Masterson v. Brody, 111035
| Docket Number | 111035 |
| Decision Date | 29 September 2022 |
| Citation | 196 N.E.3d 927 |
| Parties | Mark MASTERSON, Administrator, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Zachary BRODY, et al., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Law Office of John T. Forristal and John T. Forristal, Rocky River, for appellants.
Gallagher Sharp LLP, Mark A. Greer, and Shane A. Lawson, Cleveland, for appellees.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
{¶ 1} Mark Masterson, as Administrator of the Estate of Phil Masterson ("Masterson"), Ayako Hobbs, Georgiann Masterson, Kevin Masterson, Mark Masterson (personally), Matt Masterson, James Masterson, and Molly Barz (collectively "the Estate") appeal the trial court's decision granting partial summary judgment upon all claims against PMJ Properties, Inc., Island Club Property Owners Association, and Equity Trust Co. f/b/o Paul Michael Jeris (collectively "Island Club"). Although not parties to this appeal, Zacchary Brody, Cameron Parris, Clifton Knoth, and Matt Brotzki (collectively "tortfeasors")1 were alleged to be involved in the misconduct causing Masterson's death. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} This is one of three appeals from the underlying civil litigation arising from the death of Phil Masterson on the Island Club's property in 2011 where he was beaten and left to die by the tortfeasors.
In the other two appeals, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 111043 and 111048, two individual tortfeasors appealed from a jury verdict awarding damages based on their involvement in the killing and attempted cover-up of Masterson's death. The primary aggressor, Zachary Brody, pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter, and Parris was convicted of a misdemeanor relating to the attempted concealment of the crime. In light of the pending appeals against the parties directly involved in Masterson's death, the recitation of the facts relevant to this appeal will be brief and narrowly focused on the issues presented in this appeal, which primarily deal with the legal question of whether the landowners out of possession of the property have a duty to prevent another from attacking a third party. The parties’ sole dispute relates to a question of law as to whether a duty arose under general tort principles. Any facts related to the killing itself are for background information to better understand the legal principles at play in this case and are not to be construed as binding on any other aspect of this case.
{¶ 3} Masterson and the tortfeasors separately vacationed in Put-in-Bay over the Labor Day weekend in 2011. The tortfeasors rented a privately owned cabin from the Island Club. Each of the separate entities comprising the Island Club had separate responsibilities. The cabin was owned by Equity Trust, which employed PMJ Properties to manage the property and the rentals. There are several cabins or properties within the same development, and all are separately owned and managed. Island Club Property Owners Association managed and maintained the common area of the development, including sporadically providing a security person whose primary function was to facilitate the calling of law enforcement officers should the need arise.
{¶ 4} Masterson was drinking with the tortfeasors at their rental cabin on the night of Masterson's death and remained on the tortfeasors’ rented property through their permission, although the scope of that permission was disputed at trial. After drinking throughout the waning hours of the evening, Masterson and the tortfeasors began arguing, leading to a physical confrontation in which Masterson was severely injured. Masterson was moved to the woods near the cabin while he was still alive. He died sometime the next day. After the criminal trials, the Estate filed a civil wrongful death action against the tortfeasors and the Island Club.
{¶ 5} In the complaint, the Estate advanced several claims against the Island Club, all sounding in tort: (1) common law negligence (failure to exercise ordinary care to protect Masterson or provide security personnel as alleged in Counts I, II, and III); (2) wrongful death (based on the tortious conduct as alleged in Count VII); and (3) negligent hiring or supervision of the security personnel (as alleged in Count VIII). The remaining counts were unrelated to the Island Club or failed to assert stand-alone claims: Counts IV and V only involved claims against the tortfeasors, and Count VI pertained to a loss of consortium claim that is a derivative claim to the underlying negligence claims advanced against the Island Club.2
{¶ 6} Upon the Island Club's motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the Island Club owed no duty to Masterson, and judgment was entered in the Island Club's favor upon all claims. The Estate appealed, raising a single assignment of error in which the Estate claims "[t]he trial court erred by granting Defendants PMJ Properties, Inc., Island Club Property Owners Association, and Equity Trust Company's f/b/o Paul Michael Jeris joint motion for summary judgment."
{¶ 7} Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo, and appellate courts apply the same standard as the trial court. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Review of summary judgment is governed by the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56. Argabrite v. Neer , 149 Ohio St.3d 349, 2016-Ohio-8374, 75 N.E.3d 161, ¶ 14. Summary judgment is appropriate only when "[1] no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, [2] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and [3] viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach a conclusion only in favor of the moving party." Id. , citing M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls , 134 Ohio St.3d 65, 2012-Ohio-5336, 979 N.E.2d 1261, ¶ 12. Appellate courts provide no deference to the trial court's decision and independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
{¶ 8} In order to " ‘maintain a wrongful death action on a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty owing to plaintiff's decedent, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) proximate causation between the breach of duty and the death.’ " Estate of Ridley v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities , 102 Ohio St.3d 230, 2004-Ohio-2629, 809 N.E.2d 2, ¶ 14, quoting Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr. , 39 Ohio St.3d 86, 92, 529 N.E.2d 449 (1988). " ‘The existence of a duty is a question of law for a court to decide, even if resolving that question requires the court to consider the facts or evidence.’ " A.M. v. Miami Univ., ––– Ohio St.3d ––––, 2017-Ohio-8586, 88 N.E.3d 1013, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.), quoting Martin v. Lambert , 2014-Ohio-715, 8 N.E.3d 1024, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.). The Estate's negligence-based tort claims all fall under the same umbrella — each of the alleged tort claims requires the Estate to demonstrate that Island Club either owed a duty to prevent the tortfeasors from causing injury to Masterson or owed a duty to protect Masterson under Ohio law. The question to be answered, therefore, is whether a special relationship exists between the Island Club and either the tortfeasors or Masterson that gives rise to a duty to act.
{¶ 9} At the onset, we must recognize the Estate's attempt to muddle the tort analysis. According to the Estate, the Island Club owed a duty to protect Masterson as an invitee or a social guest on the property under the principles established for resolving premises-liability claims. Premises-liability claims generally arise from unsafe and defective conditions of an improvement to real property. See R.C. 2305.131 ; Wilson v. Durrani , 164 Ohio St.3d 419, 2020-Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448, ¶ 30 ; Westfield Ins. Co. v. Hunter , 128 Ohio St.3d 540, 2011-Ohio-1818, 948 N.E.2d 931, ¶ 25 (). The Estate's citations to authority all demonstrate this concept: Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 313, 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996) (); Shump v. First Continental-Robinwood Assocs. , 71 Ohio St.3d 414, 644 N.E.2d 291 (1994) (); Ray v. Ramada Inn N. , 171 Ohio App.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-1341, 869 N.E.2d 95, ¶ 1 (2d Dist.) (); Andler v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. , 670 F.3d 717, 721 (6th Cir. 2012) ().
{¶ 10} The entrant's status on the property (as an invitee or social guest, licensee or trespasser) is a reference to the relationship between the possessor of land and the entrant. Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc. , 122 Ohio St.3d 120, 2009-Ohio-2495, 909 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 10, citing Gladon at 315, 662 N.E.2d 287. When the negligence occurs in the context of a premises-liability action, the first inquiry is the relationship between the entrant and the landowner because that establishes the scope of the duty of care owed. Shump at 417, 644 N.E.2d 291 ; see also Donnelly v. Berea , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108753, 2020-Ohio-2722, 2020 WL 2079209, ¶ 13, citing Dysart v. Estate of Dysart , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2009 CA 24, 2010-Ohio-1238, 2010 WL 1138929, ¶ 39.
{¶ 11} The Estate's claims against the Island Club do not arise from a theory of premises liability. See, e.g., Estate of Ciotto v. Hinkle , ––– Ohio St.3d ––––, 2019-Ohio-3809, 145 N.E.3d 1013, ¶ 26 (6th...
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