Mata v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 02 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. B058555,B058555
• Citation: 20 Cal.App.4th 141,24 Cal.Rptr.2d 314
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Manuel MATA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 314

24 Cal.Rptr.2d 314

20 Cal.App.4th 141

Manuel MATA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B058555.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Nov. 2, 1993.

Michael P. Stone, Stone & Feeley and Larry J. Roberts, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

James K. Hahn, City Atty., Frederick N. Merkin, S. Asst. City Atty., and Timothy A. Hogan, Asst. City Atty., for defendants and respondents.

ARLEIGH M. WOODS, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Manuel Mata, a Los Angeles police officer, was terminated after being charged in disciplinary proceedings with six counts of misconduct and found guilty of two counts. In this action he sought and obtained a writ of mandate directing respondents City of Los Angeles and its chief of police to reinstate him. He also sought compensatory damages for violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The trial court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the balance of appellant's case is barred by the relief granted in the writ proceedings. This appeal is taken from that order. ¹ For reasons explained more fully in this opinion, we conclude the trial court erred in granting the motion and reverse.

I APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT

The controlling pleading in this case is entitled "Amended Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate; Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief and Other Extraordinary Relief." This lengthy, verbose and argumentative pleading alleges that appellant was a highly respected Los Angeles police officer with "expertise in Cuban gangs, Cuban organized crime, and Cuban drug trafficking" who became suspected of drug trafficking and contract murder because his "clothes, gold, cars and home were beyond the reach of a policeman's salary[.]" Appellant alleged that he was charged in disciplinary proceedings with six counts of misconduct. ² On the last day of a fourteen-day hearing on these charges, the board of review requested the chief of police to add a new count charging appellant with unbecoming conduct "by improperly associating with Based upon these factual allegations, appellant alleged six "counts" in which he requested relief. Counts 1, 2 and 3 sought a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 ³ directing respondents to vacate their findings and decisions with respect to the allegations of which appellant was found guilty and restore his employment. Counts 4, 5 and 6 sought injunctive relief and damages for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

                someone who had been the subject of one of [his] criminal investigations."   Appellant was found guilty of this newly alleged count 7 and count 3 (making a false statement to Internal Affairs about ownership of a gun), and removed from his job on March 1, 1989, retroactively effective to December 2, 1988.  Appellant alleged that the evidence did not demonstrate that he intentionally lied about the gun and that the improper association charge was time barred and violative of his substantive due process right to fair warning of prohibited conduct.  Appellant further alleged that he was removed from his job for the "innocent and lawful conduct of associating off-duty with another person of Cuban nationality" in violation of his constitutional right of freedom of association
                

II

THE WRIT RELIEF

On September 14, 1990, Superior Court Judge John Zebrowski issued a five-page minute order ordering respondents to "reconsider the penalty" imposed upon appellant.

The court set forth six reasons for this order: (1) the "puzzling" fact that an investigation which spanned several years uncovered no substantial evidence of wrongdoing or impropriety on the part of appellant; (2) the conclusion that count 7 was time barred and also violated the due process requirement of notice; (3) the fact that one ground argued in support of the decision to terminate (disclosing confidential informant information to a former criminal suspect) had not been charged; (4) the improbability that "an objective [Board of Review], scrupulously excluding from consideration the matters noted in items 1 and 2 above, would recommend outright dismissal on the basis of count 3 alone (which involved no illegal conduct)"; (5) the finding that the evidence on count 3 demonstrated, at most, that appellant was "careless" in his storage or disposition of a gun purchased by him over twenty years ago and made "rather innocuous," inaccurate or misleading statements on this issue; and (6) the court's "[q]uery" whether the discipline imposed was traceable to the uncharged offense of revealing confidential information, rather than to the charges which were filed against appellant.

The court concluded: "The writ of mandate is granted directing the respondent to reconsider the penalty in view of the court's finding that the record supports at most that petitioner's memory of his disposition of the handgun was deficient due to

his carelessness in the handling and disposition of the handgun."

III RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On February 25, 1991, respondent City of Los Angeles moved for summary judgment asserting that "causes of action 1 through 4 have been adjudicated by the Los Angeles Superior Court on September 14, 1991, and the remaining causes of action 4 through 6 [for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983] have no merit." Respondent argued that appellant had not been deprived of his due process rights, and that appellant's civil rights claims were barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion and the doctrine of election of remedies.

The evidence in support of respondents' motion consisted of respondents' admissions that appellant was charged, on December 2, 1988, with six counts of misconduct and relieved from duty, that a board of rights hearing commenced on January 13, 1989, and ended on February 24, 1989, and that the board of rights found appellant guilty on counts 3 and 7 and not guilty on all others. Additionally, respondents submitted orders of Police Chief Daryl Gates demonstrating that appellant was removed from police service as a penalty for the two sustained charges of misconduct, but reinstated following the ruling on appellant's writ petition, compensated retroactively and suspended for sixty days.

In opposition to the motion, appellant argued that "defendants' application of the law to the facts ... [was] erroneous[.]" Appellant pointed out that respondents did not address his claim that to the extent his discharge was predicated upon count 7, it violated his rights to freedom of association, substantive due process and equal protection. Appellant also urged that trial was necessary to determine the additional damages he suffered beyond loss of earnings. In his memorandum of points and authorities, appellant argued, inter alia, that collateral estoppel was his sword, not respondents' shield, and that the doctrine of election of remedies was inapplicable. The evidence filed by appellant in opposition to respondents' motion consisted of requests for judicial notice of documents filed as exhibits to respondents' motion and of a section of the Los Angeles Police Department Manual. Appellant filed his own declaration for the purpose of demonstrating additional damages which he suffered as a result of his removal from the police department. ⁴

Respondents' motion was granted on the ground that since appellant successfully pursued state writ of mandate proceedings to gain job reinstatement, he could not seek damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in federal court and was collaterally estopped from seeking such relief in state court. The court explained in a minute order: "Case authority indicates that the Federal Remedy under Section 1983 is not intended to offer supplemental tort remedy for victims of State Government blunders who receive due process and a remedy at law in the state where the wrong occurred. [p] See: Defendant's Points and Authorities[;] also see: Cohen Vs. City of Philadelphia 736 F.2d 81 (3rd Cir.1984) cited in Punton Vs. City of Seattle at 805 Fed. Reporter [sic ] 2d page 1382."

IV STANDARD OF REVIEW

We first address the standard of review. Contrary to respondents' suggestion, there is no presumption of the correctness of an order granting summary judgment, nor do we presume that the evidence supports the judgment. As this court explained in Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 212, 285 Cal.Rptr. 717: " 'The reviewing court In this case none of the facts relevant to determination of the motion for summary judgment is disputed. Therefore, our task is to determine, de novo, whether appellant is barred, as a matter of law, from prosecuting his causes of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 by virtue of the fact that he has been reinstated on his job in response to the writ of mandamus issued in this case.

conducts a de novo examination to see whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law or whether there are any genuine issues of material fact....' [Citations.]" (Fn. omitted.) (Quoting Enterprise Leasing Corp. v. Shugart Corp. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 737, 744, 282 Cal.Rptr. 620.)

V DISCUSSION

Appellant had several procedural options available to him. He could have first sought judicial review of the board's decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and then, after prevailing in that proceeding, filed a separate state action for compensatory damages for wrongful discharge (see Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 235, 245, 244 Cal.Rptr. 764 [holding that to the extent plaintiff can prove he suffered emotional distress from an improper termination, nothing in an earlier administrative proceeding ordering his reinstatement prevents him from doing so] ), or he could have followed his victory in the...