Mastin v. Halley

• Decision Date: 31 October 1875
• Parties: JOHN J. MASTIN, Defendant in Error, v. GEORGE HALLEY, et al., Plaintiffs in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

61 Mo. 196

JOHN J. MASTIN, Defendant in Error,

v.GEORGE HALLEY, et al., Plaintiffs in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1875.

Error to Jackson County Circuit Court.

Gage & Ladd, for Plaintiffs in Error.

I. Defendant Halley had no notice as to Lawton's possession, for he never took possession. And the record of the deed to Lawton afforded no notice of infirmities in the

instrument. If it showed anything it showed an unexecuted consideration.

II. Plaintiff has no equity. The houses which Lawton was to erect should have been completed within a reasonable time. It is now too late to comply with that agreement. As affecting the principal matters involved in this case, see Delavan vs. Duncan, 49 N. Y., 485; Hamilton vs. Elliott, 58 Kan., 385.

F. M. Black, for Defendant in Error.

I. The conveyance from Hubbard to Lawton, although not sealed, passed all his interest in equity, and is good so as to bind the land conveyed in the hands of the grantor, his heirs and purchasers with notice; and a court of equity will decree the title to the holder of the equitable title, or what would be the same, correct the conveyance. (Wadsworth vs. Wendell, 5 Johns. Chy., 225; 2 Sugd. Vend. & P., t. p. 547, b. p. 1023; McClurg vs. Phillips, 49 Mo., 316.)

II. The instrument is in the form of a deed, and purports to be signed and sealed, and on its face shows the mistake. (Wadsworth vs. Wendell, 5 Johns. Chy., 225.)

III. The registration laws apply to every instrument in writing whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be affected in law or equity--and this instrument, though not sealed, was properly recorded, and the record thereof imparts notice. (R. C. 1855, vol. 1, p. 358, § 16; Id., §§ 40, 41, 42, p. 364; McClurg vs. Phillips, 57 Mo., 214.)

IV. The recitation that the deed is also made “in consideration of the agreement of the party of the second part, to erect or cause to be erected a house, and the lots” conveyed manifestly has nothing to do with this suit. The deed without dispute was intended to operate at once. There is a money consideration specified. And this suit is not between the parties to that agreement. From the lapse of time it is evident that was settled between the parties, and if not, these parties have nothing to do with it.SHERWOOD, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

In 1855, one Chester Hubbard, being the owner of lots 6 and 7, in block No. 2, of Hubbard's addition to the town of Kansas, (now Kansas City) in consideration of the sum of $200, the receipt of which was acknowledged, “and in consideration of the agreement of the said party of the second part (one Asa Lawton) to erect or cause to be erected one certain building on the lots,” conveyed them to Lawton by an instrument which, but for its lack of seal, would have been a deed, with the usual covenants of warranty, and perfect in all its parts. Within five months from the date of this imperfect instrument, Lawton, by a similar instrument, with the exception that it was in all respects a complete deed, conveyed the same lots to one Kersey Coates. The consideration expressed in the last named instrument to have been received, was $250, together with the further consideration recited in terms almost identical with those employed as above mentioned, and absolutely the same in effect. Hubbard signed his name by an attesting witness to this deed. In 1861, Hubbard died. In the following year Coates conveyed the undivided one-half of the lots to Mordicia Lawrence and the residue to John Simmons, who subsequently dying, Coates, as the executor of his last will, conveyed the portion of his testator in the lots to the plaintiff in June, 1868, for the sum of $3,800, and on the same day Lawrence conveyed his share of the premises to the plaintiffs, for $1,500. Hubbard left at his death two heirs, one of whom, a minor, is a defendant in this suit. The other heir, J. Reuben Hubbard, in 1870, conveyed to defendant (Halley) the undivided one-half of the lots in suit. Possession of the premises was never taken by Lawton, nor by those claiming under him, nor did he or they erect a building of any description on the lots. “A small temporary shanty” was put up in the year 1872, but by whom does not appear.

This proceeding was instituted in 1871, for the purpose of divesting the legal title out of the defendants and vesting it in plaintiff, on the ground of mistake made by Hubbard in failing to affix a seal to the conveyance to Lawton, and that Halley bought with full notice of the mistake and with the desire to cheat and defraud plaintiffs, with whose rights he was well acquainted at the time of his purchase. The chief allegations of the petition, as to notice, etc., were denied in the answer of the defendant (Halley), and the usual answer was made by the guardian ad litem of the minor heir.

I.

As it was not shown at the trial that Halley was a purchaser for a valuable consideration, it is needless to discuss the sufficiency of the certificate of acknowledgment appended to the instrument executed by Hubbard to Lawton, for only those standing in the attitude of purchasers for value, can take advantage of defects of the nature alluded to. (Bishop vs. Schneider, 46 Mo., 472, and cases cited.)

II.

The doctrine that courts of equity will interpose for the relief of a vendee who has taken a defective conveyance, and will compel the vendor and his heirs and all other persons claiming under him by the act of the law, although without notice, and even persons claiming as purchasers for valuable consideration, if with notice, to make good the conveyance, is one which has found in those courts frequent recognition, and been illustrated by a long line of decisions far too numerous for citation. (2 Sugd. Vend., p. 1022; Wadsworth vs. Wendell, 5 Johns. Ch., 224, and cases cited.)

In the case last cited the defective conveyance was imperfect in the precise particular that the one before us is, i. e., it only lacked a seal, and Chancellor Kent held that as the instrument was in form a deed with the single exception that it lacked a seal, and as it concluded with the words, “In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal,” the intention to affix the seal was apparent, and the omission to do so a mere mistake, concerning which redress could be afforded. And it was accordingly decreed in that case that the subsequent purchasers, with notice, should convey the legal title to the first purchaser. And were the matter of mistake and its correction by any appropriate decree which would accomplish the desired object and procure the relief sought, the single element in the case at bar, no hesitation could be felt while complying with the plaintiff's prayer, since it will be readily seen that the defendants are not in position to resist successfully a decree based alone upon the above stated grounds. There are, however, other ingredients in this case which must exert a controlling influence in the endeavor to arrive...