 10 per cent. interest per month, and had repaid to appellant, by way of interest and other moneys, many large sums for which he had received no credit upon the principal, which sums greatly exceeded the amount of money borrowed, together with legal interest thereon; that there were executed by appellee, at various times, assignments of his wages as security for the payment of the several usurious loans, all of which assignments appellant now holds and has threatened to file with appellee's employer, thereby intending to compel appellee to comply with appellant's unlawful and usurious demands. The bill further alleges: That in February, 1907, as a transaction wholly separate and apart from the previous dealings with appellant, the appellee borrowed $25, for the use of which he agreed to pay $2.50 per month as interest until said sum was repaid, and he executed to appellant an assignment of wages to be earned until August 18, 1908, as security for the payment of said sum and interest; that this assignment was given as security for a loan tainted with usury, and was never acknowledged in person, nor before a justice of the peace, nor before any person or official whatsoever, so that, by reason of the statute in such case provided, it is not valid; that appellant has filed with the Inter-Ocean Newspaper Company a copy of this assignmentand now threatens to bring suit to enforce the same, which would result in great and irreparable injury to the complainant, and the appellant, Cessna, will bring said suit unless restrained from so doing. The prayer of the bill was that all of said assignments of wages now in the hands of the appellant or his agents be canceled, and appellant enjoined from proceeding in any manner to enforce any of said assignments. A demurrer to the bill having been overruled, the defendant elected to stand by his demurrer, and a decree was entered in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

The appellant insists that the statute in question violates section 2 of article 2 of the Constitution of the state, which provides that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.’ This is the only question for consideration, as the averments of the bill with reference to transactions prior to that of February, 1907, are too indefinite to show the existence of any equity in favor of appellee.

The right to labor for and to render services to another, and the right to dispose of the compensation to be received for so doing, are property rights within the meaning of the language just quoted from the Constitution. Froer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395,16 L. R. A. 492;Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62,22 L. R. A. 340, 37 Am. St. Rep. 206;Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, 70 N. E. 564,65 L. R. A. 602, 101 Am. St. Rep. 233. It is at once apparent upon an examination of this statute that it abridges the right of the man who earns a salary and the right of the man who earns wages to contract with reference thereto. Notwithstanding this fact, appellee contends that the act in question is not prohibited by the...