Masterson v. Sheahan

Citation186 S.W. 524
Decision Date15 May 1916
Docket NumberNo. 17277.,17277.
PartiesMASTERSON et al. v. SHEAHAN et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; George H. Shields, Judge.

Suit in equity by Katie Masterson and others against Margaret Sheahan and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded, and case dismissed.

T. J. Rowe, Thos. J. Rowe, Jr., and Henry Rowe, all of St. Louis, for appellants. Collins, Barker & Britton and Boaz B. Watkins, all of St. Louis, for respondents.

WALKER, J.

This is a suit in equity to set aside a deed. Upon a trial in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis a judgment was rendered for plaintiffs, from which defendants have appealed. The deed in question was executed September 16, 1911, by Mary J. Mitchell to Margaret Sheahan, and conveyed a lot of ground on Cote Brilliante avenue in said city for $1 and other valuable considerations. Mary J. Mitchell died intestate in the city of St. Louis October 10, 1911, leaving as her sole heir her son George Masterson, who died intestate in said city October 16, 1911. The plaintiff Katie Masterson is the widow of said George. The other plaintiffs, Nora and Charles Studdert, brother and sister, are, respectively, the niece and nephew of said Mary J. Mitchell. John J. Sheahan is the husband of the defendant Margaret Sheahan, the grantee in the deed. For several years prior to the execution of the deed in controversy Mary J. Mitchell and her son George Masterson had lived on the premises described in the deed. The latter was separated from his wife, Katie Masterson, and had been for more than 20 years prior to his death, and they had no living children. For some time before the deed was made Mrs. Mitchell, who was well advanced in years, and her son, who had reached middle age, were in feeble health, and certain witnesses for the plaintiffs state that the mind of the former was so impaired as to render her incapable of transacting any business understandingly. The petition pleaded lack of consideration, undue influence, and the mental incapacity of the grantor at the time of the making of the deed. The trial court found that the testimony of the witnesses for plaintiffs was ample to sustain the issues; hence the judgment. The sufficiency of this testimony is therefore the clearly defined issue for our determination. To solve it satisfactorily it becomes necessary to review all of the relevant facts in evidence.

Mrs. Mitchell had delusions about a son John, who had died 5 years before the making of the deed in controversy. This son's death had occurred under such circumstances that the religious organization of which she was a member had denied him what is termed a Christian burial. Being a devout churchwoman, this fact was a source of much mental unrest and worry, which grew more acute with her advancing years and impaired health. These delusions consisted principally in the belief that she held communications with her son, and that he often attempted to escape, whether in the body or the spirit is not shown, from the dead with whom he had been buried. Other testimony is that she was much addicted to drink, and that her mind had been impaired as a consequence thereof; that she lived in an unclean, unsanitary, and destitute manner with her son George, although possessed of sufficient means, arising from her rents, to enable her to live differently; further, that her conversation showed a lack of continuity of thought; and, when under the influence of liquor she would talk almost entirely of her dead son John and her four former husbands; that she offered to give the property in controversy to different witnesses, and said that the Sheahans had a mortgage on it, but she had paid it off. Other instances of conversation and conduct too trivial to be enumerated are detailed by witnesses for plaintiffs as proof of her mental irresponsibility. During all the time covered by these witnesses' testimony, Mrs. Mitchell, until physically unable so to do, transacted the ordinary affairs incident to her everyday life. This is not expressly stated, except by the doctor who attended her subsequent to the date of the deed, but it is fairly inferable from all of the facts. She exchanged social visits as often, at times, as once a week with the women who were witnesses for plaintiffs, and she and her son had drinking bouts with the witness named W. R. Elliott and his wife when they spent the evening with Mrs. Mitchell and her son, which occurrences were not infrequent. The doctor referred to, who attended her during the last weeks of her life, testifying as to her physical and mental weakness, says she was able to conduct her own affairs in so far as it was necessary for her to ascertain and pay the bills due him for each visit; that payment for his last visit was not made by her because he could not give her change for the large bill she offered him. Her source of income was from the rent of several rooms occupied by different persons who have testified for plaintiffs. If she had other sources of revenue, they are not shown. It is not an unreasonable deduction, and one authorized by other facts, that as this rent became due it would be paid by tenants to her, and it was from this fund she must have paid the physician. So much for her capacity to transact ordinary business. None of the witnesses for the plaintiff testify that they saw her the day the deed was made to Mrs. Sheahan, or for several days prior or subsequent thereto.

Mrs. Sheahan, the grantee in the deed, commenced working for Mrs. Mitchell at the age of 11 years, and continued in her employ for 14 years thereafter, or until her marriage to her codefendant. Her social intercourse with Mrs. Mitchell continued during the succeeding years of the latter's life. They saw each other frequently, and Mrs. Mitchell declared at different times that she would convey the property subsequently described in the deed to Mrs. Sheahan if the latter would agree to take care of her and her son George during their lives. On these conditions the deed was made. Mrs. Sheahan, in testifying to her compliance with her part of the agreement, said in substance:

"I sent Mrs. Mitchell and her son George to the hospital; and I went to her home and cleaned out her house and bought new beds, and had a man go out there to clean out the place. I bought two new beds, a new one for her and her son, and had everything nice and clean for her when she came home from the hospital. She would not stay but one week in the hospital, because she said she wasn't sick enough to be in a hospital; and I had everything ready for her, in perfect order, when she came home; but George stayed at the hospital until he died, and I paid the expenses of the hospital and of fitting up the house. The nurse who took care of her after she come back from the hospital did not come to me for her pay. She was Mrs. Mitchell's niece."

The facts connected with the making of the deed are succinctly stated by Charles J. Daily, a real estate agent who prepared, and as a notary took, the acknowledgment of the deed. The substance of his testimony is as follows:

"About the 14th day of September, 1911, or two days before the deed was made, Mr. John J. Sheahan telephoned me to go out to a certain number on Cote Brilliante avenue; that parties there wanted to see me about preparing some papers. I went and there met Mrs. Mitchell, her son George, and Mrs. Sheahan. The latter introduced me to Mrs. Mitchell and her son. Mrs. Mitchell explained that she desired to transfer the property in which they were living to Mrs. Sheahan, and I asked her if she had an old deed from which I could get the description. She asked her son George, or Georgie, as she called him, to get a certain box. He brought from the next room a tin cash box. In this box there were a number of written instruments, and after looking over them, they selected one which contained the required description, and handed it to me as being the last instrument they had bearing on the property. George Masterson selected the deed and handed it to me in the presence of his m...

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34 cases
  • Clark v. Skinner
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 19, 1934
    ...were not invalid because of inadequate consideration. Studybaker v. Cofield, 159 Mo. 616; 2 Tiffany (2 Ed.), p. 1624, sec. 438; Masterson v. Sheahan, 186 S.W. 526; Wimpey v. Ledford, 177 S.W. 303; Ellis v. McNally, 177 S.W. 659; Wells v. Kuhn, 221 S.W. 19; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 287;......
  • Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 13, 1932
    ...of the mental incapacity of the deceased. (d) Mental capacity. The degree of mentality required to make a gift is very slight. Masterson v. Sheahan, 186 S.W. 526; Reaves v. Pierce, 26 S.W. (2d) 611; 28 C.J. 626. The burden rested upon plaintiff to prove mental incapacity. Chadwell v. Reed, ......
  • Clark v. Skinner
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 19, 1934
    ...were not invalid because of inadequate consideration. Studybaker v. Cofield, 159 Mo. 616; 2 Tiffany (2 Ed.), p. 1624, sec. 438; Masterson v. Sheahan, 186 S.W. 526; Wimpey v. Ledford, 177 S.W. 303; Ellis McNally, 177 S.W. 659; Wells v. Kuhn, 221 S.W. 19; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 287; Go......
  • Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 13, 1932
    ...of the mental incapacity of the deceased. (d) Mental capacity. The degree of mentality required to make a gift is very slight. Masterson v. Sheahan, 186 S.W. 526; Reaves v. Pierce, 26 S.W.2d 611; 28 C. J. 626. burden rested upon plaintiff to prove mental incapacity. Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo......
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