Matalka v. Lagemann

Decision Date29 January 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84AP-546,84AP-546
Citation486 N.E.2d 1220,21 OBR 143,21 Ohio App.3d 134
Parties, 21 O.B.R. 143 MATALKA, Appellant, v. LAGEMANN et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. Defamation may be defined as a false publication causing injury to a person's reputation, or exposing him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting him adversely in his trade or business. Whether a publication is defamatory on its face (defamatory per se ), or is capable of being interpreted as defamatory (defamatory per quod ), are questions of law for the trial court.

2. Where allegedly defamatory statements, which analogize a person's conduct to the commission of criminal offenses, are such that no reasonable person reading them could conclude that the speaker had inferred that the person at whom the statements were aimed had indeed committed the offenses, the statements will not be actionable.

John G. Neal, Columbus, for appellant.

Riley, Ucker & Lavinsky and Timothy J. Ucker, Columbus, for appellees.

NORRIS, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, George A. Matalka, appeals an order of the trial court sustaining defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss his lawsuit. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendants, a weekly Gahanna newspaper and its editor, had libeled him by publishing editorials and cartoons.

Plaintiff was chairman of the committee seeking the recall of the Mayor of Gahanna, and it is apparent from the publications that the defendants were opposed to the recall effort. It is also apparent from the case file that those favoring recall had indicated to Gahanna's city council the willingness of the group to pay the extra cost that would be incurred by the city if it were to opt for a special election, as opposed to waiting and submitting the question to the electorate at the general election.

Excerpts from the first editorial, printed under the headline "Selling of a Vote," follow:

"There is something obscene about a group or individual trying to buy an election date from the city council. But that is what one individual indicated he was going to try to do.

"It is repugnant to the orderly governing of the city, and to its image, that some people believe that such decisions might be up for bid, or that city council members would be influenced by payment.

"Exchanging money for goods, services for favorable decisions is buying and selling. In effect, this offer is a bribe.

"If one group wants an early election and bids $7,000, what bid should another group make for a later election date? Would the higher bidder win?

"If the city sets a precedent of selling decisions--for whatever purpose--it is not difficult to see where it could lead. * * *

" * * *

"The election date should have been set on the merits of the situation and not on funding. If council had decided an earlier date were merited, the city could have found sufficient funds to hold it on an earlier date.

"But there were not then, nor are there now, any overriding factors to set an early election date.

"Voters should have sufficient time to make up their minds in an orderly, rational manner. All of us should be especially skeptical of those who want to hasten the process and particularly of any group which would propose to buy haste."

This editorial was accompanied by a cartoon depicting the city council in session, with the presiding officer conducting an auction in which the highest bidders obtained favorable decisions from the council. The presiding officer is portrayed as auctioning several decisions, and as saying, relative to the recall election issue:

"OK, folks, Gahanna City Council is ready to accept bids. First item, recall elections date. [W]e've got $7,500 bid, any other offers? I got sevenfive sevenfive sevenfive going gone. Sold to the man in the white shoes for $7,500. * * * "

The second editorial is reproduced below, in full:

"The offer to pay the city $7,500 to schedule an earlier election date, and the indication some of the council members would be willing to go along with it, reminds us of a story. A prostitute was before the judge for taking money for certain favors from a client.

" 'I don't see anything wrong with it, your honor,' she said. 'I wanted to do it anyway.'

"We definitely separate those who are free from those who charge. We might not condone the free, but we make charging illegal.

"Council was required to set a date. To discuss changing the date in return for money puts the council and the recall committee in another category. The fact that some council members might want to do it anyway does not mitigate the situation."

This editorial was also accompanied by a cartoon. In it, a lady intended by the artist to represent a prostitute, and labeled "City Council," is depicted talking to a man labeled "Recall Committee." In her voice balloon are the words, "Don't get me wrong, I'm not that kind of girl. I enjoy it. Let's see your money," and in his, "Well hi there. I've got some bucks."

Filed along with defendants' motion to dismiss were stipulations entered into by the parties with a view to narrowing the questions before the trial court.

Plaintiff raises two assignments of error which are interrelated:

"1. The trial court erred in that the evidence must be construed most strongly in favor of the appellant.

"2. The trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that no liability for libel can be imposed upon the appellees in this case."

Although the Constitution protects and preserves the right to a free press, the exercise of that right is subject to the condition that, if the publisher negligently publishes defamatory statements about a private individual, the publisher is liable for damages. Embers Supper Club, Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 22, 457 N.E.2d 1164. Freedom of the press does not grant to a publisher the right to defame another.

Defamation is a false publication causing injury to a person's reputation, or exposing him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting him adversely in his trade or business. Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole (1911), 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735; Newbraugh v. Curry (1831), Wright 47.

As the result of the stipulations, the trial court was required to address only the single issue of whether the materials published by defendants were defamatory. Whether a publication is defamatory on its face (defamatory per se), or, if not, whether a publication is...

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