Masters v. Van Wart

• Decision Date: 20 September 1926
• Citation: 134 A. 539
• Parties: MASTERS v. VAN WART.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

134 A. 539

MASTERS

v. VAN WART.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 20, 1926.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Aroostook County, in Equity.

Rill by Cecil D. Masters against William T. Van Wart. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff's bill, and dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Decree reversed, and case remanded.

Argued before WILSON, C. J., and PHILBROOK, DEASY, STURGIS, and BASSETT, JJ.

R. W. Shaw, of Houlton, for appellant.

H. M. Briggs, of Houlton, and H. T. Powers, of Ft. Fairfield, for appellee.

Procedure.

DEASY. J. The court below by its decree, appealed from, sustained a. demurrer to the plaintiff's bill in equity and dismissed the bill.

In this state, contrary to the rule prevailing in some jurisdictions (Whitehouse, vol. 1, p. 850), an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory decree in an equity cause (R. S. c. 82, § 24). But such appeal does "not suspend any proceedings * * * in the cause, and shall not be taken to the law court until after final decree." R. S. c. 82, § 24.

A decree in equity, overruling or sustaining a demurrer and doing nothing more, is interlocutory (Worcester v. Tupper, 210 Mass. 380, 96 N. E. 1096), and cannot be brought to this court "until after final decree." But a decree, like that in the present case, sustaining a demurrer and also dismissing the bill, is final. "It puts the case out of court." Forbes v. Tuckerman, 115 Mass. 119; Snell v. Dwight, 121 Mass. 348; DeArmas's Heirs v. United States, 6 How. 103, 12 L. Ed. 361.

Thus the procedure in this case, while unusual, is proper. The case might, indeed, have been brought forward on exceptions. R. S. c. 82, § 27.

An appeal, however, is authorized.

Upon the appeal this court must determine the correctness of the decree below.

Summary of Bill.

Omitting nonessential parts, and also, for the moment, omitting paragraph 10, we summarize the allegations of the bill as follows: The plaintiff gave the defendant three notes, for $1,000 each, with interest. One note only is paid.

The consideration for these notes was a contract or bond, whereby the defendant agreed to convey to the plaintiff by warranty deed, clear of incumbrances, two lots of land in Bridgewater. The conveyance is required to be made at the request of the plaintiff, "after the payment of said three thousand dollars, before or at the time the same shall become due." The contract further provides that the plaintiff is "to have possession of said premises until he shall have failed to perform the condition of this bond."

The plaintiff, as authorized by the contract, entered into possession, by consent of the defendant moved a building from one lot to the other, "expended large sums of money in moving, fitting up. and repairing and furnishing the said building," and leased it to the United States government to be used as a customs house.

At the time of making the contract the defendant did not own the lot upon which such building has been placed. One Mrs. McMullin has notified the plaintiff that she owns the property and has forbidden him to exercise any ownership over it.

All these facts are alleged in the bill and admitted by the demurrer.

The above epitomizes the essential parts of the bill, except the tenth paragraph, which we consider further on in this opinion.

No Case Shown by Summarized Facts. This summary discloses no case requiring the application of either an equitable or legal remedy.

It describes a contract, but sets forth no breach of it.

The defendant agreed to convey the property upon payment of the notes, but they have not been paid. A contract whereby one agrees to convey, in the future, property which at the time of making the contract he does not own, is neither illegal, reprehensible, nor unusual.

Even if there had been a breach, no equitable remedy is indicated by the facts above recited. An injunction is prayed for, but no imperious necessity is shown, and no irreparable damage threatened; Avoidance of multiplicity of suits is suggested, but plainly this ground of equitable jurisdiction is not applicable.

Tenth Paragraph—Fraud.

The tenth paragraph of the bill, however (not included in the above summary), alleges fraud, which is the "most ancient foundation of equitable jurisprudence." Hartshorn v. Eames, 31 Me. 97; Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 144, 77 A. 698.

In this paragraph of the bill it is alleged that the "defendant illegally, and with intent to defraud the plaintiff, falsely represented to him that he was the owner of the land." This allegation the demurrer, for all purposes of this appeal, admits.

In considering the appeal, we are bound to treat as admitted the charge that the defendant falsely represented himself to be the owner of the land, and that he did it with intent to defraud the plaintiff.

Thus the defendant admits all the elements of fraud, in any case required to be proved, except rescission and restituton, and except that the plaintiff, in entering into the contract, relied upon the fraudulent representations to his detriment.

If fraud, with all its elements, is shown, the plaintiff is entitled to have the contract Rescinded. This is peculiarly an equitable remedy. Under his prayer for general relief he is entitled to have his notes canceled and returned to him. Courts of law have no machinery to accomplish this result. There is, therefore, no plain, adequate, and complete legal remedy.

"One of the prominent heads of equity jurisdiction, founded upon the peculiar remedy, is where the rescission, cancellation, and delivery up of agreements, securities, or deeds is sought on the ground of fraud." Clark v. Robinson, 58 Me. 138.

Moreover, even if there be a plain, adequate, and complete legal remedy, equity gives relief in case of fraud. In such cases, legal and equitable remedies are concurrent, subject to certain exceptions.

In fraud cases "equity has jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the injured parties have a remedy at law, or whether such a remedy will be effective, or whether the loss for want of such an equitable remedy is irreparable." Trask v. Chase, 107 Me. 144, 77 A. 698.

It is chapter 175 of the Laws of 1874 that amends the then existing statute, so as to give an equitable remedy in all "other" cases where there is not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. But, inasmuch as relief in case of fraud is by the unamended statute provided for, without qualification or limitation, it is not one of the "other" cases referred to in the amendment.

"This is but an addition to the previous specifications. * * * The limiting clause applies only to the additional jurisdiction, * * * and in no respect affects that given before. Thus this court has, by force of the statute, full equity jurisdiction in cases of fraud, limited only by the usage and practice of chancery courts, * * * concurrent with courts of law or exclusive of them," with some exceptions, to wit, "'cases of warranties, misrepresentations, and frauds on the sale of personal property,' and other like cases, in which there is no prayer for rescinding the contract." Taylor, v. Taylor, 74 Me. 589.

The opinion next above cited then uses this language equally applicable to the instant case:

"It is very evident that this case does not come within any of the exceptions mentioned, or any others which can take it out of equity jurisdiction."

Granting that equity gives relief when fraud is proved or admitted, it may be urged that the bill in this case is demurrable for the reason that it contains no express allegation that the plaintiff relied upon the defendant's representations, and none that the plaintiff, before filing the bill, put the defendant in statu quo, or offered to do so.

Reliance upon Representations Not Alleged.

There is in paragraph 10 no explicit averment that the plaintiff relied upon, believed, or was influenced by the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations. But such reliance may, we think, fairly be inferred from other parts of the bill, especially paragraph 7.

The demurrer sets forth want of equity merely. It is therefore a general demurrer.

If the demurrer had been special, and had specified this...