Matasy v. Youngstown Ohio Hosp. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 July 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 16 MA 0136,16 MA 0136
• Citation: 95 N.E.3d 744,2017 Ohio 7159
• Parties: Albert MATASY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. YOUNGSTOWN OHIO HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

95 N.E.3d 744

2017 Ohio 7159

Albert MATASY, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.YOUNGSTOWN OHIO HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC, Defendant–Appellee.

NO. 16 MA 0136

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, Mahoning County.

Dated: July 31, 2017

Atty. Martin S. Hume, Martin S. Hume Co., L.P.A., 6 Central Square, Suite 905, Youngstown, Ohio, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Atty. Emily R. Yoder, Atty. Frank G. Mazgaj, Hanna, Campbell & Powell LLP, 3737 Embassy Parkway, Akron, Ohio 44333, for Defendant–Appellee.

JUDGES: Hon. Carol Ann Robb, Hon. Cheryl L. Waite, Hon. Mary DeGenaro

OPINION

ROBB, P.J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff–Appellant Albert Matasy appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court granting summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Defendant–Appellee Youngstown Ohio Hospital Company, LLC. Appellant contends the employer discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability when it denied his request to extend his previously-extended leave of absence and terminated his employment. For the following reasons, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

{¶ 2} Appellant was employed at Northside Medical Center from 1974 until his termination on January 16, 2013. He filed a complaint against the employer in 2015, alleging disability discrimination under state and federal law. (He was 57 years old at the time of his discharge and also alleged age discrimination, but he abandoned this claim.) He alleged he was terminated due to a disability, he was denied a requested reasonable accommodation (an extension of his leave of absence), and the employer failed to engage in the interactive process by making a good faith effort to assist him in seeking reasonable accommodation for his disability.

{¶ 3} Appellant's complaint asserted he was disabled due to surgical replacement of his right hip and both knees. He said the hospital was aware of his disability and had a record of his condition, pointing to a series of surgeries beginning in 2009. An affidavit of the employer's human resources employee incorporated a summary of Appellant's history of leaves and light duty since November 2009. (Stone Aff.). His right knee was replaced in March 2010. (Matasy Depo. 13). His right hip was replaced in January 2011. (Matasy Depo. 20, 39).

{¶ 4} On October 5, 2012, Appellant stopped working due to his need for left knee replacement surgery, which was performed on November 7, 2012. He initially asked for a leave of absence until November 7, 2012. The employer granted the request, extending the end date to November 30, 2012, which exhausted Appellant's Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") balance (due to prior leaves that year). A collective bargaining agreement with Appellant's union stated: "you may apply for an unpaid General Medical Leave of Absence" if FMLA and paid time off is exhausted; in order to request this leave, medical certification must be provided; medical certification forms are available in human resources and must be turned in before the leave begins; the maximum leave is six months (including prior FMLA or paid time off); and "the company cannot guarantee reinstatement to any position following a General Medical Leave."¹

{¶ 5} Appellant filed a leave of absence form requesting an extension of his leave of absence based on his physician's note seeking extended leave until December 31, 2012. Appellant requested "General Medical Leave (Non–FMLA)." The request for an extension of leave until December 31, 2012 was granted by the employer.

{¶ 6} Appellant then sought another extension of his leave of absence. He provided a note from his physician dated December 27, 2012, stating he may return to work on February 11, 2013 with no restrictions. Appellant's affidavit states he provided the physician's note to the employer "on or about" December 27, 2012. However, Appellant signed the leave of absence request form on January 3, 2013. (His physician signed paperwork for long term disability insurance through Sun Life Assurance Company on January 4, 2013.)² Appellant's January 3, 2013 request for extension of leave was denied on January 16, 2013, and Appellant was terminated in a letter.

{¶ 7} On March 13, 2013, Appellant signed an affidavit attesting his "disability substantially impairs his ability to perform the major life functions of walking, bending, kneeling, and working." He also claimed the hospital's termination letter falsely said it was necessary to terminate him in order to maintain staffing levels. The human resources employee testified the employer did not hire a new patient care associate ("pca") to replace Appellant. (Stone Depo. 55). She did not know how his position was staffed. (Stone Depo. 53). Appellant explained he worked on the heart floor with patients after open heart surgery, covering approximately 20 patients, and there was only one pca on duty at a time. (Matasy Depo. 29–20, 43).

{¶ 8} The human resources employee explained a pca transports patients and assists in patient care, helping patients bathe and get in and out of bed. (Stone Depo. 13–14). During her deposition, the job description for a pca (Exhibit E) was introduced. The job description shows the position involves patient care duties, housekeeping within surgery, and activities involving supply and inventory. The work demands included: lifting 36 to 50 pounds occasionally, 18–25 pounds frequently, and 6–10 pounds constantly; occasional climbing, crawling, reaching, and operation of a foot pedal; and frequent crouching, kneeling, and twisting. Appellant testified he was on his feet the majority of the time at work. (Matasy Depo. 43, 57–58). He said he transported patients, answered call lights, helped patients get in and out of bed (for instance from a wheelchair or chair into the bed or from the bed to the toilet), took vital signs, and ran errands such as retrieving supplies from the supply and pharmacy departments. (Matasy Depo. 31–33). He was given light duty work for a time after his March 2010 right knee replacement and after his January 2011 right hip replacement. (Matasy Depo. 39).

{¶ 9} The employer filed a motion for summary judgment contesting the third element required for a prima facie case of disability discrimination by claiming Appellant could not safely and substantially perform the essential functions of the job by his own admissions. The employer noted Appellant's history of FMLA leaves and its history of permitting non-FMLA leaves and extensions, including the extension granted after the last knee surgery. The employer noted Appellant was unable to return to work on the date of termination and was still unable to perform the job at the time of the January 2016 deposition, where he testified his hip and knees would preclude him from performing the job. (Matasy Depo. 64–65).

{¶ 10} At deposition, Appellant further explained he could not kneel due to his knee surgery, was unable to lift heavy objects because of his hip, and could not walk even short distances due to his hip. (Matasy Depo. 11–13, 19). A few weeks prior to deposition, Appellant filed an application for Social Security Disability due to his hip, knees, and feet. (Matasy Depo. 10). He had a bunion surgery and joint fusion on his little toe in February 2015 and surgery on his great toe in June 2014 (which was still presenting as a bone non-union). (Matasy Depo. 14–16).

{¶ 11} Appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to summary judgment. He noted the employer's motion did not dispute he was disabled or he suffered an adverse employment action due in part to his disability. He said the employer failed to engage in the interactive process, citing to his deposition testimony where he said he never spoke to anyone at the hospital between the time of his knee surgery and the time of his termination. (Matasy Depo. 56–57). Appellant argued the employer should have reasonably accommodated him with an extended leave rather than terminating him, noting the collective bargaining agreement permitted General Medical Leave after FMLA expired. Appellant stated that at the time of his termination, the hospital had no reason to believe he would not be able to return to work on February 11, 2013. He claimed there was evidence he could have performed his duties if he had been given the extended leave. He pointed out his physical condition when he applied for Social Security Disability, nearly three years after the termination, was not dispositive.

{¶ 12} Appellant attached his answers to interrogatories. He also attached a selection of discovery documents he produced in response to the employer's request for production of documents. For instance, there was an ADA questionnaire he signed on March 26, 2013, wherein he answered that he was able to perform his job duties with or without an accommodation and said the accommodation he requested was for additional leave. In addition, he attached his handwritten notes on his job search (utilized for unemployment compensation). He believed the job search and the statement that he volunteered at a hospital beginning in October 2013 was evidence he could have performed his job duties. He noted he returned to his regular duties after his prior surgeries (sometimes after a light duty assignment).

{¶ 13} The employer filed a reply arguing Appellant produced no evidence he could have returned to work with the requested accommodation, i.e., there was no evidence he could have performed his job on February 11, 2013. It was pointed out the December 27, 2012 physician's note was merely a projection and was not proper summary judgment evidence. The employer claimed the issue of whether Appellant could have returned to work on February 11, 2013 required expert testimony. The employer emphasized Appellant admitted he could not return on January 16, 2013 and said, in a March 13, 2013 affidavit, his disability "substantially impairs" his ability to kneel, walk, bend, and work . It was concluded the information relied on by Appellant in the...